A decision without a published opinion is authority only in the case in which such decision is rendered and should not be cited in any other case in any court for any other purpose, nor should any court consider any such decision for any purpose except in the case in which such decision is rendered. See Rule of Appellate Procedure 30 (e)(3).

NO. COA01-1156
                                          &nb sp; 
                                          &nb sp; 
Filed: 7 May 2002


v .                         Columbus County
                            Nos. 98 CRS 3197, 98 CRS 3202,
RHASSAN SMALL a/k/a                98 CRS 3597-98, 98 CRS 3611,
GREGORY DAVID JORDAN,            98 CRS 5649-57

    Appeal by defendant from judgments entered 25 May 2001 by Judge James F. Ammons, Jr., in Columbus County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 22 April 2002.

    Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Tracy C. Curtner, for the State.

    Edwin L. West, III, P.L.L.C., by Edwin L. West, III, for defendant-appellant.

    MARTIN, Judge.

    On 11 December 2000, defendant pled no contest, pursuant to a plea arrangement, to fourteen counts of obtaining property by false pretenses. After consolidating several of the counts for judgment, the trial court imposed five consecutive sentences having a total minimum term of thirty months and a total maximum term of forty months imprisonment. The trial court then suspended the sentences and placed defendant on supervised probation for thirty-six months.
    On 3 January 2001, defendant's probation officer filed a violation report which alleged defendant had violated three conditions of his probation: (1) moving without informing his probation officer; (2) violating his curfew on three dates; and (3)failing to report on 2 January 2001 and failing to report a change in his employment status. Judge James F. Ammons, Jr., held a probation violation hearing on 25 May 2001. While defendant admitted through counsel failing to report and violating curfew, he denied doing so willfully. He denied moving without informing his probation officer and also asserted he had been fired from his job because of repeated calls from the probation office.
    During the State's cross-examination of defendant, the following exchange occurred:
        Q. [Y]ou tested positive, sir, for cocaine on November second of the year 2000; is that correct?

        [Defense counsel]: Objection.

        COURT: Overruled.

            . . . .
        Q. Is it correct that you have tested positive for cocaine on November 2, 2000 and that a violation report exist[s] that says that?

        A. I'm not aware of that.

        Q. Are you aware of this violation report, sir; would you like to read it?

        A. Yes, I would.

        Q. May I approach?

        [Defense counsel]: Judge, I'd like to see it first.

        COURT: All right. I'm going to sustain the objection. Anything else?

The State then asked defendant about charges in South Carolina of obtaining property by false pretense, of financial identity fraud, and of possession of a stolen automobile. Defense counsel objectedat that time, and the following exchange occurred:
        COURT: Are these pending charges in South Carolina?

        [State]: Yes, sir.

        COURT: All right. Sustained.

        [Defense counsel]: Motion to strike.

        COURT: Allowed. All right, any further questions?

    At the close of the evidence, the trial court found that defendant had willfully and without valid excuse violated each of the three conditions of probation alleged in the violation report. The trial court then revoked defendant's probation and activated his five suspended judgments. From the trial court's judgments, defendant appeals.
    Defendant contends the trial court erred in overruling his objections to the introduction of “inadmissible and prejudicial” evidence at his probation violation hearing. He argues the resulting prejudice was not cured when the trial court subsequently sustained his objections. We disagree.
    The trial court did initially overrule defendant's objections to the State's questions about a positive drug test and about pending charges against him. However, in each instance, the trial court subsequently sustained defendant's objections and allowed defendant's motion to strike the testimony as to the pending charges. Because the trial court sustained defendant's objection to the questions about the pending charges and struck the objectionable testimony, defendant “has no grounds to assignerror.” State v. Hill, 139 N.C. App. 471, 479, 534 S.E.2d 606, 612 (2000).
    As for the State's questions about the positive drug test, defendant waived his right to assert error on appeal by failing to move to strike the objectionable testimony. See State v. Jones, 347 N.C. 193, 491 S.E.2d 641 (1997). Assuming defendant had properly preserved this second issue for appeal, it would be without merit.
        When the trial court hears a matter without a jury and allows both competent and incompetent evidence to be admitted, it is presumed that the trial court ignores the incompetent evidence and considers only that which is competent and that the findings of fact of the court are in no way influenced by hearing the incompetent evidence.

State v. Baines, 40 N.C. App. 545, 548, 253 S.E.2d 300, 302 (1979). Accordingly, defendant's arguments as to both objections are overruled.
    Defendant failed to set out his eight remaining assignments of error in his brief. Because he has neither cited any authority nor stated any reason or argument in support of those assignments of error, they are deemed abandoned. N.C.R. App. P. 28(b)(5) (2001). The trial court's judgments are affirmed.
    Judges HUNTER and BRYANT concur.
    Report per Rule 30(e).

*** Converted from WordPerfect ***