STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v. Mecklenburg County
Nos. 98 CRS 44944-46,
RONALD EDWARD MONTEITH 98 CRS 47953-47955
98 CRS 50660-50670
98 CRS 50677-50680
99 CRS 117653-117656
00 CRS 111117
00 CRS 111122
00 CRS 111126
00 CRS 111129
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General
Susan R. Lundberg, for the State.
The Law Firm of Charles L. Alston, Jr., by Charles L. Alston,
Jr., for defendant appellant.
McCULLOUGH, Judge.
On 26 April 1999, defendant was indicted for several drug-
related felonies. On 13 March 2000, defendant was indicted on
several counts of being an habitual felon. The cases were tried at
the 9 October 2000 Criminal Session of Mecklenburg County Superior
Court.
The State presented evidence at trial which tended to show the
following: In 1998, Officer Craig M. Conger of the Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Police Department was assigned to the Vice andNarcotics Bureau, an undercover unit whose purpose was to
investigate and interdict street drug sales. In January 1998, an
undercover operation was started in the Lincoln Heights
neighborhood. Officer Conger's task was to purchase drugs from
anyone selling on the street.
On 9 June 1998, Officer Conger came into contact with
defendant. Officer Conger was driving an unmarked, black Nissan
Pathfinder, and defendant yelled out for him to slow down.
Defendant then pointed Officer Conger towards the dead end of a
street, walked over to the side door of the car, and asked what
Officer Conger wanted. Officer Conger told defendant he wanted
sixty dollars. Defendant walked away, went through some houses,
came back about a minute later and sold Officer Conger three rocks
of an off white rock like substance that [Officer Conger] believed
to be crack cocaine. Officer Conger gave defendant his name, and
defendant identified himself as Runt.
After purchasing the drugs, Officer Conger called the cover
unit, the uniformed patrol officers who served as backup to
Officer Conger, and told them he purchased from Runt. Officer
Conger was given the name of defendant, Ronald Monteith. A short
time later, Officer Conger looked at photographs and was able to
identify defendant as the same person who sold him the drugs.
Officer Conger also identified defendant in court as the person who
sold him drugs.
Officer Conger purchased drugs from defendant again on 10, 18,
and 30 June 1998, and also on 2, 27 and 28 July 1998. After eachpurchase, Officer Conger took the alleged crack cocaine to the
property control bureau of the police department, filled out a
property sheet and evidence envelope detailing the complaint
number, the date and time of the transaction, the name Ronald
Monteith, Runt as the name of the case, and then signed and dated
it. The contents of the envelopes were later submitted for
chemical analysis and determined to contain cocaine.
Defendant was convicted of twenty-five different drug-related
felonies and four counts of being an habitual felon and sentenced
to four consecutive terms of 116 to 149 months' imprisonment.
Defendant appeals.
Defendant's sole argument on appeal is that there was
insufficient evidence to support the verdicts. Specifically,
defendant contends that the evidence is lacking because the State
did not produce any corroborative evidence which supported Officer
Conger's identification of defendant as the drug dealer in the
crimes charged.
In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the trial court must view
all of the evidence, whether competent or incompetent, in the light
most favorable to the State, giving the State the benefit of every
reasonable inference and resolving any contradictions in its
favor. State v Cross, 345 N.C. 713, 717, 483 S.E.2d 432, 434
(1997)(quoting State v. McCullers, 341 N.C. 19, 28-29, 460 S.E.2d
163, 168 (1995)). The trial court is to determine that a
reasonable inference of defendant's guilt may be drawn from the
evidence, then the jury decides whether 'the facts satisfy thembeyond a reasonable doubt that defendant is actually guilty.' Id.
(quoting State v. Murphy, 342 N.C. 813, 819, 467 S.E.2d 428, 432
(1996)).
After careful review of the record, briefs and contentions of
the parties, we find no error. In prosecuting a criminal charge
it is the State's burden to establish the following two
propositions: '(1) that a crime has been committed; and (2) that
it was committed by the person charged.' State v. Lively, 83 N.C.
App. 639, 642, 351 S.E.2d 111, 114 (1986) (quoting State v.
Chapman, 293 N.C. 585, 587, 238 S.E.2d 784, 786 (1977)), disc.
review denied, 319 N.C. 461, 356 S.E.2d 10 (1987). Here, defendant
does not dispute that crimes were committed, but contends that
there was insufficient evidence identifying him as the perpetrator
of the crimes. However, Officer Conger clearly identified
defendant as the perpetrator, and defendant presented no evidence
to contradict or explain Officer Conger's identification. See id.
Thus, in the light most favorable to the State, a reasonable mind
could conclude from the evidence that defendant was the perpetrator
of the drug offenses. Accordingly, we hold the trial court did not
err in denying defendant's motion to dismiss the charges.
No error.
Chief Judge EAGLES and Judge TIMMONS-GOODSON concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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