STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v
.
Cleveland County
Nos. 97 CRS 3039,
VERGIL FLOWERS 97CRS7538-40
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General
Chris Z. Sinha, for the State.
Jerry M. Trammell, for the defendant-appellant.
WYNN, Judge.
Defendant was convicted in August 1999 of first-degree sexual
offense under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-27.4 (2001) (97 CRS 7538) and
taking indecent liberties with a child under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-
202.1 (2001) (97 CRS 7539), and judgments on these convictions were
entered by Judge Timothy L. Patti on 24 August 1999. No appeal
from these convictions was taken within the prescribed time;
however, on 14 November 2000 this Court granted defendant's
petition for writ of certiorari to review the convictions in 97 CRS
7538 and 7539.
The record on appeal was filed with this Court on 10 August
2001, and the printed record was apparently mailed from this Courton 27 August 2001; however, defendant failed to timely file his
brief by 26 September 2001. On 30 October 2001, the State filed a
motion to dismiss defendant's appeal under N.C.R. App. P. 13(c)
for failure to comply with N.C.R. App. P. 13(a)(1). Also on 30
October 2001, defendant filed a motion to extend the time within
which to serve his brief under Rule 13(a)(1) until 2 November 2001.
Subsequently, defendant filed his brief with this Court on 14
November 2001 (twelve days after defendant's own requested extended
deadline). On 15 November 2001, defendant filed a motion to amend
his previously-filed motion to extend time under Rule 13(a)(1)
seeking to amend the requested deadline for filing his brief to
read 14 November 2001" instead of 2 November 2001.
Alternatively, defendant sought to suspend the Rules of Appellate
Procedure under N.C.R. App. P. 2 to allow defendant's brief and
consider it timely filed. The above motions were referred to this
panel for disposition. We hereby deny all of defendant's motions,
as well as the State's motion to dismiss; nonetheless, we elect to
treat defendant's appeal as a petition for writ of certiorari under
N.C.R. App. P. 21 (2002), and grant that petition. See State v.
Jarman, 140 N.C. App. 198, 535 S.E.2d 875 (2000).
Defendant first argues that the trial court erred by
proceeding to trial pursuant to a flawed arraignment, thereby
prejudicing defendant. In October 1998, defendant was indicted for
commission of (1) a first-degree sex offense with a juvenile female
in 97 CRS 7538, (2) one count of taking indecent liberties with the
same juvenile female in 97 CRS 7539, and (3) one separate count oftaking indecent liberties with a juvenile male in 97 CRS 7540. On
16 August 1999, the district attorney announced that the State was
calling for trial cases 97 CRS 7540 and 97 CRS 7538. In
preliminary instructions to prospective jurors, the trial court
named the juvenile female as the alleged victim of the first-degree
sexual offense charge, and incorrectly named the juvenile male as
the alleged victim of the indecent liberties charge. At the
conclusion of the preliminary instructions and prior to actual voir
dire, the trial court held a bench conference, following which it
instructed the prospective jurors that the juvenile female was the
alleged victim in each instance; ultimately, verdicts of guilty
were returned in cases 97 CRS 7538 and 7539 (both involving the
juvenile female).
Defendant acknowledges that no objection to the arraignment
was made at trial, nor was any objection raised concerning the
trial court's preliminary jury instructions. Defendant thus
contends that this Court should consider these errors under plain
error analysis. However, defendant failed to assert plain error in
his assignment of error, thereby waiving even plain error review.
See N.C.R. App. P. 10(c)(4) (2002); see also State v. Moore, 132
N.C. App. 197, 511 S.E.2d 22 (1999). Furthermore, we note that
plain error analysis is generally reserved for errors in jury
instructions or the admissibility of evidence. See N.C.R. App. P.
10(b)(1) and 10(b)(2) (2002); see also State v. Steen, 352 N.C.
227, 536 S.E.2d 1 (2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1167, 148 L. Ed.
2d 997 (2001). Nonetheless, we have considered defendant'sargument and find it to be wholly without merit, as there is no
indication that, absent the alleged error, the jury probably would
have reached a different verdict. See State v. Robinson, 330 N.C.
1, 409 S.E.2d 288 (1991). Defendant's first assignment of error is
overruled.
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in admitting
evidence under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 404(b) (2001) of
similar prior bad acts involving another juvenile female.
Defendant urges this Court to adopt the reasoning of Chief Justice
Exum in a dissenting opinion in State v. Bagley, 321 N.C. 201, 362
S.E.2d 244 (1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1036, 99 L. Ed. 2d 912
(1988). However, it is axiomatic that this Court is bound by the
decisions of our Supreme Court. See , e.g., Dunn v. Pate, 334 N.C.
115, 431 S.E.2d 178 (1993). Nonetheless, we have reviewed
defendant's argument and find it to be without merit, as defendant
has failed to show that the trial court abused its discretion in
admitting the prior bad acts evidence. See, e.g., State v.
Beckham, 145 N.C. App. 119, 550 S.E.2d 231 (2001).
Defendant next contends that the trial court erred in
admitting certain testimony, by the juvenile victim's treating
physician, regarding the victim's statements concerning a prior
instance of abuse perpetrated upon her by defendant. Defendant
concedes that no objection to this testimony was made at trial, but
argues that the trial court's admission of this evidence
constituted plain error. However, defendant failed to allege plain
error in his assignments of error, thereby waiving even plain errorreview. See N.C.R. App. P. 10(c)(4); see also Moore. Furthermore,
defendant has failed to demonstrate that absent the error, the jury
likely would have reached a different verdict. See Robinson. This
argument is without merit.
Lastly, defendant argues that the trial court committed plain
error in failing to give an adequate limiting instruction to the
jury concerning the prior bad acts evidence admitted by the trial
court pursuant to Rule 404(b). Defendant did not request such an
instruction at trial; furthermore, defendant failed to allege plain
error in his assignment of error, waiving even plain error review.
See N.C.R. App. P. 10(c)(4); see also Moore. Finally, defendant
has not shown that absent the error, the jury probably would have
reached a different verdict. See Robinson. Accordingly, this
assignment of error is overruled.
No error.
Judges HUNTER and THOMAS concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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