A decision without a published opinion is authority only in the case in which such decision is rendered and should not be cited in any other case in any court for any other purpose, nor should any court consider any such decision for any purpose except in
the case in which such decision is rendered. See Rule of Appellate Procedure 30 (e)(3).
NO. COA01-1421
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed: 16 July 2002
MICHAEL JOLLY,
by and through his guardian,
David Jolly,
Plaintiff-appellee,
v
.
Brunswick County
No. 01 CVS 884
GARCIA'S INC. a South
Carolina Corporation,
Defendant-appellant.
Appeal by defendant from order entered 6 August 2001 by Judge
James F. Ammons, Jr. in Brunswick County Superior Court. Heard in
the Court of Appeals 5 June 2002.
The Del Re' Law Firm, by Benedict J. Del Re', Jr., for
plaintiff-appellee.
Hudson & Gentry, LLC, by J. Dwight Hudson, for defendant-
appellant.
BRYANT, Judge.
Defendant appeals from an order denying its motion to dismiss
for lack of in personam jurisdiction. Defendant, Garcia's Inc., is
a South Carolina Corporation that operates Garcia's Restaurant in
Myrtle Beach, South Carolina. Plaintiff is a minor who resides
with his father in Calabash, which is in Brunswick County, North
Carolina. In his complaint, plaintiff alleges that on 4 May 2000,
plaintiff and his employer, Jeffrey Dwayne Leonard [Leonard],
finished work and drove to Garcia's at approximately 6:30 p.m.
Defendant's bartender served them each up to ten alcoholic
beverages in just over one hour. Plaintiff and Leonard thenreturned home. After crossing into North Carolina, Leonard lost
control of the vehicle and collided with a culvert. Plaintiff
suffered severe physical injuries as a result of the accident.
Plaintiff commenced this action on 2 May 2001, alleging that
defendant's employees failed to stop serving plaintiff and Leonard
alcoholic beverages after it was obvious that they were physically
and mentally impaired. Plaintiff also alleges that defendant's
employees failed to prevent them from operating a vehicle. On 8
June 2001, defendant filed a motion to dismiss for lack of in
personam jurisdiction. On 6 August 2001, the trial court filed an
order denying defendant's motion. Defendant appealed.
_________________
Defendant argues that: 1) the trial court erred in finding
facts without a sufficient basis; 2) plaintiff failed to meet his
burden of establishing that the court had in personam jurisdiction;
and 3) the exercise of in personam jurisdiction over defendant
violates its due process rights. We disagree and affirm the trial
court's order denying defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of in
personam jurisdiction.
I.
We first note that this appeal is from an interlocutory order.
"'An order or judgment is interlocutory if it is made during the
pendency of an action and does not dispose of the case but requires
further action by the trial court in order to finally determine the
entire controversy.'" Turner v. Norfolk S. Corp., 137 N.C. App.
138, 141, 526 S.E.2d 666, 669 (2000) (quoting N.C. Dep't of Transp.v. Page, 119 N.C. App. 730, 733, 460 S.E.2d 332, 334 (1995)).
Generally, there is no right to appeal from an interlocutory order.
Id. However, an appeal from an interlocutory order may be taken
under two circumstances: 1) the order is final as to some but not
all the parties and there is no just reason to delay the appeal; or
2) the order deprives the appellant of a substantial right that
would be lost unless immediately reviewed. Id.; see N.C.G.S. §§ 1-
277(a), 7A-27(d) (2001). An order denying a motion to dismiss for
lack of in personam jurisdiction is immediately appealable because
it affects a substantial right. N.C.G.S. § 1-277(b); Duke Univ. v.
Bryant-Durham Elec. Co., Inc., 66 N.C. App. 726, 311 S.E.2d 638
(1984).
II.
We next determine whether the trial court erred in making
several findings of fact leading to its conclusion that the court
had in personam jurisdiction over defendant. The plaintiff has the
burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the
trial court has jurisdiction over the defendant.
Church v. Carter,
94 N.C. App. 286, 289, 380 S.E.2d 167, 169 (1989). The judge is
not required to make findings of fact to support a ruling on a
motion to dismiss, unless requested by the parties.
Id.;
see
N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 52(a)(2) (2001).
If requested, the findings
of fact and conclusions of law "must be sufficiently detailed to
allow meaningful review."
Andrews v. Peters, 318 N.C. 133, 138,
347 S.E.2d 409, 412 (1986). The standard of reviewing findings of
fact by a trial court sitting without a jury is whether there isany competent evidence in the record to support the findings.
Hollerbach v. Hollerbach, 90 N.C. App. 384, 387, 368 S.E.2d 413,
415 (1988).
Defendant specifically challenges the following findings of
fact: 1) that plaintiff was served numerous drinks; 2) that
The
Sun News is local to North Carolina; 3) that defendant chose to
solicit business or perform services in North Carolina by
advertising in
The Sun News; and 4) that defendant did business
with multiple distributors or suppliers and that defendant dealt
with food distributors in North Carolina.
Defendant first challenges the trial court's finding that
plaintiff was served numerous drinks at defendant's restaurant.
Plaintiff's evidence shows that he and Leonard were each served
approximately ten alcoholic beverages in just over an hour. The
bartender never determined that plaintiff was underage. Medical
records indicate that Leonard's blood alcohol concentration was
.20
(See footnote 1)
when Leonard was treated some time after the accident.
Medical records also indicate that no anesthesia was needed to set
Leonard's fractured wrist due to his high level of intoxication.
We conclude that there is competent evidence in the record in
support of the trial court's finding.
Defendant next challenges the trial court's finding that
The
Sun News is local to North Carolina. The trial court found that
The Sun News serves Horry County, South Carolina (Myrtle Beach),
and Brunswick County, North Carolina. The paper is regularly
delivered to the Calabash and Carolina Shores areas in Brunswick
County via home and box delivery. Plaintiff's attorney, through
affidavit, stated that
The Sun News is available in most areas of
heavy pedestrian traffic in Brunswick County, including convenience
stores and shopping malls. Further, plaintiff presented evidence
that
The Sun News has a section entitled '
Local & the Carolinas.'
A sample clipping from this section features articles about North
Carolina schools and government. Based on the evidence in the
record, we conclude that there is competent evidence in support of
the trial court's findings that
The Sun News serves Brunswick
County.
Defendant also challenges the trial court's finding that
defendant chose to solicit business or perform services in North
Carolina by advertising in
The Sun News. The trial court found
that defendant's advertisements were "a solicitation to do business
with the Defendant as contemplated by . . . the Long Arm Statute
for the State of North Carolina." The trial court further found
that defendant also does business with at least one food supplier
or distributor in North Carolina.
In support of its argument, defendant presented an affidavit
of Gene LeDuc, a co-owner of Garcia's Restaurant. In his
affidavit, LeDuc states that defendant "does not do any advertising
campaigns directed at any citizens and residents of the State of
North Carolina." LeDuc further states that defendant "does not doany specific advertising campaigns earmarked for citizens and
residents of Brunswick County." Rather, LeDuc states that "[t]he
only advertising done by [defendant] is through publication in the
Sun News[,] a newspaper published in Myrtle Beach, South Carolina
on a periodical basis." We disagree. Although
The Sun Times is a
Myrtle Beach publication, it is clear that the newspaper services
Brunswick, a border county in North Carolina. The newspaper is
distributed in various areas in Brunswick County and has a section
devoted to local news, including North Carolina news. Accordingly,
this assignment of error is overruled.
Finally, defendant argues that the trial court erred in
finding that defendant did business with multiple distributors or
suppliers and that defendant dealt with food distributors in North
Carolina. In its order denying defendant's motion to dismiss for
lack of personal jurisdiction, the trial court found:
That the Defendant does other business with
the State of North Carolina in the form of
food distribution with North Carolina
Suppliers or Distributors. That Defendant's
Affidavit confirms at least one North Carolina
State supplier or distributor. That said
contacts invoke the protection of the laws of
the State of North Carolina.
The trial court specifically found that defendant did business with
"at least one" supplier or distributor in North Carolina. As such,
we find it unnecessary to address this argument further.
Based on the above, we conclude that there is competent
evidence in the record in support of the trial court's findings of
fact and hold that the trial court did not err in making such
findings.
III.
We next address whether plaintiff met his burden of
establishing that the court had in personam jurisdiction over
defendant. As we stated above, the plaintiff has the burden of
establishing in personam jurisdiction by a preponderance of the
evidence. Church v. Carter, 94 N.C. App. 286, 289, 380 S.E.2d 167,
169 (1989). A two-step analysis applies when determining whether
a court may exercise in personam jurisdiction over a non-resident
defendant. First, is there statutory authority that confers
jurisdiction on the court? Dillon v. Numismatic Funding Corp., 291
N.C. 674, 675, 231 S.E.2d 629, 630 (1977). This is determined by
looking at North Carolina's "long arm" statute. Id. (referring to
N.C.G.S. § 1-75.4 (2001)). Second, if statutory authority confers
in personam jurisdiction over the defendant, does the exercise of
in personam jurisdiction violate the defendant's due process
rights? Id.
We first address the issue of statutory authority. N.C.G.S.
§ 1-75.4(4) provides in pertinent part that a North Carolina court
has in personam jurisdiction over a defendant for a foreign act
resulting in a local injury. A court has jurisdiction
[i]n any action . . . claiming injury to
person or property within this State arising
out of an act or omission outside this State
by the defendant, provided in addition that at
or about the time of the injury either:
a. Solicitation or services
activities were carried on within
this State by or on behalf of the
defendant . . . .
N.C.G.S. § 1-75.4(4)a (2001). "Subject to the limitations imposed
by due process, [our long arm statute] should be liberally
construed in favor of finding personal jurisdiction." Fungaroli v.
Fungaroli, 51 N.C. App. 363, 365, 276 S.E.2d 521, 522 (1981)
(citing Telerent Leasing Corp. v. Equity Assocs., 36 N.C. App. 713,
245 S.E.2d 229 (1978); Dillon v. Numismatic Funding Corp., 29 N.C.
App. 513, 225 S.E.2d 137 (1976), rev'd on other grounds, 291 N.C.
674, 231 S.E.2d 629 (1977)).
In this case, plaintiff alleged in his complaint and by
affidavit in support of his complaint that on 4 May 2000, plaintiff
and Leonard were served numerous drinks in the bar of Garcia's
Restaurant in Myrtle Beach, South Carolina. On the way back to
North Carolina, plaintiff and Leonard were involved in an
automobile accident in which plaintiff sustained severe physical
injuries. Leonard's blood alcohol concentration was two-and-a-half
times the legal limit. Additionally, plaintiff's attorney stated
in an affidavit that defendant purchased food from a North Carolina
supplier. A co-owner of Garcia's verified in his affidavit that
Garcia's purchases produce from Honeycutt Produce in North
Carolina. Both parties presented affidavits stating that defendant
advertises in The Sun News, a newspaper published in Myrtle Beach.
Plaintiff presented evidence that The Sun News is distributed in
North Carolina. Finally, defendant maintains a listing in the
phone directory circulated in Brunswick County. Based on this
evidence, we conclude that plaintiff met his burden of establishing
that the court had jurisdiction under N.C.G.S. § 1-75.4(4) of ourlong arm statute. "Where unverified allegations in the complaint
meet plaintiff's 'initial burden of proving the existence of
jurisdiction . . . and defendant[s] d[o] not contradict plaintiff's
allegations in their sworn affidavit,' such allegations are
accepted as true and deemed controlling." Bruggeman v. Meditrust
Acquisition Co., 138 N.C. App. 612, 615, 532 S.E.2d 215, 218
(quoting Inspirational Network, Inc. v. Combs, 131 N.C. App. 231,
235, 506 S.E.2d 754, 758 (1998)), appeal dismissed and review
denied, 353 N.C. 261, 546 S.E.2d 90 (2000). Accordingly, this
assignment of error is overruled.
IV.
We next address whether the exercise of in personam
jurisdiction over defendant violates due process. The exercise of
in personam jurisdiction must comport with due process. To comport
with due process, the defendant must have minimum contacts in the
forum state. Godwin v. Walls, 118 N.C. App. 341, 353, 455 S.E.2d
473, 482 (1995). Minimum contacts must be such that the exercise
of in personam jurisdiction "does not offend 'traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice.'" Int'l Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 90 L. Ed. 95, 102 (1945) (quoting
Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463, 85 L. Ed. 278, 283 (1940)).
The defendant must have invoked the benefits and protections of the
laws of the forum state by purposely availing himself of the
privilege of doing business in that state. Godwin, 118 N.C. App.
at 353, 455 S.E.2d at 482. "This relationship between the
defendant and the forum must be 'such that he should reasonablyanticipate being haled into court there.'" Tom Togs, Inc. v. Ben
Elias Indus. Corp., 318 N.C. 361, 365, 348 S.E.2d 782, 786 (1986)
(quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297,
62 L. Ed. 2d 490, 501 (1980)).
In determining minimum contacts, the court looks at several
factors, including: 1) the quantity of the contacts; 2) the
nature and quality of the contacts; 3) the source and connection
of the cause of action with those contacts; 4) the interest of the
forum state; and 5) the convenience to the parties. Phoenix Am.
Corp. v. Brissey, 46 N.C. App. 527, 530-31, 265 S.E.2d 476, 479
(1980); see Corbin Russwin, Inc. v. Alexander's Hardware, Inc., 147
N.C. App. 722, 556 S.E.2d 592 (2001). These factors are not to be
applied mechanically; rather, the court must weigh the factors and
determine what is fair and reasonable to both parties. Id. at 531,
265 S.E.2d at 479 (citing Farmer v. Ferris, 260 N.C. 619, 625, 133
S.E.2d 492, 497 (1963)). No single factor controls; rather, all
factors "must be weighed in light of fundamental fairness and the
circumstances of the case." B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Tire King of
Greensboro, Inc., 80 N.C. App. 129, 132, 341 S.E.2d 65, 67 (1986).
As we stated above, the trial court found that defendant
solicits business in The Sun News, which is regularly delivered to
homes in the Calabash and Carolina Shores areas of Brunswick
County, as well as other areas, and has a section covering local
and North Carolina news. The trial court also found that defendant
utilizes food suppliers or distributors in North Carolina.
Further, the trial court found that the advertising was sufficientto constitute solicitation and establish in personam jurisdiction
under our long arm statute. We agree.
Defendant purchases some of its fresh produce used in its
restaurant at a farm or produce stand in North Carolina. Further,
defendant advertises its bar and restaurant in The Sun Times,
which, although a "local" South Carolina publication, also serves
border communities in Brunswick County, North Carolina. This
service ranges from home and business delivery to a section in the
paper that carries North Carolina news. Defendant advertises live
music performers appearing at Garcia's and that there is no entry
fee, an added enticement to visit the establishment. Defendant
also has a listing in the Brunswick County telephone directory
circulated throughout Brunswick County. By placing advertisements
in a newspaper circulated in North Carolina, purchasing produce
within North Carolina and maintaining telephone listings in a North
Carolina telephone directory, defendant should reasonably
anticipate being haled into court in this State. See Tom Togs,
Inc. v. Ben Elias Indus. Corp., 318 N.C. 361, 365, 348 S.E.2d 782,
786 (1986) (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444
U.S. 286, 297, 100 S. Ct. 559, 567, 62 L. Ed. 2d 490, 501 (1980)).
Accordingly, this assignment of error is overruled.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that there is competent
evidence in the record in support of the trial court's findings and
hold that the trial court did not err in concluding that plaintiffhad established in personam jurisdiction by a preponderance of the
evidence.
AFFIRMED.
Judges WALKER and McCULLOUGH concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
Footnote: 1 In North Carolina, one who drives a motor vehicle with a
blood alcohol concentration of .08 or more is Driving While
Impaired. N.C.G.S. § 20-138.1 (2001). Leonard's blood alcohol
concentration was two-and-a-half times the legal limit.
*** Converted from WordPerfect ***