STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v
.
Alexander County
No. 00 CRS 4161
00 CRS 4162
CHRISTOPHER WRIGHT STEPHENS,
Defendant.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General
Richard H. Bradford, for the State.
Edward L. Hedrick, IV, for defendant-appellant.
HUDSON, Judge.
Defendant appeals the revocation of his probation and the
resulting activation of his sentences. We hold that the trial
court properly revoked defendant's probation and activated his
sentences.
Defendant was convicted on 7 August 2000 of two counts of
felony larceny of a motor vehicle and sentenced to two consecutive
terms of not less than six months and not more than eight months.
The trial court suspended these sentences and placed defendant on
supervised probation for thirty-six months subject to a number of
special conditions including, but not limited to: (1) remaining at
Belle View Adult Care Home (“Belle View”), (2) complying with allrules and regulations of Belle View, (3) obtaining a substance
abuse assessment within thirty days of conviction, and (4) paying
a monthly fee to the court. On 5 October 2000, defendant's
probation officer filed a violation report alleging that defendant
had violated the terms of his probation by (1) failing to report to
the probations officer's office on a certain day, (2) failing to
obtain a substance abuse assessment, and (3) failing to comply with
the rules of Belle View. At a violation hearing on 13 November
2000, the trial court placed defendant on intensive probation with
some additional terms, including that “funds are to be with held
[sic] from the defendant's account until he can financially pay for
his assessment and treatment programs ordered by the court.” On 12
December 2000, defendant's probation officer filed a second
violation report alleging that defendant did not satisfy the
monetary conditions of his probation, that he was not able to
remain at Belle View because he failed to abide by the rules and
regulations of Belle View, and that he failed to obtain a substance
abuse assessment within the allotted time period. The trial court
found that defendant violated terms of his probation, and thereupon
revoked his probation and activated his sentences. Defendant
appeals.
On appeal, defendant raises one assignment of error: that “the
trial court committed reversible error in revoking the defendant's
probation, and activating the defendant's sentences on the grounds
that there was insufficient evidence to support or justify the
court's ruling.” First, we note that “[p]robation is an act ofgrace by the State to one convicted of a crime. It is a matter of
discretion with the trial court.” State v. Freeman, 47 N.C. App.
171, 175, 266 S.E.2d 723, 725, disc. rev. denied, 301 N.C. 99, 273
S.E.2d 304 (1980). Because probation is an “act of grace,” not a
right owed to all people convicted of crimes, a probation violation
hearing requires less formality than an actual criminal trial. See
State v. Duncan, 270 N.C. 241, 246, 154 S.E.2d 53, 57-58 (1967)
(holding that the trial court properly revoked defendant's
probation). And, because a probation revocation hearing is not a
formal criminal trial, the law does not require that the parties
follow precisely the rules of evidence. See id at 245, 154 S.E.2d
at 57.
The alleged violation by the defendant of a
valid condition upon which a sentence in a
criminal case was suspended need not be proven
beyond a reasonable doubt.
All that is required is that the evidence
be such as to reasonably satisfy the judge in
the exercise of his sound discretion that the
defendant has violated a valid condition upon
which the sentence was suspended.
State v. Robinson, 248 N.C. 282, 285-86, 103 S.E.2d 376, 379 (1958)
(citations omitted). “Judicial discretion implies conscientious
judgment, not arbitrary or willful action. It takes account of the
law and the particular circumstances of the case, and is directed
by the reason and conscience of the judge to a just result.”
Duncan, 270 N.C. at 245, 154 S.E.2d at 57 (citing Langnes v. Green,
282 U.S. 531, 541, 75 L. Ed. 520, 526 (1931)).
In probation revocation hearings, the burden of producing
evidence that the defendant violated the terms of his probationlies with the State. See State v. Tozzi, 84 N.C. App. 517, 521,
353 S.E.2d 250, 253 (1987) (holding that defendant's probation was
validly revoked based on willful violations of the terms of his
probation). Once satisfied, the burden shifts to the defendant to
prove that he had a valid excuse or was unable to comply with the
terms of the probation. See id. The State must prove that
defendant either wilfully or without lawful excuse violated a valid
condition of probation. See Robinson, 248 N.C. at 287, 103 S.E.2d
at 380. Initially, this Court required in State v. Foust, 13 N.C.
App. 382, 185 S.E.2d 718 (1972), that the trial court make an
extensive inquiry into defendant's ability to comply with the terms
of his probation. This Court, in State v. Young, clarified Foust,
explaining that even though the trial court is not required to make
extensive findings of fact, a “defendant is entitled to have his
evidence considered and evaluated.” Young, 21 N.C. App. 316, 321,
204 S.E.2d 185, 188 (1974) (ordering a new hearing in which the
court would consider the defendant's evidence and indicate this
consideration in the findings of fact). Consequently, the trial
court is required to show in its findings of fact that it has
considered defendant's evidence. See State v. Smith, 43 N.C. App.
727, 732, 259 S.E.2d 805, 808 (1979). Though they need not be
extensive, the findings of fact must support the court's finding
that defendant willfully and without lawful excuse violated his
probation. See State v. Lucas, 58 N.C. App. 141, 145, 292 S.E.2d
747, 750, disc. rev. denied, 306 N.C. 390, 293 S.E.2d 593 (1982).
In his appeal, defendant notes that he is mentally retarded,with a Wechsler Adult IQ of 66, a Slosson Intelligence Test score
of 54, an associated mental age of eight years and eight months,
and an adaptive behavior age of four years and four months. He
suffers from a number of mental and emotional illnesses and he has
been prescribed multiple medications for these illnesses. Due to
his mental and emotional limitations, defendant argues that he is
not capable of performing certain functions and, therefore, that he
did not willfully violate the terms of his probation. For example,
defendant contends that the director of Belle View, Rick Connor,
was the payee of defendant's Social Security disability income, and
that because defendant has severe mental limitations, Mr. Connor
was expected to pay defendant's court-ordered fees from this
disability income. Additionally, defendant testified that he
expected that Mr. Connor would assist him in obtaining a substance
abuse assessment, but he did not. When asked if he knew what a
substance abuse assessment was, he responded that he did not,
other than that it was a “drug thing”, and that he did not know how
to obtain one.
Although it appears from the transcript and record that
defendant was not able to meet two requirements of his probation
(obtaining a substance abuse assessment and paying court ordered
costs), the evidence indicates that defendant willfully violated
the other requirements of his probation. Defendant argues that the
evidence introduced by the State (a letter written by an employee
at Belle View) neglects to state that defendant may not return to
Belle View or to specify which rules defendant violated at BelleView. Defendant also argues that his mental limitations excuse his
behavior at Belle View and that this same behavior demonstrates
defendant's need for a special care home.
Again, we note the relaxed nature of evidentiary rules and
requirements at probation violation hearings. See State v. White,
129 N.C. App. 52, 58, 496 S.E.2d 842, 846 (1998), aff'd in part by
350 N.C. 302, 512 S.E.2d 424 (1999). It does appear from the
record that defendant was involved in an incident at Belle View, as
a result of which he left the facility. The trial court
specifically noted at the probation violation hearing that
defendant had been reported to the court earlier for not following
the rules of Belle View, and that for a second time he had not
complied with those rules. As a result, the trial court determined
that returning defendant to Belle View was not an option, and
neither side presented “a viable alternative” to incarceration for
the remainder of defendant's sentence. In the pre-printed
“Judgment and Commitment Upon Revocation of Probation” form (AOC-
CR-607), the trial court found that
[e]ach of the conditions violated as set forth
above is valid; the defendant violated each
condition willfully and without valid excuse;
and each violation occurred at a time prior to
the expiration or termination of the period of
the defendant's probation. Each violation is,
in and of itself, a sufficient basis upon
which this Court should revoke probation and
activate the suspended sentence.
Because we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in finding that defendant violated the terms of his probation
requiring him to continue residing at Belle View and to follow itsrules, we hold that the trial court's judgment revoking defendant's
probation and activating his sentences will not be disturbed on
appeal. See State v. Guffey, 253 N.C. 43, 45, 116 S.E.2d 148, 150
(1960).
Affirmed.
Judges MARTIN and THOMAS concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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