Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 15 March 2001 by
Judge Martin B. McGee in Cabarrus County District Court. Heard in
the Court of Appeals 23 May 2002.
Brooks, Pierce, McLendon, Humphrey & Leonard, L.L.P., by H.
Arthur Bolick, II, and Jessica M. Marlies, for plaintiff
appellee.
Kilpatrick Stockton LLP, by Kurt E. Lindquist, II, Stephen R.
Calkins, Lisa C. Flowers, and Angela D. Seabrooks, for
defendant appellant.
TIMMONS-GOODSON, Judge.
Melissa Solt (“defendant”) appeals from a judgment by the
trial court concluding that Royal Oak Apartments (“plaintiff”)
properly terminated its lease with defendant and that plaintiff was
therefore entitled to possession of the leased premises. For the
reasons stated herein, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The relevant facts of this appeal are as follows: On 24
September 1999, plaintiff entered into a lease agreement with
defendant. Under the lease agreement, defendant's rental payments
were federally subsidized by the United States Department of
Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”). The original term of thelease agreement was from 24 September 1999 until 31 August 2000,
after which the lease continued under a month-to-month tenancy.
Termination provisions in the lease agreement set forth the
following grounds for termination of the lease by the landlord:
(1) the Tenant's material non-compliance with
the terms of this Agreement;
. . . .
(3) criminal activity that threatens the
health, safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment
of the premises by other tenants or any drug
related criminal activity on or near such
premises, engaged in by a tenant, any member
of the tenant's household, or any guest or
other person under the tenant's control; or
. . . .
(5) other good cause.
The lease defined the term “material non-compliance” in part to
include:
(1) one or more substantial violations of the
lease; (2) repeated minor violations of the
lease that: (a) disrupts the livability of the
project, (b) adversely affect the health or
safety of any person or the right of any
tenant to the quiet enjoyment of the leased
premises and related project facilities, (c)
interfere with the management of the project,
or (d) have an adverse financial effect on the
project[.]
When defendant moved into Royal Oak Apartments, she was
married to Travis Eddie (“Eddie”). Eddie, however, did not reside
with defendant and was not a party to the lease agreement.
Although defendant and Eddie were separated, Eddie occasionally
resided at defendant's apartment and was considered a “guest” under
the terms of the lease. On 4 November 2000, Eddie was involved inan altercation with defendant's neighbor on the apartment premises,
during which law enforcement officers were summoned. Following the
4 November incident, plaintiff gave defendant a written “Notice of
Lease Violation,” and verbally warned her that any future
misconduct on the part of her guests would result in the
termination of her lease. Despite the written and verbal warnings,
defendant continued to allow Eddie to frequent her apartment.
On 8 November 2000, defendant and Eddie engaged in a heated
argument that escalated into violent action on Eddie's part.
According to defendant, Eddie “trashed” the apartment and her
personal belongings by, among other things, kicking and punching
holes in the walls, ripping a door from its hinges, and destroying
electronic equipment. Defendant testified that Eddie “was
basically just running wild.” When responding law enforcement
officers arrived, they were forced to subdue Eddie, who resisted
arrest.
Following the 8 November incident, plaintiff terminated the
lease with defendant on 20 November 2000 by giving her formal
written notice of the termination and granting her a period of
thirty days in which to vacate the premises. Defendant disregarded
the notice of termination, however, prompting plaintiff to file a
complaint for summary ejectment. On 19 February 2001, the matter
came before the trial court which, after considering the evidence,
made the following pertinent findings of fact:
4. On 4 November 2000, Mr. Eddie got into a
fight with another at the apartment complex
owned by the Plaintiff. The Defendant was
warned that she would be responsible for thefuture conduct of her guests.
5. The Defendant continued to permit Mr.
Eddie to live with her on the Premises “off
and on” during the following week.
6. On 8 November 2000, Mr. Eddie got into a
confrontation with the Defendant, “trashed”
her apartment, created a disturbance at the
apartment complex and resisted arrest when the
police officers arrived on the scene .
7. On 11 November 2000, the Plaintiff gave
to the Defendant notice to quit and notified
her that her lease would expire on 20 December
2000.
8. The month-to-month lease expired and the
Defendant failed to vacate the Premises.
Based in part on these findings, the trial court concluded that
plaintiff properly terminated defendant's lease and that plaintiff
was thus entitled to possession of the premises. The trial court
further determined that the termination of the lease did not
violate public policy. The trial court therefore entered a
judgment in favor of plaintiff. From this judgment, defendant
appeals.
Defendant argues that the judgment of the trial court must be
reversed in that (1) plaintiff failed to establish proper grounds
upon which to evict defendant; and (2) the trial court approved
eviction of defendant based on mere expiration of the lease and
failed to make specific findings regarding defendant's material
non-compliance with the terms of the lease or other grounds
constituting “good cause.” We examine these issues in turn. Defendant argues that the trial court erred in upholding her
eviction in that she complied with the terms of the lease agreement
and plaintiff had no other good cause to terminate the lease. We
note initially that the trial court's findings of fact are
conclusive on appeal if supported by competent evidence.
See
Foster v. Foster Farms, Inc., 112 N.C. App. 700, 706, 436 S.E.2d
843, 847 (1993). Conclusions of law drawn from the facts found,
however, are fully reviewable
de novo by the appellate court.
See
Mann Contr'rs, Inc. v. Flair With Goldsmith Consultants-II, Inc.,
135 N.C. App. 772, 775, 522 S.E.2d 118, 121 (1999). With this
standard in mind, we review defendant's argument.
“[A] tenant in a federally subsidized housing project has an
'entitlement' to continued occupancy, and to that extent cannot be
evicted unless and until certain procedural protections have been
afforded him, including notice, confrontation of witnesses,
counsel, and a decision by an impartial decision maker based on
evidence adduced at a hearing.”
Apartments, Inc. v. Williams, 43
N.C. App. 648, 650, 260 S.E.2d 146, 148 (1979),
disc. review
denied, 299 N.C. 328, 265 S.E.2d 395 (1980). This entitlement to
occupancy may not be discontinued until “'there exists a cause to
evict other than the mere expiration of the lease.'”
Id. at 651,
260 S.E.2d at 149 (quoting
Joy v. Daniels, 479 F.2d 1236, 1241 (4th
Cir. 1973)). Thus, a tenant in federally subsidized low-income
housing may be evicted where it is established that “good cause”
exists to do so.
See Maxton Housing Authority v. McLean, 313 N.C.
277, 281, 328 S.E.2d 290, 293 (1985). Grounds establishing “goodcause,” as set forth in the federal regulations relating to public
housing and specifically adopted in defendant's lease include: (1)
material non-compliance with the lease; (2) criminal activity
threatening the health, safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment of
the premises by other residents; and (3) other good cause.
See 24
C.F.R. § 880.607 (b)(1) (2002). The term “material non-
compliance,” as defined by the Code of Federal Regulations and
provided in defendant's lease, include “[r]epeated minor violations
of the lease that disrupt the livability of the building” or
“adversely affect the health or safety of any person or the right
of any tenant to the quiet enjoyment of the leased premises[.]” 24
C.F.R. § 880.607(b)(3)(i)(B).
In the present case, there was substantial evidence that (1)
defendant's guest, Eddie, was involved in an altercation on the
apartment premises with defendant's neighbor on 4 November during
which law enforcement officers were summoned; (2) defendant
received written notice following the incident that Eddie's actions
constituted a violation of defendant's lease; (3) plaintiff
verbally warned defendant that she would be held responsible for
any further misconduct on the part of her guests; (4) defendant
allowed Eddie to continue to reside with her despite the 4 November
incident; (5) on 8 November, Eddie and defendant were involved in
an altercation on the apartment premises in which Eddie inflicted
substantial damage on defendant's residence and her personal
property and which required intervention by law enforcement
officers. We conclude that the above-stated actions constituted“good cause” to justify termination of defendant's lease.
Defendant argues that no good cause exists to support
termination of the lease in that it was Eddie's actions that
violated the lease provisions. Defendant notes that “good cause
for eviction does not exist when a public housing tenant is not
personally at fault for a breach of the criminal activity
termination provision of a public housing lease by a member of the
tenant's household.”
Charlotte Housing Authority v. Patterson, 120
N.C. App. 552, 557-58, 464 S.E.2d 68, 72 (1995). As such,
defendant contends that she cannot be held responsible for Eddie's
misconduct, or the lease violations arising therefrom. We
disagree.
In
Charlotte Housing Authority,
the plaintiff brought a
summary ejectment action against the defendant, who was a tenant of
a public housing development managed by the plaintiff. The
plaintiff attempted to evict the defendant after the defendant's
son, who resided with her and was named in her lease, allegedly
shot and killed a person. The trial court rejected the plaintiff's
summary ejectment action, concluding that good cause did not
support the defendant's eviction. On appeal, this Court affirmed
the lower court, noting that the defendant “had no knowledge of the
shooting until after it occurred[;]” that “the gun used in the
shooting was not kept in [the] defendant's home” and “did not
belong to anyone in her household[;]” and that the defendant “had
no reason to know that her son might commit such an act.”
Id.
at
558, 464 S.E.2d at 72. Unlike the tenant in
Charlotte Housing Authority, defendant
in the case at bar had knowledge of the violent propensities of her
guest and took no action to prevent further misconduct from
occurring on the apartment premises. Defendant was specifically
warned, both verbally and in writing, that Eddie's actions
constituted a violation of the lease and that any further
misconduct would result in termination of the lease. Defendant
nevertheless continued to allow Eddie to reside with her. On 8
November 2000, in addition to destroying defendant's apartment,
Eddie “fought off six officers” during an arrest, creating a
disturbance at the apartment complex and adversely affecting the
safety and quiet enjoyment of the premises. Clearly, the repeated
violent acts committed by Eddie constituted “material non-
compliance” with the terms of the lease and gave plaintiff good
cause to terminate the lease.
Defendant nevertheless contends that she had no control over
Eddie's actions and therefore could not have prevented the 8
November incident. Defendant overlooks with this argument the fact
that Eddie was her guest for whose conduct she was responsible.
Under federal regulations, a guest is defined as “a person
temporarily staying in the unit with the consent of a tenant[.]”
24 C.F.R. § 5.100 (2002). There was no evidence that defendant did
not consent to Eddie's presence in her apartment. Further, the
term “other person under the tenant's control” is defined as a
person “on the premises . . . because of an invitation from the
tenant[.]”
Id. Thus, for federal regulation purposes, a tenantexercises “control” over another by virtue of inviting that person
onto the leased premises, rather than, as defendant appears to
argue, by virtue of actually controlling that person's actions.
See Department of Housing and Urban Development v. Rucker, 535 U.S.
125, __, 152 L. Ed. 2d 258, 270 (2002) (holding that, under Title
42, section 1437(d)(l)(6) of the United States Code, local public
housing authorities have the discretion to terminate the lease of
a tenant when a member of that tenant's household or a guest
engages in drug-related activity, regardless of whether the tenant
knew, or should have known, of the drug-related activity). Because
defendant continued to allow Eddie to reside with her on the
apartment premises, she exercised sufficient control over the
situation to be held responsible for the 8 November incident. The
trial court therefore did not err in concluding that termination of
defendant's lease was proper, and we overrule defendant's argument
that good cause did not exist to terminate the lease.
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred when it
determined that termination of the lease was proper because the
lease had expired. Defendant's argument is based on the fact that,
among its other conclusions, the trial court concluded that “[a]t
the time of the filing of this action, the lease period had ended
and the Defendant was holding over after the expiration of the
lease period.” Moreover, the trial court never expressly found
that defendant was in “material non-compliance” with the lease, or
that “good cause” existed to terminate the lease. Noting that mere
expiration of the lease agreement cannot support an eviction,defendant argues that the trial court's decision upholding her
eviction cannot stand. We disagree.
Findings of fact and conclusions of law in a final judgment
are liberally interpreted, and “[i]f the judgment fails to clearly
express the final determination of the court, reference may be had
to the pleadings and findings for the purpose of ascertaining what
was determined.”
Watkins v. Smith, 40 N.C. App. 506, 510, 253
S.E.2d 354, 356-57 (1979). “Necessary legal implications should be
included although not expressed in precise terms.”
Id. at 510, 253
S.E.2d at 357.
Although the trial court never specifically
employed the terms “good cause” and “material non-compliance” in
its findings or conclusions, the judgment and the record clearly
reveal that defendant's lease was terminated for cause and not
merely because of expiration of her lease. The trial court made
specific findings detailing the 4 November and 8 November incidents
to support its conclusion that defendant's “termination was not
against public policy” and that plaintiff “properly terminated the
lease.” These findings and conclusions clearly indicate that the
trial court considered and ruled favorably for plaintiff on the
issue of good cause and sufficiently support its decision that
plaintiff was entitled to possession of the premises. We therefore
elect to treat those findings and conclusions regarding defendant
as a holdover tenant as mere surplusage,
see id. at 510, 253 S.E.2d
at 356, and we overrule this argument.
We recognize that the termination of a lease of a public
housing tenant based on the actions of another may seem a harshresult. The decision to terminate a lease, however, rests within
the discretionary power of the public housing complex, which is
obligated to provide for and ensure the health and safety of all
those residing on the premises.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1437d (l)(6)
(2000) (requiring public housing complexes to utilize leases that
permit termination for any activity by a tenant or guest of a
tenant that threatens the “health, safety, or right to peaceful
enjoyment of the premises by other tenants”). In fact, a public
housing agency may disapprove an owner who does not take steps to
terminate the lease of a disruptive tenant.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1437f
(o)(6)(C) (2000). As such, local public housing agencies cannot
adequately fulfill their duties to provide for peaceful enjoyment
for all of their tenants unless they are allowed to control,
through termination, tenants who invite disruptive persons onto the
leased premises. We hold that the trial court was correct in
determining that termination of defendant's lease was proper, and
that plaintiff was entitled to possession of the premises.
Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is hereby
Affirmed.
Judges MARTIN and CAMPBELL concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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