FRANK S. EASTON,
Employee,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. N. C. Industrial Commission
I.C. No. 743687
J.D. DENSON MOWING COMPANY,
Employer-Appellant,
and
GREAT AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY,
Carrier-Appellant,
Defendants.
Scudder & Hedrick, by Samuel A. Scudder, for the plaintiff-
appellee.
Teague, Campbell, Dennis & Gorham, L.L.P., by Bruce A.
Hamilton and Melissa R. Garrell, for the defendants-
appellants.
WYNN, Judge.
This appeal by J.D. Denson Mowing Company and its workers
compensation insurance carrier, Great American Insurance Company,
arises from an Industrial Commission award in favor of Frank S.
Easton. The Commission found that Easton fell off a tractor while
working for J.D. Denson Mowing Company and suffered injury, and
that:
15. On 6 September 199[7], three days afterthe accident, plaintiff was seen at Wake
Medical Center with complaints of neck and
chest wall pain and bilateral tingling in his
hands. A CT examination and x-rays were done
and the physician diagnosed a fracture of the
spinous process at C-7.
16. Plaintiff had follow-up treatment at UNC
Hospital. He has been treated by Joe Minchew,
M.D., an orthopaedic surgeon, and by two
neurologists, Alan Finkel, M.D., and Albert
Hinn, M.D. Dr. Minchew referred plaintiff to
Dr. Hinn after the results of an MRI scan of
his neck were abnormal. Dr. Hinn began
treating plaintiff on 6 February 1998.
Plaintiff complained of pain in his neck,
tingling and numbness in his extremities, cold
feet, diminished control of his fingers, and
weak legs.
17. Dr. Hinn diagnosed plaintiff with
neuropathy, a disease of the nerves, and with
[] myelopathy, a disease of the spinal cord.
Plaintiff's neuropathy was a pre-existing
alcohol-related condition which was not cause
by his fall but was probably aggravated by the
fall and the resulting myelopathy.
Plaintiff's fractured vertebrae, spinal cord
lesion, and myelopathy were caused by the 3
September 1997 injury by accident.
. . .
19. At the time of the hearing before the
deputy commissioner, plaintiff suffered from
numerous medical conditions, including a
fracture of his spinous process, an abnormal
lesion of the cervical spinal cord, an
unsteady gait, depression, and a combination
of neuropathy and myelopathy. Plaintiff had
not reached maximum medical improvement and
has not been released to return to any type of
work.
20. Due to injury by accident, plaintiff was
unable to work in any employment from 3
September 1997 and continuing.
The Commission concluded:
1. On 3 September 1997, plaintiff sustained
an injury by accident arising out of and inthe course of his employment with defendant-
employer . . . .
Accordingly, the Commission awarded plaintiff disability benefits
and medical expenses compensation. Defendants appeal arguing that
no competent evidence supports the Commission's finding of fact 17
that Easton's neuropathy “was probably aggravated by the fall” on
3 September 1997; and that therefore, that finding cannot support
the Commission's conclusion that Easton's injury arose out of his
course of employment. We disagree.
Generally, from an appeal from an opinion and award of the
Commission, we address two questions: (1) Whether there is any
competent evidence to support the Commission's findings of fact;
and (2) Whether the Commission's findings of fact support its
conclusions of law. See Lowe v. BE&K Construction Co., 121 N.C.
App. 570, 573, 468 S.E.2d 396, 397 (1996). The Commission is the
fact finding body, id., and its findings, if supported by any
competent evidence, are conclusive on appeal even where the
evidence may support a contrary finding. See Bailey v. Sears
Roebuck & Co., 131 N.C. App. 649, 652-53, 508 S.E.2d 831, 834
(1998). “[T]he Commission is the sole judge of the credibility of
the witnesses as well as how much weight their testimony should be
given.” Id. at 653, 508 S.E.2d at 834.
Where expert medical testimony is required to establish
causation, “the expert testimony need not show that the work
incident caused the injury to a 'reasonable degree of medical
certainty.'” Peagler v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 138 N.C. App. 593, 599,
532 S.E.2d 207, 211 (2000) (quoting Cooke v. P.H.Glatfelter/Ecusta, 130 N.C. App. 220, 224, 502 S.E.2d 419, 422
(1998)). Rather, there must be some competent evidence “that the
accident at least might have or could have produced the particular
disability in question.” Click v. Freight Carriers, 300 N.C. 164,
167, 265 S.E.2d 389, 391 (1980) (emphasis added).
The Commission found as fact that Easton's fractured
vertebrae, spinal cord lesion, and myelopathy were caused by the 3
September 1997 accident, and that Easton's neuropathy, although
preexisting, was “probably” aggravated by the fall and resulting
myelopathy. Dr. Hinn testified in his deposition on 19 November
1998 that it was his presumption that Easton's fall on 3 September
1997 was the cause of Easton's fractured vertebrae. Dr. Hinn
further testified that Easton's fall from the tractor was the “best
explanation” for his spinal cord lesion, and that it was “quite
possible” that Easton sustained a myelopathy as a result of the
fall. Dr. Hinn also testified that he considered it “a distinct
possibility and perhaps quite likely” that Easton's myelopathy was
a source of his symptomology after the fall. According to Dr.
Hinn, it was a “distinct possibility” that Easton's spinal cord
injury caused a myelopathy that increased the amount of Easton's
disability or symptomology, or increased his likelihood of
problems.
We conclude that competent evidence in the record supports the
Commission's finding of fact 17. Defendants do not challenge the
remaining findings of fact; nonetheless, we conclude that those
findings of fact are likewise supported by competent evidence inthe record. Furthermore, we conclude that the Commission's
findings support its conclusions of law. Accordingly, the
Commission's 13 October 2000 opinion and award is,
Affirmed.
Judges TIMMONS-GOODSON and THOMAS concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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