A decision without a published opinion is authority only in the case in which such decision is rendered and should not be cited in any other case in any court for any other purpose, nor should any court consider any such decision for any purpose except in the case in which such decision is rendered. See Rule of Appellate Procedure 30 (e)(3).

NO. COA01-555

NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS

Filed: 19 March 2002

SUZANNE HILL, FORD GOUDEY,
MARY SUSAN SCHMIDT, DORA DEAN
BALLOU, A.C. BLAKENSHIP,
STEVE A. BROCK, JEAN BURROWS,
CAROLYN B. BYRD, D.S. BYRD,
JOSEPH CANOSA, J.L. CASTLEBERRY,
MARGIE R. CASTLEBERRY, ALBERT
CHAPPELL, JEAN CHAPPELL,
LEWIS CLARKE, BRENDA DAVIS,
J. CHRIS DAVIS, JOSEPHINE DAVIS
JIM FRENCH, ANNE B. GILLIAM,
JAMES GILLIAM, ANN J. GOLD,
W.A. GOLD, EMILY GRAHAM, LUKE
GRUBER, PRICE TAYLOR HARRISON,
L.B. HASKINS, JAMES M. HAYWARD,
VIRGINIA C. HAYWARD, L. JARVIS
HERRING, SALLY HERRING, CLARA
INSCOE, RALPH JOHNSON, CLINTON
LEWIS, BARBARA D. MARTIN, JESSICA            Carteret County
L. MARTIN, JOSEPH McCLURE, JANIL             No. 00 CVS 797
MILLER, JOHN MILLER, GENE W.
MORRISON, HERBERT PARKIN, BARBARA
PAERL, MICHELLE S. PITTMAN,
GILBERT M. POTTER, PAT I. POTTER,
JOAN PULLEY, W. PAUL PULLEY, JR.,
ARTHUR RITTMASTER, KEITH RITTMASTER,
CAROLYN ROGERS, ROBERT F. ROSER,
DENISE ROSER, LENA RUDDER, HAZEL
SIMPSON, KERRY SINCLAIR, C.W.
STAMPER, DAWN STEWART, MACK STYRON,
VICKY THAYER, DEBORAH BOYCE TODD,
EDWIN LEE TODD, GWENDOLYN TOWLES,
THELMA P. WARD, JAMES R. WHEATLEY,
MACK WILLIS, EDITH YORK,
             Plaintiffs
v .                         
                            
MIKE TAYLOR,
                Defendant

    Appeal by defendant from order entered 17 February 2001 by Judge Jay D. Hockenbury in Carteret County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 13 February 2002.
    Pulley, Watson, King & Lischer, P.A., by W. Paul Pulley, Jr., for plaintiffs-appellees.

    Wheatly, Wheatly, Nobles & Weeks, P.A., by C.R. Wheatly, Jr. and C.R. Wheatly, III, for defendant-appellant.

    WALKER, Judge.

    Plaintiffs filed this action on 2 August 2000, seeking a judgment quieting title to certain real property located in their residential subdivision and for a declaratory judgment pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-253 declaring the validity of their right to use this property as a landing. Defendant answered and counterclaimed for a judgment declaring that he owned the real property in fee simple, or alternatively, that he had acquired title through adverse possession. Defendant also moved the trial court to dismiss plaintiffs' action for failure to join necessary parties, to order the joinder of all lot owners within the subdivision as party plaintiffs, and for summary judgment. On 17 February 2001, the trial court denied each of defendant's motions. Within its order, the trial court noted that defendant had orally withdrawn his motion for summary judgment.
    Plaintiffs have filed with this Court a motion to dismiss defendant's appeal asserting that the trial court's order is an interlocutory order from which defendant has no right to immediate appeal. We agree.
    “Interlocutory orders are those made during the pendency of an action which do not dispose of the case, but instead leave it forfurther action by the trial court in order to settle and determine the entire controversy.” Carriker v. Carriker, 350 N.C. 71, 73, 511 S.E.2d 2, 4 (1999)(internal citation omitted); see also Stevenson ex rel. Long v. Joyner, ___ N.C. App. ___, 558 S.E.2d 215 (2002). Clearly, the trial court's order denying defendant's motions is interlocutory as it is not a final judgment disposing of the case.
    The right to appeal from an interlocutory order exists provided one of two circumstances is present. The order itself must either: (1) affect a substantial right or (2) be a final judgment as to some but not all the claims or parties and be certified by the trial court as having no just reason to delay the appeal. Bartlett v. Jacobs, 124 N.C. App. 521, 477 S.E.2d 693 (1996), disc. rev. denied, 345 N.C. 340, 483 S.E.2d 161 (1997); see also N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 54(b)(1999).
    This Court has previously held that the denial of a motion to dismiss for failure to join necessary parties does not affect a substantial right and therefore is not immediately appealable. See Fraser v. Di Santi, 75 N.C. App. 654, 331 S.E.2d 217, disc. rev. denied, 315 N.C. 183, 337 S.E.2d 856 (1985); and Auction Co. v. Myers, 40 N.C. App. 570, 253 S.E.2d 362 (1979). Nevertheless, defendant maintains the trial court's failure to order the joinder of all lot owners within plaintiffs' subdivision affects a substantial right which makes his appeal on this issue appropriate.
    The determination of whether an interlocutory order affects a substantial right essentially involves a two-part analysis. Goldston v. American Motors Corp., 326 N.C. 723, 726, 392 S.E.2d 735, 736 (1990). First, “the right itself must be substantial,” and second, “the deprivation of that substantial right must potentially work injury to [the party] if not corrected before appeal from final judgment.” Id.
    
Our review of the record fails to reveal how the trial court's refusal to order the joinder of all lot owners within plaintiffs' subdivision would potentially injure defendant. Indeed, the trial court specifically stated that “if defendant wants additional parties, he should join them.” Moreover, we see nothing within plaintiffs' cause of action which would require them to join all lot owners within their subdivision. See generally Rice v. Randolph, 96 N.C. App. 112, 384 S.E.2d 295 (1989).
    We conclude the denial of defendant's request to order the joinder of necessary parties did not affect a substantial right which requires this Court's immediate attention. Furthermore, the trial court has not certified its order pursuant to Rule 54(b). Therefore, we grant plaintiffs' motion to dismiss defendant's appeal as interlocutory.
    Appeal dismissed.
    Judges HUNTER and BRYANT concur.
    Report per Rule 30(e).

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