A decision without a published opinion is authority only in the case in which such decision is rendered and should not be cited in any other case in any court for any other purpose, nor should any court consider any such decision for any purpose except in the case in which such decision is rendered. See Rule of Appellate Procedure 30 (e)(3).

NO. COA01-1137


Filed: 4 June 2002


    v.                                Pender County
                                    Nos. 00 CRS 51383-4

    Appeal by defendant from judgments entered 27 June 2001 by Judge Gary E. Trawick in Pender County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 28 May 2002.

    Attorney General Roy A. Cooper, III, by Assistant Attorney General Thomas B. Wood, for the State.

    Samuel J. Randall, IV for defendant-appellant.

    HUNTER, Judge.

    On 4 December 2000, Larry D. Armistead (“defendant”) was indicted on charges of conspiracy to deliver marijuana to inmates and employing a minor to commit a controlled substance offense. The cases were tried at the 25 June 2001 Criminal Session of Pender County Superior Court.
    The State presented evidence at trial which tended to show the following: On 6 April 2000, Agent Jason Crist, a narcotics officer with the Burgaw Police Department, was conducting surveillance on the Northwoods Apartments after receiving an anonymous report of drug activity behind the apartments. Agent Crist was advised that subjects were smoking marijuana, and Agent Crist investigated. Two male subjects ran away, but Ramesha Armistead remained behind. Ramesha was holding a bookbag, and in it was found two soda cans stuffed with plastic bags containing four ounces of marijuana.
    Agent John Dixon of the Pender County Sheriff's Office was called in to assist in the investigation, and interviewed Ramesha. Agent Dixon testified that Ramesha told him that her father, defendant, had contacted her and asked her to pick up the marijuana from another subject, deliver it to the prison where he was an inmate, and dump it off in a ditch. Ramesha's testimony at trial was in conformity with what she told Agent Dixon.
    Agents Dixon and Crist then executed a controlled delivery of the marijuana, putting the marijuana back into the cans and placing the cans in a ditch in front of the Pender County Correctional Center. An inmate, whose job was to pick up trash outside the prison, then picked up the cans and brought them into a storage building at the prison. The marijuana was later retrieved from the storage building. Agent Dixon then interviewed defendant, told him that his daughter had been arrested, and defendant admitted that he had arranged for his daughter to drop the marijuana off in front of the prison.
    Defendant was convicted of employing a minor to commit a controlled substance offense and conspiracy to deliver marijuana. Defendant was sentenced to a term of twenty-one to twenty-six months' imprisonment for the offense of employing a minor to deliver controlled substances, and a consecutive term of five to six months' imprisonment for the conspiracy offense. Defendant appeals. We find no error.    Defendant's sole argument on appeal is there was insufficient evidence to support the convictions because he was not identified by any of the witnesses as the person who committed the offenses charged. Defendant notes that “the record is silent as to any witness ever identifying the defendant that was indicted as the person that committed the acts about which they were testifying.” Accordingly, defendant contends that the State failed to prove an essential element of their case _ that defendant committed the crimes -- and the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss.
    After careful review of the record, briefs and contentions of the parties, we find no error. “In prosecuting a criminal charge it is the State's burden to establish the following two propositions: '(1) that a crime has been committed; and (2) that it was committed by the person charged.'” State v. Lively, 83 N.C. App. 639, 642, 351 S.E.2d 111, 114 (1986) (quoting State v. Chapman, 293 N.C. 585, 587, 238 S.E.2d 784, 786 (1977)), disc. review denied, 319 N.C. 461, 356 S.E.2d 10 (1987). To survive a motion to dismiss, the State must present substantial evidence of each essential element of the charged offense. State v. Cross, 345 N.C. 713, 716-17, 483 S.E.2d 432, 434 (1997). “'Substantial evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'” Id. at 717, 483 S.E.2d at 434 (quoting State v. Olson, 330 N.C. 557, 564, 411 S.E.2d 592, 595 (1992)).    In the case sub judice, defendant contends that the State failed to prove its case because he was not identified by any of the witnesses as the person who committed the offenses charged. However, Ramesha testified that the defendant was her biological father, and she further testified that her father had asked her to: (1) meet someone to pick up some drugs; (2) put the drugs in soda cans so that it would look like trash, and; (3) put the cans in a ditch in front of the prison where they would be picked up and delivered to him. When confronted with the scheme, defendant admitted to Agent Dixon that he had arranged for Ramesha to drop off the marijuana in front of the prison. Jonnie Spearman, a case manager at Pender County Correctional Institution, testified that defendant was an inmate at the facility on the day of the offense. In the light most favorable to the State, a reasonable mind could conclude from the evidence that defendant was the perpetrator of the offenses charged in the indictments. See Cross, 345 N.C. at 717, 483 S.E.2d at 434. Accordingly, we conclude the trial court did not err by denying defendant's motion to dismiss the charges.
    No error.
    Judges MARTIN and BRYANT concur.
    Report per Rule 30(e).

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