IN THE MATTER OF:
Wake County
THOMAS RYAN KOPACH, No. 00 J 657
Juvenile.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General
Bertha L. Fields, for the State.
Law Offices of James R. Ansley, by Robert J. Clements, for the
respondent appellant.
TIMMONS-GOODSON, Judge.
In a juvenile petition filed 13 September 2000, the State
charged thirteen-year-old Thomas Ryan Kopach ("respondent") with
communicating threats in violation of section 14-277.1 of the North
Carolina General Statutes. The matter was heard on 27 November
2000, at which time the State presented evidence tending to show
the following: The victim, a twelve-year-old male, and respondent
both attended North Garner Middle School in Wake County, North
Carolina. The victim testified that on 31 August 2000, as he was
entering the school with a friend, respondent “cut in front of meand said he was going to 'f' me up.” The victim testified that
respondent spoke “in a deep tone of voice[,]" “like in a voice when
you want - - when you're trying to get revenge.” The victim
explained that he was afraid of respondent because he had to pass
through respondent's neighborhood when he walked to and from
school, and “because [respondent] had brought the dog with him
before, brought his dog and waited at the corner, waited for me.”
Respondent denied that the incident occurred and further
testified that the victim had confronted him on several prior
occasions. Respondent testified that in one incident, the victim
took his keys and teased him. On another occasion, respondent
stated that the victim approached him in health class and called
him the “'n' word for some reason.”
Respondent's father, Thomas Russell Kopach ("Kopach"), also
testified. Kopach agreed that the relationship between respondent
and the victim had been “an ongoing problem” and that he had walked
his son to school many times “[f]or his safety.” Kopach testified
that he confronted the victim once and told him that, “[i]f you
don't leave my son alone, you are going to have big problems, real
big problems.” On cross-examination, the following exchange
occurred:
Q: Mr. Kopach, you were pretty upset about
your son being charged in this incident,
weren't you?
A: As upset as any parent.
Q: Did you tell Officer McIver that you were
going to call David Duke - -
. . . .
Q: -- and that you were a member of No Fear?
. . . .
Q: Did you tell Officer McIver that, sir?
A: I may have.
Q: Did you call David Duke?
A: No, I haven't.
. . . .
Q: Mr. Kopach, did you tell Officer McIver
that you could sure use some money in your
pockets and that Officer McIver could tell
everybody that, that you could use a million
dollars?
. . . .
A: No, I did not tell Officer McIver that. I
think you have the words twisted there.
On 27 November 2000, the trial court adjudicated respondent a
delinquent juvenile for communicating threats. On 18 December
2000, a disposition order was entered placing respondent on
supervised probation for six months. Respondent appeals.
______________________________________________________
The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred by
allowing the State to conduct certain cross-examination of
respondent's father. For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm
the trial court.
Respondent contends the trial court erred in overruling his
objections to the State's cross-examination of Kopach.
Specifically, respondent objected to Kopach's testimony regarding
his plans to contact David Duke, his membership in David Duke'sgroup, the "National Organization for European-American Rights" or
“No Fear,” and Kopach's statement that he could “use a million
dollars.” Respondent argues that the statements were irrelevant,
unduly prejudicial and constituted reversible error. Respondent
asserts that the statements were made by his father, not by him,
and were therefore not probative as to whether he threatened the
victim. Respondent further argues that the statements were
inflammatory and only served to destroy the credibility of
respondent and his father.
After careful review of the record, briefs and contentions of
the parties, we affirm the trial court. “In a bench trial, the
court is presumed to disregard incompetent evidence.” In re
McMillon, 143 N.C. App. 402, 411, 546 S.E.2d 169, 175, disc. review
denied, 354 N.C. 218, 554 S.E.2d 341 (2001). “Where there is
competent evidence to support the court's findings, the admission
of incompetent evidence is not prejudicial.” Id. In the instant
case, there is no indication that the trial court relied on the
controverted testimony in determining that respondent communicated
threats. Moreover, there is sufficient evidence to support the
trial court's findings. The victim identified the respondent in
court and testified that respondent threatened to “f” him up.
Donald Plush, a witness to the incident, corroborated the victim's
testimony. The victim further testified that the threats caused
him to be afraid. Thus, even assuming arguendo that the cross-
examination was improper, respondent has failed to show any
prejudice to his case. We therefore overrule respondent'sassignment of error and affirm the trial court.
Affirmed.
Chief Judge EAGLES and Judge McCULLOUGH concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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