LAVERNE ELLERBE-CHISOLM,
Plaintiff
v. Mecklenburg County
No. 98 CVD 14066
JOSEPH FRANKLIN CHISOLM,
Defendant
Pamela A. Hunter for plaintiff-appellant.
No brief for defendant-appellee.
WYNN, Judge.
This appeal arises from an equitable distribution judgment
that divided the marital estate equally, and ordered the plaintiff-
wife, Laverne Ellerbe-Chisolm pay to her defendant-husband, Joseph
Franklin Chisolm $10,987.73 as a distributional payment within 60
days. From the denial of plaintiff's motions for relief from that
judgment under Rules 59 and 60(b) of the North Carolina Rules of
Civil Procedure, plaintiff appeals. We affirm the trial court's
judgment.
From the outset, we point out that while plaintiff seeks to
argue the merits of the equitable distribution judgment, she did
not notice appeal from that judgment. Instead, plaintiff noticedappeal from the order denying her post-trial motion for relief from
the equitable distribution judgment. Accordingly, the only issue
presently before this Court is whether the trial court abused its
discretion in denying plaintiff's Rules 59 and 60(b) motions.
It is well settled that motions for relief under Rules 59 and
60(b) are “addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court and
appellate review is limited to determining whether the court abused
its discretion.” Vuncannon v. Vuncannon, 82 N.C. App. 255, 258,
346 S.E.2d 274, 276 (1986). Plaintiff raises no argument that the
trial court abused its discretion in denying her post-trial
motions, and after a thorough review of the record, we conclude no
such abuse occurred.
Indeed, in this case, District Court Judge Louis A. Trosch,
Jr., who originally heard this matter and entered the equitable
distribution judgment, was also the judge who heard plaintiff's
post-trial motions for relief from the equitable judgment. Judge
Trosch found no merit in plaintiff's arguments--that it was error
for the court to consider defendant's health at the time of the
equitable distribution hearing in making his distributional
decision, and that it was error for the court not to consider the
price break plaintiff received on the marital home in valuing the
marital estate. The judge then concluded: “There are no grounds
for a New Trial, Amendment of Judgment or Relief from Judgment or
Order.”
On appeal, plaintiff in essence challenges the trial court's
consideration of defendant's health at the time of the hearing asa distributional factor. However, in Harris v. Harris this Court
stated,
The factors listed under [G.S. 50-20](c)
indicate that the legislature intended to
grant the trial court the authority to
consider the future prospects of the parties,
as well as their status at the time of the
hearing, in determining whether an equal
division of marital assets would be equitable.
The statute directs the court to consider,
among other things, obligations for support
arising out of prior marriages, the age and
health of the parties, the need of the
custodial parent to own or occupy the marital
residence, expectations of nonvested pension
or retirement rights, and contributions to the
development of the other spouse's career
potential. All of these factors relate, in
part, to future prospects and responsibilities
of the parties.
84 N.C. App. 353, 359, 352 S.E.2d 869, 873 (1987) (emphases added).
In light of Harris, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in denying plaintiff's Rules 59 and 60(b) motions for
relief from the trial court's equitable distribution judgment.
Affirmed.
Judges MCGEE and CAMPBELL concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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