IN THE MATTER OF: Cabarrus County
RAYQUAN HAYES, No. 99 J 85
A Minor Child.
Kathleen Arundell Widelski for petitioner-appellee Cabarrus
County Department of Social Services.
Amy S. Davis for respondent-appellant.
WYNN, Judge.
Respondent Niger Hayes is the child's mother. The minor
child was born on 25 November 1995. On 30 April 1999, the Cabarrus
Department of Social Services (“DSS”) received a report stating
that the minor child had been brought to the Northeast Medical
Center Emergency Room with second and third degree burns on his
feet, legs, buttocks and scrotum. He was transported to the burn
center at the University of North Carolina where he was treated for
immersion burns on the lower half of his body. His injuries were
consistent with being forcibly held down in scalding water. While
at the burn center, the minor child blamed William Alfonzo Miller,
the respondent's boyfriend, for his injuries. Further examination
revealed that the minor child had six rib fractures and a fracturedhumerus. Accordingly, on 1 June 1999, a non-secure custody order
was entered and the minor child was placed in the custody of DSS.
On the same date, DSS filed a petition alleging that the minor
child was an abused juvenile. On 2 March 2000, nunc pro tunc 30
September 1999, the minor child was adjudicated an abused juvenile.
On 17 March 2000, a petition to terminate parental rights was
filed by DSS alleging that respondent: (1) had abused and neglected
the minor child and (2) that respondent had failed to pay a
reasonable portion of the cost of child care for the children in
the six months preceding the filing of the petition. On 6 April
2000, an adjudication consent order was entered whereby respondent
stipulated that the minor child was an abused juvenile, as alleged
in the petition in that she allowed Miller to injure the minor
child.
On 26 September 2000, the trial court determined that
respondent's parental rights should be terminated. The trial court
found that respondent had abused and neglected the minor child
within the meaning of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-101(1) and (15), and
concluded that if the minor child was returned to respondent, there
was a probability of repetition of abuse. The trial court noted
that respondent: (1) had “repeatedly denied that Mr. Miller caused
the minor child's injury despite evidence to the contrary”; (2)
although no longer in an intimate relationship with Miller, still
relied on him for transportation and was frequently in his
presence; “maintained passive to the services offered and still has
not completed counseling even though the minor child has been infoster care for over (1) year.” Accordingly, the trial court
concluded that it was in the best interests of the child that
respondent's parental rights be terminated. Respondent appeals.
Respondent argues that the trial court abused its discretion
by terminating her parental rights. First, respondent contends
that there was insufficient evidence to establish that she had
abused the minor child or allowed him to be abused. Respondent
asserts that she did not know that Miller was abusing the minor
child. Second, respondent argues that the probability of
repetition of abuse did not exist at the time of termination.
Respondent notes that by the time of the hearing, she had severed
her romantic relationship with Miller, had her own apartment, and
went to parenting classes. Respondent further asserts that there
were no findings to support a determination of neglect.
Accordingly, respondent contends the trial court erred by
concluding that termination was in the minor child's best
interests.
After careful review of the record, briefs and contentions of
the parties, we affirm. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111 (2001) sets out
the statutory grounds for terminating parental rights. A finding
of any one of the separately enumerated grounds is sufficient to
support a termination. In re Taylor, 97 N.C. App. 57, 64, 387
S.E.2d 230, 233-34 (1990). “[T]he party petitioning for the
termination must show by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence
that grounds authorizing the termination of parental rights exist.
In re Young, 346 N.C. 244, 247, 485 S.E.2d 612, 614 (1997)(citing N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-289.30(e)).
Here, the trial court concluded that respondent had abused the
minor child within the meaning of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(1).
The trial court based its conclusion and findings on evidence that
respondent had pled guilty to misdemeanor child abuse, stipulated
to allowing Miller to abuse the minor child, yet failed to address
the issues that led to the abuse. Dana Horn, a social worker who
worked with respondent, testified that respondent disagreed with
the recommendations made to her, and that respondent felt that
there were no issues that she needed to address. Respondent failed
to complete treatment recommendations, and did not complete
counseling. Furthermore, respondent continues to maintain a
relationship with Miller, and denies any responsibility for the
abuse. Accordingly, we conclude there was clear, cogent and
convincing evidence to support the trial court's finding that
respondent had abused the minor child and that there was a
probability of repetition of abuse should he be returned to
respondent.
Since grounds exist pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111 to
support the trial court's order, the remaining grounds found by the
trial court to support termination need not be reviewed by this
Court. Taylor, 97 N.C. App. at 64, 387 S.E.2d at 233-34.
DSS argues that the trial court erred by not finding that
respondent failed to pay a portion to Cabarrus County Department of
Social Services (“DSS”) for the minor child's child care although
financially able to do so. However, because grounds exist tosupport termination, we need not consider DSS's cross-assignment of
error.
Once the trial court has found that grounds exist to terminate
parental rights, “the court shall issue an order terminating the
parental rights of such parent with respect to the juvenile unless
the court shall further determine that the best interests of the
juvenile require that the parental rights of the parent not be
terminated.” N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 7B-1110(a) (2001). The trial
court's decision to terminate parental rights at the disposition
stage is discretionary. See In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. 101, 110,
316 S.E.2d 246, 252 (1984). Here, the trial court found that it
was in the best interests of the child that respondent's parental
rights be terminated. Furthermore, the trial court found that the
minor child was in foster care and had bonded with his foster
family. Based upon the facts in this case, we hold the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in determining that termination was in
the children's best interests. Accordingly, the order terminating
respondent's parental rights is affirmed.
Affirmed.
Judges McGEE and CAMPBELL concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
*** Converted from WordPerfect ***