STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v. Buncombe County
Nos. 97 CRS 52890
97 CRS 137-38
DONALD FRANKLIN VICK,
Defendant.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney
General T. Lane Mallonee, for the State.
Belser & Parke, P.A., by David G. Belser, for the defendant.
HUDSON, Judge.
Defendant Donald Franklin Vick was charged with the attempted
murder of his wife, discharging a firearm into occupied property
and assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting
serious injury. Pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant pled
guilty to the above charges on 20 February 1998. All three charges
were consolidated for judgment. Consistent with the plea
agreement, the trial court sentenced defendant to a term of
imprisonment from a minimum of 150 months to a maximum of 189
months, which was within the presumptive range of the most serious
offense of attempted murder, a class B2 felony. Defendant's 26June 2001 appellate entries show that defendant gave notice of
appeal to this Court, however, the record on appeal does not
contain defendant's notice of appeal.
On 1 October 2001, defendant filed a Motion to Deem Brief
Timely Filed or, in the Alternative, Petition for Writ of
Certiorari with this Court. Defendant's counsel states that he
was unable to complete the brief on time and prays the Court to
deem [his] brief timely filed or in the alternative, to consider
this motion a Petition for Writ of Certiorari and [] grant the
petition. The State contends, and we agree, defendant has no
appeal of right from the judgment in this case. See N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 15A-1444(a1) and (e)(1999) (a defendant who pleads guilty
and is sentenced within the presumptive range is not entitled to
appeal as a matter of right the issue of whether the sentence is
supported by the evidence introduced at the sentencing hearing, but
may petition the appellate court for a review by writ of
certiorari). We hereby treat defendant's motion to deem his brief
timely filed, as a petition for writ of certiorari, which we allow,
and we review his argument on its merits.
Defendant contends that the trial court erred by failing to
find as a mitigating factor that he was suffering from a mental or
physical condition that was insufficient to constitute a defense,
but significantly reduced his culpability for the offense.
Here, the court found five factors in mitigation and one
aggravating factor, but imposed a sentence within the presumptive
range, noting that the factors counterbalanced each other. ThisCourt has held that the trial court [is intended] to take into
account factors in aggravation and mitigation only when deviating
from the presumptive range. State v. Caldwell, 125 N.C. App. 161,
162, 479 S.E.2d 282, 283 (1997); see also, State v. Campbell, 133
N.C. App. 531, 542, 515 S.E.2d 732, 739, disc. rev. denied, 351
N.C. 111, 540 S.E.2d 370 (1999). Thus, we hold that even though
the trial court chose to find some mitigating factors, it was not
required to do so, and did not err by failing to find the
additional factor urged by defendant.
Affirmed.
Judges GREENE and TYSON concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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