A decision without a published opinion is authority only in the case in which such decision is rendered and should not be cited in any other case in any court for any other purpose, nor should any court consider any such decision for any purpose except in the case in which such decision is rendered. See Rule of Appellate Procedure 30 (e)(3).

NO. COA01-696

NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS

Filed: 5 February 2002

IN THE MATTER OF:                     Wake County
CANDACE CARPENTER                    No. 99 J 753

    

    Appeal by juvenile respondent from orders entered 9 March 2000 by Judge Joyce A. Hamilton in Wake County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 31 December 2001.

    Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Robert C. Montgomery, for the State.

    Peter Wood for respondent-appellant.

    EAGLES, Chief Judge.

    Juvenile was adjudicated delinquent upon a finding that she knowingly possessed a counterfeit controlled substance with the intent to sell or deliver. In a 9 March 2000 disposition order, Judge Joyce A. Hamilton placed juvenile on probation for up to twelve months, subject to periods of intermittent confinement under G.S. § 7B-2506(20). Juvenile appeals.
    While conducting undercover surveillance of the intersection of Barbee and Wakefield Streets, Zebulon Police Officer Rodney Boykin saw juvenile, Warren Bunn, and Samuel Allen engage in what appeared to be a hand-to-hand drug transaction with the occupants of a blue pickup truck. Zebulon Police Sergeant Johnnie Joyce apprehended juvenile. Joyce handcuffed juvenile and told her, “Youare not under arrest. You are under investigative detention. I'm handcuffing you now for my safety and for your safety.” After asking if she was “going to jail[,]” juvenile told Joyce, “I don't have any dope. All I have is bombers.” A pat down search of juvenile's coat produced a plastic bag containing seven and one- half grams of a hard substance that Joyce believed to be crack cocaine. Subsequent tests on the substance revealed that it was not cocaine.
    Juvenile claims the trial court erred in admitting into evidence her incriminating statement made while she was in custody but before she was informed of her Miranda rights as required by G.S. § 7B-2101. Joyce gave the following, uncontested account of the circumstances surrounding juvenile's statement:
        [Juvenile] turned to me. And she said, “Am I going to jail?” And I looked at her and it appeared to me that she was not sixteen years of age. And I asked her, “How old are you?” And she told me at that time that she was fifteen. I separated her from the other suspects at that time because we don't allow suspects to be together. I walked her to the back of the car, and walking her to the back of the car, she turned to me and she said, “I don't have any dope. All I have is bombers.”

Incriminating statements may be suppressed under G.S. § 7B-2101 “only where a defendant is subjected to custodial interrogation.” State v. Gaines, 345 N.C. 647, 661, 483 S.E.2d 396, 404, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 900, 139 L. Ed. 2d 177 (1997).
    Here, juvenile was not interrogated. The lone question Sergeant Joyce asked juvenile before she made her incriminatingstatement was, “How old are you?” Such a “'routine informational question[]'” does not constitute interrogation for suppression purposes. State v. Golphin, 352 N.C. 364, 407, 533 S.E.2d 168, 200 (2000), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 149 L. Ed. 2d 305 (2001) (quoting State v. Ladd, 308 N.C. 272, 287, 302 S.E.2d 164, 173 (1983)). Moreover, we discern no evidence of conduct or remarks by Joyce that were “reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response[,]” from juvenile. Golphin, 352 N.C. at 406, 533 S.E.2d at 199 (quoting Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301, 64 L. Ed. 2d 297, 308 (1980)). Juvenile's statement was therefore admissible, because it was “unsolicited and spontaneous.” State v. Hall, 131 N.C. App. 427, 436, 508 S.E.2d 8, 14 (1998), aff'd per curiam, 350 N.C. 303, 513 S.E.2d 561 (1999). The trial court properly overruled juvenile's objection on this basis.
    Juvenile next argues the evidence was insufficient to support the finding of delinquency. Having failed to move to dismiss the juvenile petition at trial, however, she has waived appellate review of this issue. See In re Davis, 126 N.C. App. 64, 66, 483 S.E.2d 440, 441-42 (1997). Juvenile attempts to avoid the waiver by now assigning plain error. See N.C.R. App. P. 10(c)(4). The sufficiency of the evidence is not subject to plain error review under Rule 10(c)(4) when no motion to dismiss was made in the trial court. See State v. Richardson, 341 N.C. 658, 677, 462 S.E.2d 492, 504 (1995); see also N.C.R. App. P. 10(b)(3).    Juvenile's remaining assignment of error is not addressed in her brief to this Court. Therefore, it is deemed abandoned. See N.C.R. App. P. 28(b)(5).
    Affirmed.
    Judges TIMMONS-GOODSON and McCULLOUGH concur.
    Report per Rule 30(e).

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