IN THE MATTER OF:
James Keith Williamson;
Matthew Lee Williamson; and Buncombe County
Shana Marie Williamson, Nos. 00 J 99-101
Minor Children.
J. Elizabeth Spradlin for respondent appellant.
Charlotte A. Wade for Buncombe County Department of Social
Services, petitioner appellee.
Judy N. Randolph for Guardian ad Litem Paul Willison.
TIMMONS-GOODSON, Judge.
Mary Jo Williamson (“respondent”) appeals from judgments
terminating her parental rights as to three of her children. For
the reasons set forth herein, we affirm the judgments of the trial
court.
Respondent is the natural mother of the three children at
issue in the instant appeal: James Keith Williamson (“James”), born
4 November 1985; Matthew Lee Williamson (“Matthew”), born 16 April
1987; and Shana Marie Williamson (“Shana”), born 1 October 1990,
(collectively, “the minor children”). On 10 June 1997, the HaywoodCounty District Court adjudicated the minor children to be
neglected children under the Juvenile Code upon findings that
respondent had, inter alia, smoked marijuana in the presence of the
minor children, and that respondent also permitted her oldest
daughter, Crystal, to use marijuana. Respondent stated that she
did so “out of fear for her safety” from her husband, Keith
Williamson (“Williamson”), the minor children's father, who had a
history of violent behavior. At the time of the adjudicatory
hearing, respondent was residing at a shelter for battered women.
The court further found that the minor children had significant
speech problems for which they received inadequate treatment.
Respondent was present and represented by counsel at the hearing.
In its adjudicatory order, the trial court also granted a motion
made by the Haywood County Department of Social Services to
transfer the case to Buncombe County. Custody of the minor
children was thereafter transferred to the Buncombe County
Department of Social Services (“DSS”).
On 20 March 2000, DSS filed petitions to terminate the
parental rights of Williamson and respondent. The matter came
before the trial court on 11 September 2000 and was heard over the
course of seven days. Respondent was present at the termination
hearing and was represented by counsel. During the hearing, the
trial court took notice of information contained in the court file
concerning the family's history with DSS: In November 1989, child
protective services in the State of Washington investigated sexual
abuse allegations involving James and Matthew. At the time, Jameswas four years old and Matthew was two years old. According to the
allegations, “James had rectal bleeding and he was attempting to
put his penis in Matthew's rectum.” When questioned about his
behavior, James stated that “daddy showed me.” Sexual abuse was
not substantiated, although earlier allegations of sexual abuse by
Williamson of Crystal led to her removal from the household at the
age of three until the age of twelve. The family eventually
relocated to North Carolina.
In January of 1997, the Haywood County Department of Social
Services became involved with the Williamson family when respondent
and Crystal left the family home and took up residence at a shelter
for abused women. Respondent informed workers at the shelter that
“there was domestic violence in the home and that the children --
that [she] and Crystal had smoked marijuana with the father in
front of the other children in the home” and that “the boys were
allowed to watch pornographic videos.” Respondent further reported
that “the father had called the police department and threatened to
commit suicide.”
On 27 January 1997, when police attempted to serve a warrant
on Williamson for communicating threats, he “barricaded himself and
the three minor children in the home.” When DSS investigated, the
investigator noticed that “there were a lot of large knives stuck
between the wood frame and the door so the back door couldn't be
opened.” At an investigation on 31 January 1997, Williamson told
investigators that he feared that drug dealers wanted to kill him
and his family. He told investigators that he planned to killhimself “before the drug dealers got a chance to do it, that he
bought an assault rifle, and that he would put the minor children
in front of him if the police stormed the house.” After Williamson
served a jail term for communicating threats, respondent permitted
him to move back in with her and Crystal, in violation of the
protection plan she had signed. There were further incidences of
domestic violence between respondent and Williamson, including the
arrest of Williamson for assault on 29 May 2000. In fact, visits
between Williamson and his children while they were in foster care
“had to be held at the Sheriff's Department due to Mr. Williamson's
threatening and abusive behavior towards the social worker and Mrs.
Williamson.” Moreover, there was evidence that Williamson had
sexually abused Shana, and that respondent knew of such abuse. As
her therapist testified, Shana told her that “her mama came in the
room when her daddy was having sex with her. . . . She said her
mama came in the room and saw what was happening, 'that mama knew,
but it must have been all right.'”
The trial court found that respondent
28. . . . has continually failed to follow the
orders of this Court, failed to cooperate with
the social worker for the Department, and
failed to make efforts towards reunification
with the children. [She] has not obtained a
substance abuse assessment nor enrolled in any
substance abuse treatment program although she
admitted to marijuana use on several
occasions, nor has she had a psychological
assessment or enrolled in therapy. Further,
she failed to get the necessary speech therapy
for James, who has a severe speech impediment,
or for Shana. She has demonstrated for the
majority of the li[ves] of th[ese] child[ren]
that she is not willing to make the changes in
her life necessary to provide for the safetyof the minor child[ren].
[These] child[ren have] been in out-of-home
placement for over three years . . . .
Respondent . . . has made little progress, if
any, to correct the conditions that led to the
removal of the child[ren] from her care.
Respondent . . . continues to reside with
[Williamson], who, by [her] report . . . has a
significant and chronic history of inability
to control his anger.
Based on these findings, the trial court concluded that there was
clear, convincing and cogent evidence that respondent had neglected
her children and had failed to make reasonable progress in
correcting conditions leading to the children's removal. The court
thereafter determined that it was in the minor children's best
interest that respondent's parental rights be terminated. From
these judgments, respondent appeals.
__________________________________________________
Respondent argues that the trial court committed reversible
error by finding that (1) respondent had failed to obtain a
psychological evaluation, counseling, and a substance abuse
assessment; and that (2) respondent had neglected her children.
For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the trial court.
When reviewing a trial court's findings in a termination of
parental rights proceeding, we determine whether the findings of
fact were based on clear, cogent and convincing evidence, carefully
considering all of the circumstances and the best interests of the
child. See In re Alleghany County v. Reber, 75 N.C. App. 467, 472,
331 S.E.2d 256, 259 (1985), aff'd. 315 N.C. 382, 337 S.E.2d 851
(1986). “[W]here no exceptions are taken to the findings of fact,the only question present for review is whether the findings
support the conclusions of law, and it is not incumbent upon this
Court to search the record in order to determine whether the
findings of fact are supported by competent evidence” In re Pierce,
67 N.C. App. 257, 259, 312 S.E.2d 900, 902 (1984), because they are
“deemed to be supported by competent evidence and are conclusive on
appeal.” In re Apa, 59 N.C. App. 322, 324, 296 S.E.2d 811, 813
(1982); see also In re Caldwell, 75 N.C. App. 299, 301, 330 S.E.2d
513, 515 (1985) (stating that failure to object to any of the
findings of fact renders them conclusive on appeal).
Termination of parental rights is a two-step procedure
established by the North Carolina General Statutes. In re Church,
136 N.C. App. 654, 656, 525 S.E.2d 478, 479 (2000). In the initial
adjudication phase of the trial, grounds for termination must be
shown by clear, convincing and cogent evidence. N.C. Gen. Stat. §
7B-1109(f) (2001); In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. 101, 110, 316 S.E.2d
246, 252 (1984). The court may terminate the parental rights on
the basis of several findings, and “[a] finding of any one of the
. . . separately enumerated grounds is sufficient to support a
termination.” In re Pierce, 67 N.C. App. at 261, 312 S.E.2d at
903.
This includes a finding that “[t]he parent has . . . neglected
the juvenile” or that “[t]he parent has willfully left the juvenile
in foster care or placement outside the home for more than 12
months without showing to the satisfaction of the court that
reasonable progress under the circumstances has been made incorrecting those conditions which led to the removal of the
juvenile.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1)-(2) (2001). A
neglected juvenile is one “who does not receive proper care,
supervision, or discipline from the juvenile's parent . . . or who
is not provided the necessary remedial care; or who lives in an
environment injurious to the juvenile's welfare.” N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 7B-101(15) (2001). “Upon determining that one or more of the
grounds for terminating parental rights exist, the court moves to
the disposition stage to determine whether it is in the best
interests of the child to terminate the parental rights.” In re
Young, 346 N.C. 244, 247, 485 S.E.2d 612, 615 (1997); see also N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 7B-1110 (2001).
Respondent first assigns error to the trial court's finding
that she “did not obtain either the substance abuse assessment or
psychological evaluation as recommended by the Treatment Team and
as ordered by this Court September 19, 1997.” Respondent asserts
that this finding was based upon evidence from earlier proceedings
involving respondent's oldest child, Crystal. Respondent argues
that this evidence was contained in a closed juvenile file, and
that the earlier proceedings were irrelevant to the termination of
respondent's rights over James, Matthew and Shana. Because the
earlier proceedings concerning Crystal were not consolidated with
the instant action, argues respondent, the trial court was not
allowed to notice them or use any of the evidence for its current
findings. As noted above, failing to take exception to underlying
findings makes the trial court's findings of neglect binding onthis court, we therefore disagree with respondent's argument.
Section 7B-101(15) of the North Carolina General Statutes
states that when determining neglect, “it is relevant whether that
juvenile lives in a home where another juvenile . . . has been
subjected to abuse or neglect by an adult who regularly lives in
the home.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-101(15). The evidence regarding
Crystal was therefore relevant to the proceedings. The court may
take judicial notice of the juvenile file before it. In re
Isenhour, 101 N.C. App. 550, 553, 400 S.E.2d 71, 73 (1991).
Furthermore, “evidence of neglect by a parent . . . including an
adjudication of such neglect -- is admissible in subsequent
proceedings to terminate parental rights. The trial court must
also consider any evidence of changed conditions in light of the
evidence of prior neglect and the probability of a repetition of
neglect.” In re Ballard, 311 N.C. 708, 715, 319 S.E.2d 227, 232
(1984).
In the instant case, the trial court recounted this family's
long history with DSS, which began when the family lived in the
State of Washington. Furthermore, the trial court found that
Crystal was abused and neglected; for instance, at her adjudicatory
hearing, the trial court found that Crystal and her boyfriend “were
allowed to watch sexually explicit and pornographic videos.”
Additionally, at the minor children's neglect hearing, the court
found that both parents admitted that they smoked marijuana with
Crystal in the presence of the minor children and that such drug
use occurred “on an almost daily basis.” As a result of thesefindings, respondent was ordered to undergo a psychological
assessment and treatment and a drug abuse assessment and follow all
recommendations made by these therapists. Respondent never
obtained a psychological or drug abuse assessment. As evidence
concerning Crystal's abuse was relevant to the proceedings
involving James, Matthew, and Shana, the trial court did not err in
considering evidence of respondent's failure to comply with the
orders of the trial court imposed during Crystal's adjudicatory
hearing. We therefore overrule respondent's first assignment of
error.
Respondent argues in her second assignment of error that the
trial court erred in concluding that respondent neglected her
children. The trial court terminated respondent's parental rights
on the grounds that respondent neglected the children, and that she
“willfully left the minor child[ren] in foster care for more than
12 months without showing to the satisfaction of the Court that
reasonable progress under the circumstances had been made in
correcting the conditions which led to the removal of the minor
child[ren] from [her] care.” Respondent argues that there was no
clear and convincing evidence that she neglected the children. We
disagree.
There was clear, cogent and convincing evidence to support the
trial court's findings and conclusions. The evidence showed, and
the trial court found, that respondent neglected her children's
welfare, in that she failed to obtain necessary speech therapy for
James, who has a severe speech impediment, or for Matthew andShana, who also have speech difficulties. See N.C. Gen. Stat. §
7B-101(15) (defining a neglected juvenile as one who, among other
criteria, “is not provided necessary remedial care”); In re Huber,
57 N.C. App. 453, 458, 291 S.E.2d 916, 919 (1982), disc. review
denied, 306 N.C. 557, 294 S.E.2d 223 (1982) (adjudicating child
neglected when child had treatable speech defect but mother refused
necessary care). There was also ample evidence that respondent
failed to adequately provide for the safety of her children. At
the time of the termination hearing, respondent continued to reside
with her husband, despite her own acknowledgment of domestic
violence, as evidenced by his repeated episodes of violence during
which the welfare of the children was endangered. For instance,
after securing an apartment through the battered-women's shelter,
on the condition that her husband not be informed of her
whereabouts, or have contact with Crystal, respondent allowed her
husband to move in with them.
Moreover, DSS presented evidence that respondent failed to
protect her children from sexual abuse by Williamson. Respondent
denied the sexual abuse, and her refusal to acknowledge it resulted
in the termination of her visits with Shana. Respondent chose,
over the best interests of her children to remain with her husband,
which demonstrates that she cannot be trusted to properly care for
and protect her children.
Respondent further argues that the trial court erroneously
found that she had failed to make reasonable progress based on
earlier proceedings involving Crystal during which respondentwaived her right to an attorney. Respondent asserts that she did
not knowingly waive her right to an attorney, because she does “not
read . . . very well”, and that therefore, the trial court erred in
finding that she had failed to make reasonable progress based on
that earlier proceeding. This argument has no merit. There was no
showing that respondent was incompetent. Other than her testimony
that she has a learning disability and difficulty reading, there
was no other evidence offered to support respondent's claim that
she did not “knowingly” waive consent. Furthermore, the record
shows that respondent was represented by an attorney at the
adjudicatory hearing and at the termination of parental rights
hearing for James, Matthew and Shana. In addition, the trial court
did not base its finding that respondent had failed to make
reasonable progress solely on her failure to obtain counseling --
other factors were at issue, such as her failure to protect her
children.
Finally, respondent asserts that the trial court erred in
terminating her parental rights without sufficient notice.
Respondent argues that “she was not made aware that she was in
peril of having her parental rights terminated.” This argument is
wholly without merit. The evidence showed that respondent was
served notice on 22 May 2000; she requested an attorney at that
time, and was appointed counsel on 9 June 2000. In addition, she
was present in court on 22 July 1998, when the court sanctioned the
change in the minor children's permanency plan from reunification
to adoption. This dispositional order included notice that ifrespondent followed court orders, DSS could continue to work
towards reunification.
On 26 October 1998, however, the court found it in the best
interests of the minor children to approve a change in the
permanency plan to termination of parental rights and respondent
was also in court that day. Furthermore, she was in court on 1
March 1999, when the court reiterated its sanction of the
initiation of termination of parental rights, and on 19 July 1999
when the court ordered a final re-examination of the permanency
planning goals, including the termination of parental rights.
Finally, respondent was in court on 9 June 2000, when it was noted
that “adoption should remain the permanent plan for these
children.” Given her presence at these hearings, we conclude that
the respondent could not reasonably have been unaware that she was
in peril of having her parental rights terminated.
In conclusion, we hold that the trial court did not err in
terminating respondent's parental rights to James, Matthew and
Shana. The trial court is therefore
Affirmed.
Judges GREENE and HUNTER concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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