STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v. Lincoln County
Nos. 00CRS005500
DAVID LOUIS CAMP, JR. 00CRS005501
Attorney General Roy A. Cooper, III, by Assistant Attorney
General Steven A. Armstrong, for the State.
Leslie C. Rawls for defendant-appellant.
HUNTER, Judge.
David Louis Camp, Jr. (“defendant”) was charged with assault
with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury
and attempted robbery with a dangerous weapon. The State's
evidence tended to show that on the evening of 29 November 2000, a
group of people, including Brian Keith Littlejohn, Raymond Nicholes
and T. J. Smith, were assembled at the apartment of Ronnie Dale
Carte and his girlfriend, located at 137 Deaton Avenue, in an area
of Lincolnton, North Carolina known as “the hill.” “The hill” has
a reputation for illegal drug activity.
Shortly before 10:00 p.m., Littlejohn, Nicholes and Carte left
the apartment together. Once outside, Carte and the two othersencountered Smith, who had left the apartment earlier, and
defendant. Defendant repeatedly demanded of Carte, “get your hands
out of your pockets” and “[g]ive me your jacket.” Carte complied
with defendant's demand and showed that he did not have anything in
his hands, whereupon defendant pulled a handgun from his coat
pocket and hit Carte several times in the face with the gun.
Defendant then dropped a forty ounce bottle of beer he had been
holding and attempted to take Carte's jacket. When defendant's
attempts failed, he suddenly began to fire his handgun at Carte in
quick succession. The first bullet stuck Carte in the left ankle,
while four additional bullets struck other parts of Carte's legs.
A final bullet narrowly missed Carte's stomach. Smith, who was
also armed, began shooting into the air. Littlejohn assisted Carte
in getting back to his residence, where someone called for
emergency assistance. In response, Sergeant John Caudle of the
Lincolnton Police Department arrived at the scene at approximately
9:45 p.m. Thereafter, Carte was transported to the hospital in
Lincolnton. Carte was later transferred to Carolinas Medical
Center in Charlotte, North Carolina, where he stayed four days
while being treated for his injuries. At trial, Carte still walked
with a noticeable limp due to his injuries.
Defendant did not present any evidence. The jury found
defendant guilty as charged. The trial court found two aggravating
factors and no mitigating factors, and determined that the
aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors. The trial
court then sentenced defendant to consecutive aggravated terms of33-49 months' imprisonment for the assault with a deadly weapon
inflicting serious injury conviction and 90-117 months'
imprisonment for the attempted robbery with a dangerous weapon
conviction. Defendant appeals. We find no error.
By his sole assignment of error brought forward on appeal,
defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion
to dismiss. Specifically, defendant contends that the State failed
to prove the following: (1) the subject crimes occurred in North
Carolina, and (2) he possessed the requisite intent to commit the
crime of robbery.
“A motion to dismiss is properly denied if 'there is
substantial evidence (1) of each essential element of the offense
charged and (2) that defendant is the perpetrator of the offense.'”
State v. Wheeler, 138 N.C. App. 163, 165, 530 S.E.2d 311, 312
(2000) (citation omitted). Substantial evidence has been defined
as “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.” State v. Franklin, 327 N.C.
162, 171, 393 S.E.2d 781, 787 (1990). In ruling on a motion to
dismiss, the trial court must consider the evidence in the light
most favorable to the State, allowing the State the benefit of
every reasonable inference derived therefrom. Wheeler, 138 N.C.
App. at 165, 530 S.E.2d at 312.
As to defendant's contention that the State failed to prove
the crime occurred in this jurisdiction, we note that at no time
prior to, nor during trial did defendant raise the issue of the
trial court's jurisdiction over this matter. See State v. Batdorf,293 N.C. 486, 493, 238 S.E.2d 497, 502 (1977) (providing that
“jurisdiction is a matter which, when contested, should be proven
by the prosecution as a prerequisite to the authority of the court
to enter judgment” (emphasis omitted)). Further, defendant failed
to request a jury instruction that the State was required to prove,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant committed these offenses
in North Carolina. See N.C.R. App. P. 10(b)(2) (requiring that a
party object to a jury charge or omission therefrom to assign error
on appeal). It is, therefore, questionable whether defendant
preserved this matter for appellate review. See N.C.R. App. P. 10.
Assuming arguendo that the matter is properly before the
Court, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence on this
record to show that the crime occurred in North Carolina: the
testimony established that the crime occurred outside an apartment
complex in Lincolnton, defendant was indicted for the instant
felonies by a Lincoln County, North Carolina grand jury, the crime
was investigated by the Lincolnton Police Department, and defendant
was first transported to a hospital in Lincolnton before being sent
to Carolinas Medical Center. Accordingly, Lincoln County, North
Carolina was the proper venue, and Lincoln County Superior Court
properly exercised jurisdiction over this matter.
We proceed, then, to defendant's contention that there was not
sufficient evidence to show that he possessed the intent to commit
the robbery as charged. Robbery with a dangerous weapon has been
defined as “'(1) the unlawful taking or an attempt to take personal
property from the person or in the presence of another (2) by useor threatened use of a firearm or other dangerous weapon (3)
whereby the life of a person is endangered or threatened.'” State
v. Wilson, 354 N.C. 493, 506, 556 S.E.2d 272, 281 (2001) (quoting
State v. Beaty, 306 N.C. 491, 496, 293 S.E.2d 760, 764 (1982)).
“'An attempted robbery with a dangerous weapon occurs when a
person, with the specific intent to unlawfully deprive another of
personal property by endangering or threatening his life with a
dangerous weapon, does some overt act calculated to bring about
this result.'” Id. (quoting State v. Allison, 319 N.C. 92, 96, 352
S.E.2d 420, 423 (1987)).
As defendant contends, the evidence does tend to show that he
initially approached Carte and demanded that Carte remove his hands
from his pockets. The evidence also, however, tends to show that
defendant demanded of Carte, “[g]ive me your jacket,” that
defendant tugged at Carte's jacket in an attempt to take it from
him, and that when defendant's attempts to remove the jacket proved
unsuccessful, he shot Carte several times.
While defendant contends that the evidence was only sufficient
to show that he approached Carte to ascertain whether he was armed,
we disagree. In the light most favorable to the State, there was
sufficient evidence from which the finder-of-fact could find that
defendant intended to deprive Carte of his jacket. See State v.
Harris, 71 N.C. App. 141, 144, 321 S.E.2d 480, 483 (1984) (holding
that there was sufficient evidence to submit the charge of
attempted robbery with a dangerous weapon to the jury where the
defendant ordered the victim to “empty his pockets,” and rejected the three pennies produced, said “'[t]hat ain't crap'” and left).
Accordingly, this assignment of error is overruled.
Defendant has not brought forward his remaining assignments of
error, and therefore, they are taken as abandoned. See N.C.R. App.
P. 28(b)(5). In light of the foregoing, we hold that defendant
received a fair trial, free from prejudicial error.
No error.
Judges MARTIN and BRYANT concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
*** Converted from WordPerfect ***