IN THE MATTER OF: Mecklenburg County
SYRIN KEVINO THOMAS Nos. 00-J-105,06
and
MYKIBA SHEE-LEE MCCOREY
Associate County Attorney Tyrone C. Wade for petitioner-
appellee Mecklenburg County Department of Social Services.
Chiege O. Kalu Okwara for the Guardian Ad Litem.
Leslie C. Rawls for respondent-appellant.
EAGLES, Chief Judge.
The facts relevant to this appeal are as follows: Mykiba
Shee-Lee McCorey was born on 22 May 1990 and Syrin Kevino Thomas
was born on 28 August 1991. Respondent, Keva Thomas, is the
children's mother. Mecklenburg County Department of Social
Services (DSS) received a referral that Mykiba had been sexually
abused by her mother's boyfriend. Mykiba also later named a
thirteen-year old cousin who lived in the same home as her as the
perpetrator of the abuse. DSS later substantiated the abuse. The
children were having academic problems and Mykiba was exhibiting
inappropriate sexual behavior. DSS created a case planrecommending services for respondent and her children. DSS also
implemented a protective plan to ensure adequate protection of the
children. Respondent failed to fully cooperate with the terms of
the case plan and the children continued to be exposed to the
cousin who had abused Mykiba. Accordingly, on 22 October 1997, a
non-secure custody order was entered and the children were placed
in the custody of DSS. On 15 December 1997, the children were
adjudicated abused, neglected, and dependent juveniles.
After the adjudication, on 3 February 1998, the court adopted
a case plan. The court identified respondent's “depression” and
“poor judgment as well as poor communication techniques with her
children” as problems that had to be addressed. The court
determined that respondent should: (1) participate with
recommended therapeutic interventions; (2) successfully complete
parenting classes and demonstrate her ability to implement sound
parenting techniques; (3) follow through with outpatient treatment
as long as it is determined that it is beneficial or needed; (4)
complete parenting classes at Family Center, with the social worker
to provide transportation if needed with three days notice; and (5)
complete a custody evaluation once her outpatient therapy plateaued
and she completed parenting classes.
On 20 January 2000, DSS filed a petition to terminate parental
rights alleging that respondent: (1) willfully left the children
in foster care for more than twelve months without showing to the
satisfaction of the court that reasonable progress had been made
towards correcting those conditions that led to her removal, and(2) that respondent failed to pay a reasonable portion of the cost
of child care for the children in the six months preceding the
filing of the petition.
On 4 October 2000, nunc pro tunc 9 August 2000, the trial
court found that the parental rights of respondent should be
terminated. Specifically, the trial court found that respondent
failed to follow through on case plans, failed to follow through
with individual therapy, and failed to maintain regular and
consistent visitation with the children. The court noted that
respondent's participation at the Alexander Children's Center was
“sporadic,” and her behavior at the Family Center was “detrimental
and abusive.” Furthermore, the court noted that respondent had
allowed the alleged sexual perpetrator against Mykiba, the father
of her youngest child, to visit her in her home, and she had
minimized the trauma that Mykiba had experienced. Thus, the court
found that respondent did “not have an understanding at all of what
these children's needs are nor does she have the ability to follow
through and provide for them.”
The court then found that respondent: (1) neglected the
children as defined by N.C.G.S. § 7B-101(15) in that she failed to
provide proper care, supervision, and discipline for them; (2)
willfully left the children in foster care for more than twelve
months without showing to the satisfaction of the court that
reasonable progress had been made towards correcting those
conditions that led to her removal, and (3) that respondent failed
to pay a reasonable portion of the cost of child care for thechildren in the six months preceding the filing of the petition.
Accordingly, the trial court concluded that the best interests of
the children required that respondent's parental rights be
terminated.
On appeal, respondent contends that the trial court abused its
discretion by terminating her parental rights. First, respondent
contends that the trial court's findings of facts are not supported
by the evidence. Respondent cites eleven specific findings of the
court, findings which state how respondent failed to address
problems and follow through on the recommendations made to foster
reunification. Respondent contends that she participated in
individual and family counseling, visited the children regularly,
and tried to work with case plans. Respondent denies that she
minimized the trauma Mykiba experienced, arguing that she believed
Mykiba had been abused, but was unsure who had done it because
Mykiba had told differing stories. Respondent argues that she had
a “safety plan” in place so that the alleged abuser, the father of
respondent's youngest child, would not come into contact with
Mykiba. In regards to paying for reasonable cost of care while the
children were in DSS custody, respondent notes that she was largely
out of work and that there is no evidence that respondent had any
income to pay support. Finally, respondent asserts that the trial
court erred in finding grounds for termination and thus it was
error to address whether termination was in the children's best
interest. Furthermore, respondent argues that the evidence does
not support a finding that the children's best interests wereserved by termination. After careful review of the record and
briefs, we affirm.
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111 sets out the statutory grounds for
terminating parental rights. A finding of any one of the
separately enumerated grounds is sufficient to support termination.
In re Taylor, 97 N.C. App. 57, 64, 387 S.E.2d 230, 233-34 (1990).
“[T]he party petitioning for the termination must show by clear,
cogent, and convincing evidence that grounds authorizing the
termination of parental rights exist.” In re Young, 346 N.C. 244,
247, 485 S.E.2d 612, 614 (1997).
Here, the trial court concluded that respondent willfully left
the children in foster care for twelve months without showing to
the satisfaction of the court that reasonable progress under the
circumstances had been made within those twelve months in
correcting those conditions which led to their removal. N.C.G.S.
§ 7B-1111(a)(2) (1999). The trial court based its conclusion on
numerous findings that respondent failed to cooperate with DSS
efforts aimed at reuniting her with her children. The court found
that family therapy was scheduled for respondent but that it was
discontinued due to respondent's lack of cooperation and progress.
The court noted that respondent “has indicated throughout the case
she did not believe she needed therapy although it has been
recommended by other professionals in the case.” The court also
found that the alleged perpetrator of the sexual offense against
Mykiba, the father of respondent's youngest child, visited
respondent just prior to termination proceedings, that respondentcontinued to have regular contact with him, and that respondent
“continues to minimize the trauma that [Mykiba] has experienced.”
The court also found that respondent failed to maintain regular and
consistent visitation with the children. Thus, the court found
that respondent did not have the ability or understanding to
provide for the children's needs or to protect them. Accordingly,
we conclude that there was clear, cogent, and convincing evidence
to support the trial court's finding that respondent had willfully
left the children in foster care for twelve months without making
reasonable progress towards correcting those conditions which led
to her removal. Since grounds exist pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-
1111(a)(2) to support the trial court's order, the remaining
grounds found by the trial court supporting termination need not be
reviewed.
Once the trial court has found that grounds exist to terminate
parental rights, “the court shall issue an order terminating the
parental rights of such parent with respect to the juvenile unless
the court shall further determine that the best interests of the
juvenile require that the parental rights of the parent not be
terminated.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) (1999). The trial court's
decision to terminate parental rights at the disposition stage is
discretionary. In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. 101, 110, 316 S.E.2d
246, 252 (1984). Here, the trial court found that it was in the
best interest of the child that respondent's parental rights be
terminated. We hold that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in determining that termination was in the children'sbest interests. Accordingly, the order terminating respondent's
parental rights is affirmed.
Affirmed.
Judges TIMMONS-GOODSON and McCULLOUGH concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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