STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v. Guilford County
No. 01 CRS 31377
DONALD ANTHONY CARTER
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General
Mary S. Mercer, for the State.
Terry W. Alford for defendant-appellant.
WYNN, Judge.
Following his conviction for assault with a deadly weapon on
a government official, defendant appeals based on two issues: (1)
The trial court's failure to grant his request to admit
photographic evidence not offered by his attorney, and (2) The
trial court's failure to dismiss the charge against him because of
insufficient evidence. We find no error and therefore uphold his
conviction and sentence of 19 to 23 months imprisonment.
The State's evidence tended to show that on 6 March 2001,
Forsyth County law enforcement pursued defendant who drove a pickup
truck in an easterly direction on Interstate 40. Once defendant
crossed the county line into Guilford County, Greensboro PoliceCaptain Alfred C. Stewart, Jr. and Officer Brett E. Davis joined in
the chase. Defendant exited Interstate 40 and proceeded on Mount
Church Road. After Officer Davis bumped defendant's truck, the
truck stalled in deep sand on the shoulder of the road. Captain
Stewart placed his patrol vehicle in front of defendant's vehicle
to prevent defendant from fleeing. Defendant rocked his vehicle
back and forth, ramming into Captain Stewart's patrol vehicle.
Defendant backed out of the sand and drove down Old Liberty Road.
Officer Davis pursued defendant in his patrol vehicle with its
lights and siren activated.
The pursuit continued into Randolph County at speeds exceeding
100 miles per hour. Defendant attempted to make a left turn at an
intersection, missed the turn, drove through a parking lot and
crashed into a brick building. When Officer Davis followed
defendant into the parking lot, defendant put his truck into
reverse, spun around and struck the left side of Officer Davis'
patrol vehicle. Defendant then accelerated and pushed Officer
Davis' patrol vehicle into the curb, which broke the axle of the
patrol vehicle and rendered the vehicle inoperable. Officer Davis
testified that defendant had “plenty of room to go around my
vehicle.” Defendant eventually came to a stop and was taken into
custody.
On appeal from his conviction of assault with a deadly weapon
on a law enforcement officer (Officer Davis), defendant first
contends the trial court erred by not allowing him to introduce
pictures of his pickup truck into evidence. During directexamination, defendant testified that Officer Stewart rammed his
car into his passenger side “[a]nd I have pictures of the truck
here. (Indicated.)” After defendant's attorney concluded her
questioning on redirect, the following colloquy took place:
[DEFENSE ATTORNEY]: Thank you. Nothing
further, Your Honor.
THE DEFENDANT: But what about my pictures? Do
I get to show them?
THE COURT: You need to step down. Your
attorney hasn't offered them.
(The witness left the stand)
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, that would be
the evidence for the defense.
Defendant, relying on State v. Ali, 329 N.C. 394, 407 S.E.2d
183 (1991), argues that his attorney should have honored his
request to introduce the photographs. In Ali, our Supreme Court
held that "when counsel and a fully informed criminal defendant
client reach an absolute impasse as to . . . tactical decisions,
the client's wishes must control[.]" Ali, 329 N.C. at 404, 407
S.E.2d at 189. In a subsequent decision, our Supreme Court held
that Ali did not apply where there was no indication of an absolute
impasse, and at no time did defendant voice any complaints to the
trial court as to tactics of defense team. State v. McCarver, 341
N.C. 364, 385, 462 S.E.2d 25, 36 (1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S.
1110, 134 L. Ed. 2d 482 (1996).
Like McCarver, the record here reveals no indication of "an
absolute impasse" between defendant and his attorney concerning
trial tactics and defendant did not voice any complaints to thetrial court as to his attorney's tactics. Accordingly, this
assignment of error is without merit.
Defendant also contends the trial court erred by denying his
motion to dismiss based on insufficiency of the evidence. The
standard for ruling on a motion to dismiss "is whether there is
substantial evidence (1) of each essential element of the offense
charged and (2) that defendant is the perpetrator of the offense."
State v. Lynch, 327 N.C. 210, 215, 393 S.E.2d 811, 814 (1990).
“Substantial evidence is that which a reasonable juror would
consider sufficient to support the conclusion that each essential
element of the crime exists.” State v. Baldwin, 141 N.C. App. 596,
604, 540 S.E.2d 815, 821 (2000). In ruling on a motion to dismiss,
the trial court must consider all of the evidence in the light most
favorable to the State, and the State is entitled to all reasonable
inferences which may be drawn from the evidence. State v. Davis,
130 N.C. App. 675, 679, 505 S.E.2d 138, 141 (1998). “Any
contradictions or discrepancies arising from the evidence are
properly left for the jury to resolve and do not warrant
dismissal.” State v. King, 343 N.C. 29, 36, 468 S.E.2d 232, 237
(1996).
To prevail on the charge against defendant in this case, the
State must present substantial evidence of: (1) an assault; (2)
with a deadly weapon; (3) on a law enforcement officer; (4) in
performance of his official duties. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14- 34.2
(2001). Assault with a deadly weapon on a government officer is a
general intent offense. Therefore, the jury is not required tofind that defendant possessed any intent beyond the intent to
commit the unlawful act, and this will be inferred or presumed from
the act itself. See State v. Page, 346 N.C. 689, 700, 488 S.E.2d
225, 232, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1056, 139 L. Ed. 2d 651 (1997).
Defendant argues the State failed to prove he “'intentionally'
rammed his car into the [police vehicle].” We disagree.
Here, the State's evidence showed that defendant reversed his pick
up truck and struck Officer Davis' patrol vehicle. He then
accelerated and pushed Officer Davis' patrol vehicle into the curb,
breaking the axle of the patrol vehicle. Defendant did this
despite having “plenty of room to go around [Officer Davis's]
vehicle.” From these facts, a reasonable jury could infer
defendant's intentional act constituted an assault on Officer
Davis. Accordingly, the trial court properly denied defendant's
motion to dismiss.
No error.
Judges MCGEE and CAMPBELL concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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