A decision without a published opinion is authority only in the case in which such decision is rendered and should not be cited in any other case in any court for any other purpose, nor should any court consider any such decision for any purpose except in the case in which such decision is rendered. See Rule of Appellate Procedure 30 (e)(3).

NO. COA02-87

NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS

Filed: 3 September 2002

IN THE MATTER OF:                    Cabarrus County
RAYQUAN HAYES,                        No. 99 J 85
A Minor Child.

    

    Appeal by respondent from order entered 26 September 2000 by Judge Donna H. Johnson in District Court, Cabarrus County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 26 August 2002.

    Kathleen Arundell Widelski for petitioner-appellee Cabarrus County Department of Social Services.

    Amy S. Davis for respondent-appellant.

    WYNN, Judge.

     Respondent Niger Hayes is the child's mother. The minor child was born on 25 November 1995. On 30 April 1999, the Cabarrus Department of Social Services (“DSS”) received a report stating that the minor child had been brought to the Northeast Medical Center Emergency Room with second and third degree burns on his feet, legs, buttocks and scrotum. He was transported to the burn center at the University of North Carolina where he was treated for immersion burns on the lower half of his body. His injuries were consistent with being forcibly held down in scalding water. While at the burn center, the minor child blamed William Alfonzo Miller, the respondent's boyfriend, for his injuries. Further examination revealed that the minor child had six rib fractures and a fracturedhumerus. Accordingly, on 1 June 1999, a non-secure custody order was entered and the minor child was placed in the custody of DSS. On the same date, DSS filed a petition alleging that the minor child was an abused juvenile. On 2 March 2000, nunc pro tunc 30 September 1999, the minor child was adjudicated an abused juvenile.     On 17 March 2000, a petition to terminate parental rights was filed by DSS alleging that respondent: (1) had abused and neglected the minor child and (2) that respondent had failed to pay a reasonable portion of the cost of child care for the children in the six months preceding the filing of the petition. On 6 April 2000, an adjudication consent order was entered whereby respondent stipulated that the minor child was an abused juvenile, as alleged in the petition in that she allowed Miller to injure the minor child.
    On 26 September 2000, the trial court determined that respondent's parental rights should be terminated. The trial court found that respondent had abused and neglected the minor child within the meaning of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-101(1) and (15), and concluded that if the minor child was returned to respondent, there was a probability of repetition of abuse. The trial court noted that respondent: (1) had “repeatedly denied that Mr. Miller caused the minor child's injury despite evidence to the contrary”; (2) although no longer in an intimate relationship with Miller, still relied on him for transportation and was frequently in his presence; “maintained passive to the services offered and still has not completed counseling even though the minor child has been infoster care for over (1) year.” Accordingly, the trial court concluded that it was in the best interests of the child that respondent's parental rights be terminated. Respondent appeals.
    Respondent argues that the trial court abused its discretion by terminating her parental rights. First, respondent contends that there was insufficient evidence to establish that she had abused the minor child or allowed him to be abused. Respondent asserts that she did not know that Miller was abusing the minor child. Second, respondent argues that the probability of repetition of abuse did not exist at the time of termination. Respondent notes that by the time of the hearing, she had severed her romantic relationship with Miller, had her own apartment, and went to parenting classes. Respondent further asserts that there were no findings to support a determination of neglect. Accordingly, respondent contends the trial court erred by concluding that termination was in the minor child's best interests.
    After careful review of the record, briefs and contentions of the parties, we affirm. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111 (2001) sets out the statutory grounds for terminating parental rights. A finding of any one of the separately enumerated grounds is sufficient to support a termination. In re Taylor, 97 N.C. App. 57, 64, 387 S.E.2d 230, 233-34 (1990). “[T]he party petitioning for the termination must show by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that grounds authorizing the termination of parental rights exist. In re Young, 346 N.C. 244, 247, 485 S.E.2d 612, 614 (1997)(citing N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-289.30(e)).
    Here, the trial court concluded that respondent had abused the minor child within the meaning of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(1). The trial court based its conclusion and findings on evidence that respondent had pled guilty to misdemeanor child abuse, stipulated to allowing Miller to abuse the minor child, yet failed to address the issues that led to the abuse. Dana Horn, a social worker who worked with respondent, testified that respondent disagreed with the recommendations made to her, and that respondent felt that there were no issues that she needed to address. Respondent failed to complete treatment recommendations, and did not complete counseling. Furthermore, respondent continues to maintain a relationship with Miller, and denies any responsibility for the abuse. Accordingly, we conclude there was clear, cogent and convincing evidence to support the trial court's finding that respondent had abused the minor child and that there was a probability of repetition of abuse should he be returned to respondent.
    Since grounds exist pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111 to support the trial court's order, the remaining grounds found by the trial court to support termination need not be reviewed by this Court. Taylor, 97 N.C. App. at 64, 387 S.E.2d at 233-34.
    DSS argues that the trial court erred by not finding that respondent failed to pay a portion to Cabarrus County Department of Social Services (“DSS”) for the minor child's child care although financially able to do so. However, because grounds exist tosupport termination, we need not consider DSS's cross-assignment of error.
    Once the trial court has found that grounds exist to terminate parental rights, “the court shall issue an order terminating the parental rights of such parent with respect to the juvenile unless the court shall further determine that the best interests of the juvenile require that the parental rights of the parent not be terminated.” N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 7B-1110(a) (2001). The trial court's decision to terminate parental rights at the disposition stage is discretionary. See In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. 101, 110, 316 S.E.2d 246, 252 (1984). Here, the trial court found that it was in the best interests of the child that respondent's parental rights be terminated. Furthermore, the trial court found that the minor child was in foster care and had bonded with his foster family. Based upon the facts in this case, we hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that termination was in the children's best interests. Accordingly, the order terminating respondent's parental rights is affirmed.
    Affirmed.
    Judges McGEE and CAMPBELL concur.
    Report per Rule 30(e).

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