STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v
.
Durham County
Nos. 00 CRS 56097 and
KENDRICK LAMONT SCOTT, 00 CRS 16692
Defendant.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General
John P. Barkley, for the State.
Miles & Montgomery, by Lisa Miles, for defendant-appellant.
HUDSON, Judge.
A jury found defendant guilty of felonious breaking and
entering, felonious larceny, and possession of stolen goods.
Defendant was convicted as a habitual felon, and was sentenced to
a minimum term of 90 months and a maximum term of 117 months
imprisonment. Defendant appeals.
The State presented evidence that on 6 May 2000 at
approximately 4:30 a.m., Mr. Ronnie Sturdivant heard glass break
and an alarm go off at Janet's Hair Salon at 122 West Parrish
Street in Durham. Mr. Sturdivant owned the building and leased the
space to the hair salon; he and his wife lived in the apartment
upstairs. Mr. Sturdivant got out of bed, dressed and ran down the
back stairs that exited directly beside the hair salon. Mr.Sturdivant saw a person step out of the broken picture window of
the store holding a boombox and a telephone or answering machine.
The person swung the boombox at Mr. Sturdivant, threw down the
items and ran.
Mr. Sturdivant testified that he drove around in his car to
try to find the person and saw him at the Marriott Hotel, just
around the corner from the hair salon. Although the person had
removed his shirt, Mr. Sturdivant was certain that it was the same
person he had seen outside the hair salon. Mr. Sturdivant had a
lead pipe in his hands and told the suspect, later identified as
defendant, that they were going to wait until the police arrived.
Defendant did not try to flee and told Mr. Sturdivant that he had
just gotten out of jail and was trying to get something to eat.
The police arrived approximately two minutes later. One of
the officers on the scene, Officer Scott J. Pennica, noticed some
bulges in defendant's pockets and for his own safety patted down
the defendant. Officer Pennica removed what he described as more
than a handful of large and small white rocks from defendant's
pockets. Officers later discovered white rocks similar to those
found on defendant inside of the hair salon.
The defendant testified that he had been at a friend's house,
then went downtown, and eventually ended up at the loading dock of
the Marriott Hotel. He denied ever being on Parrish Street or
seeing Mr. Sturdivant before Mr. Sturdivant pulled up to the
Marriott in his car. He further denied having broken into Janet's
Hair Salon or taking any items from the store. He claimed that therocks found in his pockets were to be used as part of his daily
prayer or salott. Defendant also claimed that Mr. Sturdivant hit
him with the lead pipe, which Mr. Sturdivant denied. The officers
testified that they saw no signs that defendant had been hit.
Prior to trial, defendant moved to dismiss the habitual felon
count. Judge Orlando F. Hudson heard defendant's motion in the
Superior Court in Durham County on 5 March 2001. Defendant alleged
that a grant from the City of Durham to fund the prosecution of
habitual felons violates the Separation of Powers provisions in the
North Carolina and United States Constitutions. After hearing
arguments from counsel and taking evidence, Judge Hudson denied
defendant's motion. The State proceeded to trial.
The jury convicted defendant on all counts. In the habitual
felon phase of the trial, the State called Myrtle Weaver, assistant
clerk of Superior Court for Durham County. Ms. Weaver identified
State's exhibits eight through sixteen as indictments, transcripts
of guilty pleas and judgments against defendant in case numbers 88
CRS 1106, 96 CRS 13532, and 98 CRS 5224, each involving a felony
offense. The jury convicted defendant of the status of habitual
felon.
Appellate review is confined to those assignments of error
which pertain to the arguments presented. State. v. Barfield, 127
N.C. App. 399, 401, 489 S.E.2d 905, 907 (1997). North Carolina
Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(a) provides that [q]uestions raised
by assignments of error in appeals from trial tribunals but not
then presented and discussed in a party's brief, are deemedabandoned. N.C. R. App. P. 28(a). In his brief, defendant has
not brought forward assignments of error 2, 3, 4, and 6, which are,
therefore, abandoned.
As for defendant's remaining assignments of error, our Supreme
Court has held that the scope of appellate review is limited to
those issues presented by assignment of error set out in the record
on appeal. State v. Williamson, 333 N.C. 128, 138, 423 S.E.2d
766, 71 (1992). The defendant argued in his brief that the
combined use of the Structured Sentencing Act and the Habitual
Felon Act violates defendant's right to due process and constitutes
cruel and unusual punishment under the United States Constitution.
These issues, however, were not contained in any assignment of
error brought forth by defendant and are beyond the scope of
appellate review. Therefore, we decline to address them.
The first issue properly before us is defendant's contention
that the trial court erred in denying defendant's motion to dismiss
the habitual felon indictment. Defendant contends that a grant
awarded to the Durham County District Attorney's office for
prosecution of habitual felons gave the prosecutor a financial
incentive to indict defendant and that this grant violates the
Separation of Powers Clause of both the North Carolina and United
States Constitutions. Here, the defendant's own evidence showed
that the grant was in no way connected to the indictment or
prosecution of a certain number of habitual felons. Further,
defendant's evidence showed that the number of persons indicted or
convicted as habitual felons is not used to evaluate thecontinuation of the grant. Thus, the record reveals no financial
incentive for this prosecutor to have prosecuted this defendant as
a habitual felon.
Next, defendant argues that the combined use of the Habitual
Felon Act and Structured Sentencing constitutes double jeopardy in
violation of the United States Constitution. In State v. Brown, we
rejected this argument and we are bound to follow the decision in
that case. State v. Brown, 146 N.C. App. 299, 552 S.E.2d 234
(2001), disc. review denied, 354 N.C. 576, 559 S.E.2d 186 (2001),
cert. denied, 122 S.Ct. 2305, 152 L.Ed.2d 1061 (2002); Cf. In the
Matter of Appeal from Civil Penalty, 324 N.C. 373, 384, 379 S.E.2d
30, 37 (1989) (holding that [w]here a panel of the Court of
Appeals has decided the same issue, albeit in a different case, a
subsequent panel of the same court is bound by that precedent,
unless it has been overturned by a higher court). This assignment
of error is overruled.
No error.
Judges McGEE and BIGGS concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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