STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v
.
Gaston County
No. 98 CRS 25427
ETHEL HAZELINE BRIDGES
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by R. Marcus Lodge, Special
Deputy Attorney General, for the State.
Andrew C. Blumenberg for defendant.
McGEE, Judge.
Ethel Hazeline Bridges (defendant) was indicted on 7 August
2000 for common law robbery. The evidence for the State at trial
tended to show that Shan McAteer (Ms. McAteer) and defendant were
co-workers at the Pharr Yarns plant in McAdenville, North Carolina.
Ms. McAteer was employed at the plant from 1994 to 1998. Ms.
McAteer and defendant worked beside each other at the plant and Ms.
McAteer described their relationship as a "regular co-worker
relationship." According to Ms. McAteer, the relationship between
her and defendant began to change when a man named Philip Roberts
(Mr. Roberts), who was also employed at the plant, began speaking
to Ms. McAteer daily. Ms. McAteer testified that on several
occasions, defendant said things to Ms. McAteer about Mr. Robertsthat Ms. McAteer described as "hostile, little small, short
conversations[.]"
As Ms. McAteer was leaving the plant around 10:00 p.m. on 12
February 1998, she placed her leather handbag on a railing outside
the door in order to get her keys out of it. Her head was down as
she looked for her keys and someone ran up to her, grabbed the top
of her hair, and pulled her over the railing. Ms. McAteer fell on
the pavement and her attacker began kicking her. Ms. McAteer
looked up and saw defendant was her attacker. During the
altercation, Ms. McAteer's handbag fell to the ground. Ms. McAteer
testified that she and defendant were not struggling over the
handbag. Defendant kicked Ms. McAteer about ten times and hit her
all over her body with her hands. Ms. McAteer stated that she saw
her handbag lying on the ground and started to get it but "it was
closer to [defendant] and [defendant] got it." Ms. McAteer
testified that defendant never verbally asked her for the handbag.
Ms. McAteer testified that she went back inside the plant and
from a window saw defendant grab her handbag and get into a
friend's car with it. Ms. McAteer told her supervisor what
happened and called the police. Ms. McAteer testified she never
found her handbag, which contained her keys, her payroll check,
work items and some cash.
A McAdenville police officer testified that he responded to a
call at Pharr Yarns on 12 February 2000 around 10:35 p.m. He
interviewed Ms. McAteer, who was obviously upset. He corroborated
Ms. McAteer's testimony that another employee had fought with her,taken her handbag and left. He testified he searched the area but
was unable to locate Ms. McAteer's handbag.
At the close of the State's evidence, defendant moved to
dismiss the common law robbery charge, which was denied by the
trial court. Defendant testified that she had a problem with Ms.
McAteer because they both liked Mr. Roberts. Defendant testified
that she left work around 10:00 p.m. on the night of the
altercation. She went outside to the parking lot where Ms. McAteer
called her a "black B[.]" Defendant went over to Ms. McAteer,
grabbed her and "jerked her down and . . . proceeded in kicking
her." Defendant testified that two of her friends intervened, and
she then got into her sister's car. Defendant testified that she
"believe[d] that [Ms. McAteer] had her [handbag]" and that she did
not take Ms. McAteer's handbag. Defendant testified that as she
was fighting Ms. McAteer, her "attention wasn't on [the handbag.]"
At the close of all the evidence, defendant renewed her motion
to dismiss the common law robbery charge, which the trial court
denied. The jury found defendant guilty and the trial court
imposed an intermediate punishment with a suspended sentence of
twelve to fifteen months imprisonment. Defendant appeals.
Defendant assigns as error the trial court's denial of her
motion to dismiss the charge of common law robbery arguing that
the evidence was insufficient to sustain the charge.
Upon review of a denial of a motion to dismiss, we must
determine "whether there is substantial evidence: 1) of each
essential element of the offense charged . . . and 2) ofdefendant's being the perpetrator of the offense. If each of these
requirements are satisfied, the motion is properly denied." State
v. Richardson, 308 N.C. 470, 474, 302 S.E.2d 799, 802 (1983). See
also State v Duncan, 136 N.C. App. 515, 520, 524 S.E.2d 808, 811
(2000). Substantial evidence is defined as "such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion." State v. Smith, 300 N.C. 71, 78-79, 265 S.E.2d 164,
169 (1980). All evidence is to be viewed in a light most favorable
to the State, and the State must have the benefit of all reasonable
inferences from the evidence. State v. Baker, 338 N.C. 526, 558
451 S.E.2d 574, 593 (1994).
"Common law robbery is the felonious, non-consensual taking of
money or personal property from the person or presence of another
by means of violence or fear." State v. Smith, 305 N.C. 691, 700,
292 S.E.2d 264, 270, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1056, 74 L. Ed. 2d 622
(1982). See also State v. White, 142 N.C. App. 201, 204, 542
S.E.2d 265, 267 (2001). As our Supreme Court stated in State v.
Davis, 325 N.C. 607, 630, 386 S.E.2d 418, 430 (1989), cert. denied,
496 U.S. 905, 110 L. Ed. 2d 268 (1990),
[t]o withstand a motion to dismiss a
common-law robbery charge, the State must
offer substantial evidence that the defendant
feloniously took money or goods of any value
from the person of another, or in the presence
of that person, against that person's will, by
violence or putting the person in fear.
The "felonious taking" required for common law robbery, like
that of armed robbery, is an intent to permanently deprive the
owner of the owner's property for the use of the taker. State v.Smith, 268 N.C. 167, 169, 150 S.E.2d 194, 198 (1966). This intent
may be found where a person without any right to property "takes
property (1) with the specific intent wholly and permanently to
deprive the owner of it, or (2) under circumstances which render it
unlikely that the owner will ever recover his property[.]" Id. at
173, 150 S.E.2d at 200.
The means of violence or fear used "must precede or be
concomitant with the taking, or be so joined by time and
circumstances with the taking as to be part of one continuous
transaction." State v. Olson, 330 N.C. 557, 566, 411 S.E.2d 592,
597 (1992).
In the case before us, defendant argues that the evidence
shows that the alleged taking of Ms. McAteer's handbag was merely
an "afterthought" and thus "separate and distinct" from the
physical confrontation between defendant and Ms. McAteer.
Defendant argues that "at the time force was used by [] defendant
there was [no] intention of depriving the victim of her handbag."
As support for her argument, defendant claims that she did not ask
for or demand Ms. McAteer's handbag at any point during the
altercation, nor was there ever a struggle over the handbag.
Further, defendant argues that it was only after Ms. McAteer
"retreated to the inside of the mill, after the physical
confrontation was over, [that defendant was] accused of taking the
handbag from the middle of the parking lot."
Defendant argues that her case is similar to State v.
Richardson, 308 N.C. 470, 302 S.E.2d 799 (1983), wherein theevidence showed that the victim was physically attacked by the
defendant. In order to protect himself from the defendant during
the altercation, the victim threw his duffel bag at the defendant.
The evidence at trial showed that the defendant's threats and use
of violence were not made in order to induce the victim to separate
with his property; thus, the defendant did not have the intent to
deprive the victim of his property. It was only sometime later,
after the victim left the scene, that the defendant looked through
the victim's duffel bag and discovered the victim's wallet. In
Richardson, our Supreme Court found that the evidence presented was
insufficient to sustain the charge of armed robbery because there
was "no evidence that defendant's threats or use of violence
preceded or were concomitant with the taking of the victim's
property." Id. at 477, 302 S.E.2d at 803.
We find Richardson is distinguishable, because unlike in
Richardson, the events in this case were part of a continuous
transaction. Defendant physically separated Ms. McAteer from her
handbag by hitting and kicking her and continued to use force and
violence until Ms. McAteer fled back into the plant. Thus, as the
State argues, "[h]aving eliminated any interference from the
victim, [] defendant immediately took physical possession of the
[handbag] and removed it from the scene." Further, defendant took
Ms. McAteer's handbag with such force and violence that it was
unlikely Ms. McAteer would recover her handbag, thus establishing
defendant's intent to deprive Ms. McAteer of her property.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State,we find the record here satisfies the substantial evidence standard
for denying defendant's motion to dismiss the charge of common law
robbery. We find no error by the trial court and affirm the trial
court's denial of defendant's motion to dismiss.
No error.
Judges WALKER and BIGGS concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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