STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v
.
Wake County
No. 98 CRS 98313
ALONZO JUREON GARDNER
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney
General Thomas D. Zweigart, for the State.
Mary Boyce Wells for defendant.
McGEE, Judge.
Alonzo Jureon Gardner (defendant) was convicted on 23 February
2000 of trafficking in cocaine. Defendant was sentenced to thirty-
five to forty-two months in prison. Evidence presented by the
State at trial tended to show that Detective D.R. Johnson
(Detective Johnson) of the Raleigh Police Department went to 311
Freeman Street, Raleigh, North Carolina, to serve a warrant on
defendant on 21 October 1998. Detective Johnson knocked on the
back door of the house at 311 Freeman Street. When defendant saw
Detective Johnson, defendant ran to the front door of the house,
where he saw a second police officer. Defendant then climbed out
a window and ran down the street. The two officers found defendant
hiding behind another house and arrested him. Detective Johnson found a key to 311 Freeman Street in
defendant's pocket, and Detective Johnson went back to the house at
311 Freeman Street to secure the premises. Later that day, based
on Detective Johnson's observations, police officers obtained a
search warrant for 311 Freeman Street. When the officers searched
the house, they found a shoe box containing rocks of crack cocaine
and papers belonging to defendant. Officers found a bag in a
closet containing 61.2 grams of cocaine, several handguns, and
approximately $900.00 in cash.
Defendant moved to dismiss the charge of trafficking in
cocaine at the close of the State's evidence, which was denied.
Defendant presented no evidence. Defendant renewed his motion to
dismiss at the close of all evidence, which the trial court denied.
The jury convicted defendant of trafficking in cocaine. Defendant
appeals.
Defendant argues the trial court erred in denying defendant's
motion to dismiss the charge of trafficking in cocaine for
insufficiency of the evidence. Defendant contends the State failed
to present substantial evidence of defendant's actual or
constructive possession of the cocaine. We disagree.
Defendant argues the State did not present sufficient evidence
that defendant had the "power and intent to control" the cocaine
that was found in the house at 311 Freeman Street.
A trial court properly denies a motion to
dismiss if there is substantial evidence that
the offense was committed and that the
defendant committed it. In determining
whether there is evidence sufficient for a
case to go to the jury, the court mustconsider the evidence in the light most
favorable to the State, and the State is
entitled to every reasonable inference to be
drawn from the evidence.
State v. Neal, 109 N.C. App. 684, 686, 428 S.E.2d 287, 289 (1993)
(citations omitted).
The State did not present evidence that defendant was in
actual possession of the drugs, or that he had ever had actual
possession of the drugs. However, the State relied on the doctrine
of constructive possession. With constructive possession, "the
State is not required to prove actual physical possession of the
controlled substance[.]" Id. "Constructive possession exists when
a person, while not having actual possession, has the intent and
capability to maintain control and dominion over a controlled
substance." State v. Williams, 307 N.C. 452, 455, 298 S.E.2d 372,
374 (1983). If a controlled substance is found on premises under
the control of a defendant, "this fact alone may be sufficient to
overcome a motion to dismiss and to take the case to the jury."
Neal, 109 N.C. App. at 686, 428 S.E.2d at 289.
Defendant argues the State did not prove he had exclusive
control over the premises where the drugs were found. The State
offered physical evidence that was discovered in the house at 311
Freeman Street, including release documents from prior criminal
charges against defendant and insurance documents containing
defendant's name. Defendant also had a key to the 311 Freeman
Street house in his pocket when he was arrested. There was no one
else in the house at the time officers found defendant there.
Even if we agreed with defendant's argument that the Statefailed to present sufficient direct evidence that defendant was
exclusively in control of the premises at 311 Freeman Street, the
State can establish constructive possession of an illegal substance
by "an additional inquiry into whether there were incriminating
circumstances from which a jury might infer possession." Neal, 109
N.C. App. at 687, 428 S.E.2d at 290. "[E]vidence from which a jury
might infer that defendant was fleeing from the area where illegal
drugs were found is [a] circumstance supporting an inference of
constructive possession." Id.; see also State v. Harrison, 93 N.C.
App. 496, 499, 378 S.E.2d 190, 192 (1989) (holding that evidence
that the defendant was found in a closed room standing "next to a
window under circumstances from which the jury could infer that it
had just been broken" was sufficient for a jury to infer the
defendant was attempting to escape or dispose of a controlled
substance, which in turn was sufficient to establish constructive
possession of the drugs).
In the case before us, even if the State failed to directly
show defendant had exclusive "control of the premises," the State
did present other incriminating evidence which, under Neal and
Harrison, established constructive possession. Officers knocked on
the door of the house at 311 Freeman Street. When defendant
realized there were police officers at both doors of the house, he
climbed out the window. The officers chased defendant and caught
him hiding behind another house. Defendant fled from the house
where the illegal drugs were found, and his attempted escape is a
circumstance supporting an inference of constructive possession. Harrison, 93 N.C. App. at 499, 378 S.E.2d at 192. The evidence in
this case would permit a jury to infer defendant's possession of
cocaine. We overrule defendant's assignment of error. The trial
court did not err in denying defendant's motion to dismiss.
No error.
Judges GREENE and CAMPBELL concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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