IN THE MATTER OF:
Christopher Thomas Brown Cabarrus County
No. 97 J 107
A Minor Child.
Matthew F. Ginn for respondent appellant.
Cabarrus County Department of Social Services, by Kathleen
Arundell Widelski, for petitioner appellee.
TIMMONS-GOODSON, Judge.
Deanna Brown (“respondent”) appeals from an order of the trial
court terminating her parental rights. For the reasons stated
herein, we affirm the order of the trial court.
Respondent is the natural mother of the minor child at issue
in the present case: Christopher Thomas Brown (“Christopher”), born
1 July 1989. On 18 July 1997, the Cabarrus County Department of
Social Services (“DSS”) filed a petition alleging that Christopher
was a neglected child as defined by the North Carolina General
Statutes and seeking a non-secure custody order. Upon reviewing
the allegations contained within the petition, the trial court
issued such order that same day. On 18 November 1997, the trial court adjudicated Christopher
to be a neglected child based on the following evidence: DSS first
became involved with respondent in October of 1995, when the
Mecklenburg County Department of Social Services substantiated
neglect of Christopher by respondent and subsequently transferred
the case to Cabarrus County for treatment services. Although
respondent suffered from several mental illnesses, including bi-
polar disorder, anxiety disorder and agoraphobia, she consistently
failed to comply with necessary medical treatment and other
services available to her through DSS. In April 1997, Christopher
threatened a classmate at school with a knife. After this
incident, Christopher was hospitalized for six weeks and diagnosed
with major depression, oppositional defiant disorder and attention
deficit hyperactivity disorder. Upon Christopher's release from
the hospital, respondent failed to comply with recommended therapy
and medication management for him, missing numerous appointments
for his care. On 7 July 1997, Christopher used a knife to
repeatedly strike a dresser, threatened to kill respondent's
boyfriend, as well as a pet bird, and threatened a social worker
from DSS. On 18 July 1997, Christopher vandalized a house and
repeated his threat to kill respondent's boyfriend. Despite this
behavior, respondent refused to obtain further mental health
treatment for Christopher, and also refused to accompany him when
DSS arranged for such treatment. Instead, respondent indicated to
social workers that she “could not handle” Christopher or his
behavior and informed them that she wanted him removed from herhome.
Based on the above-stated evidence, the trial court
adjudicated Christopher to be a neglected child. The trial court
then ordered respondent to comply with the following tasks in order
to achieve reunification with Christopher: (1) complete a
psychological evaluation and follow any recommendations arising
from that evaluation; (2) maintain stable and suitable housing; (3)
attend parenting classes; (4) visit with Christopher on a regular
basis; (5) cooperate with and follow recommendations by DSS; (6)
report any changes in her residential status to DSS; and (7) attend
all appointments for medical management and individual therapy.
On 12 February 1999, DSS filed a motion to terminate
respondent's parental rights, which motion came before the trial
court on 30 September and 1 October 1999. At the hearing, the
evidence presented tended to show, and the court so found, that
respondent had failed to comply with the tasks outlined by the
trial court in the adjudication order. Specifically, the evidence
showed that respondent had only visited Christopher six times over
a twenty-three month period, despite weekly visitation
opportunities and available transportation services arranged
through DSS. During one period, Christopher had no contact with
his mother for five months. When respondent did visit Christopher,
she engaged in inappropriate behavior. During one visit, for
example, respondent climbed up the outside railing of a staircase
and encouraged Christopher to follow her. Respondent also told
Christopher that he was “her sole reason for living.” Respondent failed to maintain stable housing, moving from one
residence to another, including several homeless shelters. At the
time of the hearing, respondent testified that she was currently
living in a shelter for battered women. Although respondent
obtained a psychological evaluation, she failed to follow the
treatment plan recommended by her physician to address her mental
health problems. Respondent moreover did not complete the
parenting classes as ordered by the trial court.
In addition to failing to abide by the reunification plan as
set forth in the order of adjudication, respondent contributed
nothing to the cost of Christopher's care, despite her testimony at
trial that she had been sporadically employed during the relevant
time period. The evidence further showed that Christopher's
behavior and general well-being improved remarkably after his
placement in the care of DSS. In fact, Christopher received an
award at school in May 1998 for the “most improved student,”
achieving superior grades and exhibiting none of his former
aggressive behavior.
Upon reviewing the evidence, the trial court concluded that
several grounds existed upon which to terminate respondent's
parental rights. Specifically, the trial court concluded that (1)
respondent had neglected Christopher and that such neglect would
likely continue; (2) respondent willfully failed to pay a
reasonable portion of the cost of Christopher's care although
physically and financially able to do so; (3) respondent willfully
left Christopher in foster care for more than twelve months withoutmaking reasonable progress in correcting the conditions that led to
the child's removal; and (4) that respondent was incapable, due to
her mental illness, of properly caring for Christopher, such that
he was a dependent child within the meaning of the North Carolina
General Statutes. Having determined that there existed sufficient
grounds to support termination of respondent's parental rights, the
trial court then determined that it was in the best interests of
the child that respondent's parental rights be terminated. The
trial court therefore entered an order terminating respondent's
parental rights. Respondent appeals.
_______________________________________________________
Respondent presents five assignments of error on appeal,
arguing that the trial court erred in concluding that respondent
(1) neglected her child; (2) failed to pay a reasonable portion of
the cost of his care; (3) willfully left Christopher in foster care
for more than twelve months without making reasonable progress in
correcting the conditions that led to the child's removal; (4) was
incapable of properly caring for her child because of mental
illness; and (5) concluding that it was in the best interests of
the child that respondent's parental rights be terminated. We
address respondent's arguments in turn.
We note initially that termination of parental rights is a
two-step procedure established by the North Carolina General
Statutes. See In re Church, 136 N.C. App. 654, 656, 525 S.E.2d
478, 479 (2000). In the initial adjudication phase of the trial,
grounds for termination must be shown by clear, convincing andcogent evidence. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1109(f) (2001); In re
Montgomery, 311 N.C. 101, 110, 316 S.E.2d 246, 252 (1984). The
petitioner seeking termination of parental rights has the burden of
showing by clear, cogent and convincing evidence that such grounds
exist. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1109(f); In re Ballard, 311 N.C.
708, 716, 319 S.E.2d 227, 232 (1984). The court may terminate
parental rights on the basis of several findings, and “[a] finding
of any one of the . . . separately enumerated grounds is sufficient
to support a termination.” In re Pierce, 67 N.C. App. 257, 261,
312 S.E.2d 900, 903 (1984). “Upon determining that one or more of
the grounds for terminating parental rights exist, the court moves
to the disposition stage to determine whether it is in the best
interests of the child to terminate the parental rights.” In re
Young, 346 N.C. 244, 247, 485 S.E.2d 612, 615 (1997); see also N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 7B-1110 (2001) (outlining the disposition stage).
The appellate court's task upon review is to “determine
whether the trial court's findings of fact were based on clear,
cogent, and convincing evidence, and whether those findings of fact
support a conclusion that parental termination should occur on the
grounds stated in N.C. Gen. Stat. § [7B-1111].” In re
Oghenekevebe, 123 N.C. App. 434, 435-36, 473 S.E.2d 393, 395
(1996). Where the petitioner meets its burden, and the trial
court's findings of fact support any one of the statutory grounds,
we should affirm the order terminating parental rights. See In re
Swisher, 74 N.C. App. 239, 240, 328 S.E.2d 33, 35 (1985). We
therefore examine the grounds for terminating respondent's parentalrights as found by the trial court, and to which respondent now
assigns error.
Respondent argues that the trial court erred in finding and
concluding that respondent neglected Christopher and that such
neglect was likely to continue. Respondent contends that this
finding was unsupported by clear, cogent and convincing evidence,
in that she presented “ample evidence of significant progress” at
the hearing. We disagree.
A neglected juvenile is one “who does not receive proper care,
supervision, or discipline from the juvenile's parent . . . or who
is not provided necessary medical care; . . . or who lives in an
environment injurious to the juvenile's welfare . . . .” N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 7B-101(15) (2001). Neglect serves as one of the bases
supporting termination of parental rights. See N.C. Gen. Stat. §
7B-1111(a)(1) (2001). “[E]vidence of neglect by a parent . . .
including an adjudication of such neglect -- is admissible in
subsequent proceedings to terminate parental rights. The trial
court must also consider any evidence of changed conditions in
light of the evidence of prior neglect and the probability of a
repetition of neglect.” Ballard, 311 N.C. at 715, 319 S.E.2d at
232.
In the instant case, the trial court adjudicated Christopher
neglected on 18 November 1997 based on evidence that respondent
failed to provide proper care for Christopher, particularly in
regard to his medical and mental health needs. Although
Christopher displayed violent behavior, and even after he washospitalized for mental health treatment, respondent failed to
obtain necessary medical care for him. As a result, Christopher's
violent behavior intensified to the point that respondent informed
social workers that she could no longer care for the child. After
Christopher was adjudicated neglected, respondent failed to
cooperate with DSS, asserting that Christopher had been
“kidnapped.” The psychological evaluation performed on respondent
indicated that she was “at moderate risk for future neglect of her
son if given custody.” The evaluation further stated that
respondent's “unwillingness to acknowledge the extent of neglect as
well as her refusal to make reasonable accommodations to [the DSS]
service plan suggest she is more invested in justifying her
animosity toward that agency rather than improving her parenting
skills and ultimately preventing future neglect.” Contrary to
respondent's argument, she failed to present “ample evidence of
significant progress” at the hearing.
We conclude that there was clear, cogent and convincing
evidence to support the trial court's finding and conclusion that
respondent neglected her child, and that such neglect was likely to
continue. Although this finding and conclusion, standing alone,
adequately serves as a basis for the termination of respondent's
parental rights, see Pierce, 67 N.C. App. at 261, 312 S.E.2d at
903, we address the remaining three grounds for termination.
As further grounds for terminating respondent's parental
rights, the trial court determined that respondent “willfully
failed to pay a reasonable portion of the cost of care for[Christopher] although financially and physically able to do so.”
In support of this conclusion, the court found that
The cost of care for Christopher Brown since
his placement in care totaled $12,054.54 from
September 1997 through the date of this
hearing. [Respondent] has contributed nothing
towards the cost of the child's care though
she has been employed sporadically during the
time the child has been in care. She also
could afford to take a trip to the beach
during the period of time the child was in
care. The mother had minimal expenses and
poverty was not the reason the mother could
not pay. The mother could have paid some
amount greater than zero during the time the
child was in care. The mother has worked at
Village Pizza, Wendy's, Dollar General, Days
Inn, Advance Till Payday, Krispy Kreme Donuts,
Waffle House and UDI during the time the child
was in care. The mother has been unwilling or
unable to maintain employment for any extended
period of time. The mother has resided the
last four months at “Turning Point” for which
she does not have to pay any rent or fees. At
the time of this hearing, the Respondent-
mother was attending Union Tech.
This finding was clearly supported by the evidence of record.
Respondent testified that she had never paid any type of support
for Christopher, despite the fact that she was sporadically
employed. Respondent argues that, even if she failed to pay a
reasonable portion of the cost of Christopher's care, it was not
“willful,” in that she suffers from mental illness. The evidence
provides no support for such an argument. Although there was
substantial evidence that respondent suffers from bi-polar
disorder, acute anxiety disorder and agoraphobia, there was no
evidence to suggest that these conditions rendered respondent
incapable of forming willful intent or otherwise prevented her from
contributing some monies, however small, to the cost ofChristopher's care. We conclude that the trial court properly
found and concluded that respondent failed to pay a reasonable
portion of the cost of her child's care. We therefore overrule
this assignment of error.
The court further determined that respondent willfully left
Christopher in foster care for more than twelve months without
making reasonable progress in correcting the conditions which led
to his removal. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(2) (2001). Under
this section, “[a] finding of willfulness is not precluded even if
the respondent has made some efforts to regain custody of the
children.” In re Nolen, 117 N.C. App. 693, 699, 453 S.E.2d 220,
224 (1995).
Respondent argues that she made substantial progress in
addressing the conditions leading to Christopher's removal, and
that the trial court erred in finding and concluding otherwise.
Respondent refers to evidence tending to show that, at the time of
the hearing, respondent was attending classes to obtain her high
school equivalency degree, and was working and attending parenting
classes. Respondent also asserts that the evidence showed that she
had obtained stable housing and was attending counseling.
Respondent contends that this evidence demonstrates that she made
substantial progress in correcting the conditions leading to her
child's removal, and the trial court erred in finding and
concluding otherwise. We disagree.
Despite respondent's characterization of her progress as
“substantial,” there was clear and convincing evidence before thetrial court that, at the time of the hearing, respondent had
actually done little to address the problems that ultimately led to
Christopher's removal. Respondent did not follow through on her
medical treatment, nor did she complete the parenting classes she
was ordered to attend. Respondent failed to regularly visit her
son, although she was given ample opportunity to do so. Although
respondent did present evidence tending to show that she was
actively employed, she also testified that she had been working for
less than three weeks. She moreover had attended only two
parenting classes, and had been living at the shelter for little
more than four months. We conclude that there was clear, cogent,
and convincing evidence to support the trial court's finding and
conclusion that respondent failed to make sufficient progress in
correcting the conditions that led to the loss of custody of her
child. See Nolen, 117 N.C. App. at 700, 453 S.E.2d at 224-25
(stating that, “[e]xtremely limited progress is not reasonable
progress”). This assignment of error is overruled.
Finally, the trial court found that respondent was incapable,
as a result of mental illness, of properly caring for and
supervising Christopher, such that he was a dependent child within
the meaning of section 7B-101(9) of our General Statutes, and that
there was a reasonable probability that such incapability would
continue for the foreseeable future. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-
1111(a)(6) (2001). Such incapability by a parent to properly care
for a child may arise as a result of mental illness. See id. A
dependent juvenile is one “in need of assistance or placementbecause the juvenile has no parent, guardian, or custodian
responsible for the juvenile's care or supervision or whose parent,
guardian, or custodian is unable to provide for the care or
supervision and lacks an appropriate alternative child care
arrangement.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-101(9) (2001).
There was clear and convincing evidence that respondent was
unable to properly care for Christopher in part due to her mental
illness and, more specifically, her failure to comply with medical
and mental health treatment. The evidence before the trial court
tended to show that respondent was hospitalized in 1994 for
psychiatric reasons. Her treating physician noted that she was
“extremely dysfunctional” with “extremely poor coping skills and
ego functions.” Respondent's anxiety and panic attacks at that
time rendered her incapable of caring for Christopher, working,
driving, or attending school. In 1996, respondent was diagnosed
with post-traumatic stress disorder and panic disorder with
agoraphobia. In 1997, respondent reported that she was often too
anxious to leave her home. In her psychiatric evaluation performed
in September of 1998, respondent stated that she always carried a
knife for personal protection, and that her panic episodes had
increased in frequency. This evaluation concluded that
respondent's condition, and respondent's resistance to appropriate
treatment, presented a moderate risk for future neglect of
Christopher. Throughout the years, respondent sporadically sought
assistance for her mental illness, but consistently failed to
follow through with outpatient treatment. Respondent's failure toabide by the conditions of her medical treatment resulted in a
worsening of her symptoms, to the point that respondent was often
too anxious to visit Christopher. We conclude that there was clear
and convincing evidence that respondent's mental illness rendered
her incapable of properly caring for her child. We therefore
overrule this assignment of error.
Finally, respondent contends that the trial court erred in
concluding that it was in the best interests of the child to
terminate her parental rights. We do not agree. The trial court
found, and the evidence showed that
When [Christopher] initially came into care,
his behavior was disobedient, [he] used
inappropriate language, got up in the middle
of the night and wandered through the house,
rummaged through drawers[,] etc. and would
have running fits through the house. He did
not know how to bathe himself, blow his nose,
or perform any personal hygiene functions.
The child was sent home from school on average
2-3 times per week for uncontrollable
behavior. He had to be escorted to his class,
and was not allowed to [ride] the bus.
The evidence further showed that
Since placement in care, [Christopher] has
shown marked improvement. He plays with
friends, his fears [have] decreased, his
[attention deficit hyperactivity disorder] has
decreased, his anxiety has decreased, his
hygiene has improved, he has learned to follow
rules and has had no instances of aggression
in a substantial length of time. In May 1998,
the child received an award for “most improved
student.” He has been consistently on the AB
honor roll.
The court moreover found that Christopher needed “safety, security
and structure in his environment and an appropriate and consistent
treatment regarding rewards and consequences,” none of which hismother was capable of providing. We conclude that the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in concluding that it was in
Christopher's best interests that respondent's parental rights be
terminated.
A petition for termination of parental rights must be
carefully considered in light of all the circumstances and with the
children's best interests firmly in mind. “Although severing
parental ties is a harsh judicial remedy, the best interests of the
children must be considered paramount.” In re Adcock, 69 N.C. App.
222, 227, 316 S.E.2d 347, 350 (1984). In the case at bar,
Christopher has made remarkable progress in the care of DSS,
developing from a violent, aggressive child whose constant
disruptions at school led to his removal therefrom, to a superior
student with no or few behavioral incidents. While the decision to
terminate parental rights should never be lightly made, it is not
in the best interests of a neglected or dependent child to require
that he languish indefinitely in foster care in the dim hope of
eventual reunification with a parent. The order of the trial court
terminating respondent's parental rights as to Christopher Thomas
Brown is hereby affirmed.
Affirmed.
Judges HUDSON and CAMPBELL concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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