IN THE MATTER OF: Buncombe County
KENNY COFFEY No. 99 J 21
Appeal by juvenile from adjudication and disposition orders
entered 18 December 2000 by Judge Gary S. Cash in Buncombe County
District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 22 April 2002.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General
Anne Goco Kirby, for the State.
Assistant Public Defender Dennis Gibson, for the respondent-
appellant.
HUDSON, Judge.
On 2 August 2000, Douglas Waite, owner of the Newbridge Fruit
Market in Oteen, North Carolina, arrived at the market to open up
his business. After Waite entered the market, he noticed that
change was missing from the register and some of it was spilled on
the floor. Upon further investigation, Waite determined that
someone had entered the building through a small window in the
bathroom. After discovering the break-in, Waite checked the desk
drawer in his office where he had hidden three stacks of fifty one-
dollar bills which had been individually bundled with rubber bands.
Waite found that the money was missing.
Later that day, Brittany Brown Buchanan was standing outside
the Kountry Kitchen, a restaurant about a half-mile away from thefruit market, when she was approached by respondent and David
Arrington, respondent's friend. Buchanan and respondent were
friends. After talking with Buchanan for a short time, respondent
pulled out a bundle of one-dollar bills secured by a rubber band.
Respondent and Arrington told Buchanan they had stolen the money,
but did not tell Buchanan from where.
After speaking with Buchanan, respondent and Arrington went
into the restaurant, where they asked Melissa Trezza, an employee
of the restaurant, if she would switch the money for larger bills.
Trezza testified that respondent and Arrington had a couple of
rolls of one-dollar bills fastened by a rubber band. After
speaking with her manager about changing the money, Trezza told
respondent and Arrington she could not do so, and the boys left the
restaurant.
On 21 September 2000, a juvenile petition was filed alleging
that respondent had broken into or entered Newbridge Fruit Market
and had stolen $150.00. An adjudicatory hearing was held on 30
November 2000. Following the hearing, respondent was adjudicated
a delinquent juvenile by reason of felony breaking and entering and
felony larceny. A disposition order was then entered placing
respondent on supervised probation for six months. Respondent
appeals.
Respondent's sole argument on appeal is that the trial court
erred by denying his motion to dismiss for insufficiency of the
evidence. Respondent argues that the State presented no direct or
circumstantial evidence that he broke or entered into the NewbridgeFruit Market. Respondent notes that the State used the doctrine of
recent possession to show that the one-dollar bills taken from the
market were the ones found in the possession of respondent.
Respondent argues that the doctrine of recent possession is
inapplicable here, because the State provided no evidence that the
dollar bills found in his possession were in fact the same ones
stolen from the market.
After careful review of the record, briefs, and contentions of
the parties, we affirm. This Court has stated:
In reviewing a challenge to the
sufficiency of evidence, it is not our duty to
weigh the evidence, but to determine whether
there was substantial evidence to support the
adjudication, viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the State, and giving
it the benefit of all reasonable inferences.
In Re Heil, 145 N.C. App. 24, 29, 550 S.E.2d 815, 819 (2001).
In the case sub judice, the petition alleged that respondent
was delinquent for felonious breaking or entering and larceny in
violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-54 (1999) and N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 14-72 (1999). The State argues that the doctrine of recent
possession links respondent to the breaking or entering and
larceny. Under the doctrine of recent possession:
A person found in unexplained possession
of recently stolen property is presumed to be
the thief if (1) the property is stolen, (2)
the property stolen was possessed by the
accused, and (3) the accused possessed the
stolen property recently after the larceny.
Simply, the [accused's] possession of the
fruits of the crime recently after its
commission [justify] the inference of guilt on
his trial for larceny.
In re Phillips, 128 N.C. App. 732, 736, 497 S.E.2d 292, 294-95,disc. review denied, 348 N.C. 283, 501 S.E.2d 919 (1998) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted) (alteration in original).
The evidence presented by the State tended to show that on the same
day the break-in at the fruit market was discovered, respondent was
seen at a nearby restaurant with bundled rolls of one-dollar bills
similar to those that had been stolen from the market. Respondent
first showed the money to Buchanan, a friend, and told her he had
stolen the money. Buchanan testified that respondent pulled out
ten or fifteen ones in a wad. Respondent then went into the
restaurant where he tried to change the dollar bills for larger
bills. Trezza, who worked in the restaurant, testified that
respondent had a couple of rolls of one-dollar bills secured by a
rubber band. Respondent's possession of these bundles of one-
dollar bills so soon after and so close to the scene of the
break-in and larceny, coupled with defendant's admission to
Buchanan that the money was stolen, leads us to conclude there was
substantial evidence to support the adjudication. Accordingly, we
affirm.
Affirmed.
Judges GREENE and TYSON concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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