Appeal by respondents from orders entered 9 July 2001 by Judge
Ernest J. Harviel in Alamance County District Court. Heard in the
Court of Appeals 29 October 2002.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General J.
Bruce McKinney, for the State.
John W. Cox for respondent-appellant Daniel Ray Russell.
Daniel H. Monroe for respondent-appellant Brandon Lee Sherman.
MARTIN, Judge.
Respondents appeal from orders adjudicating them delinquent,
and placing them on probation, upon findings that each of them had
committed three counts of injury to personal property, one count of
injury to real property, one count of misdemeanor larceny, and one
count of misdemeanor possession of stolen property.
Briefly summarized, the evidence presented by the State tended
to show that respondent Sherman was born 31 January 1988 and
respondent Russell was born 16 March 1989. They are half-brothers
and, in February 2001, resided in Hickory Hill Mobile Home Park in
Alamance County. The mobile home park is located adjacent to the
Burlington Airport and the evidence indicated that children fromthe mobile home park use a hole in the fence between the mobile
home park and the airport grounds to access the airport to play and
watch airplanes.
On Friday evening, 16 February 2001, Robin Mundy, a mechanic
for LabCorp at its flight operation at the airport, saw the
respondent juveniles and another boy at the airport. He talked
with them and, at their request, showed them the inside of an
airplane. On the following Sunday morning, 18 February 2001, Mr.
Mundy arrived at work and discovered extensive vandalism at the
airport, including damage to an International tractor owned by Joe
McPherson, damage to a forklift owned by K.W. Dodson Construction,
tools and equipment strewn about, and fire extinguishers which had
been discharged. He also discovered that valves to fuel storage
tanks owned by LabCorp had been forced open and over five thousand
gallons of jet fuel and gasoline had been released. Some of the
damage appeared to have resulted from the use of a hammer and from
shooting a B-B gun into various gauges and instruments on the
vehicles. Tools and keys had been taken from a toolbox on Mr.
McPherson's tractor.
Ernest Coleman, a neighbor of the respondent juveniles,
testified that at about 5:00 or 5:30 p.m. on Saturday, 17 February,
he saw them come through the fence from the airport and go into
their mobile home; each was carrying a box. He testified that he
had also seen the respondent juveniles shooting an air pistol at
cans on the airport grounds a couple of weeks before.
Jacob Riley, a thirteen year old who lives at Hickory HillMobile Home Park testified that he had been at the airport on
Sunday watching the airplanes, but had not gone to the hangars and
had not released the fuel.
Alamance County Sheriff's Department Detective David Barr
spoke with the respondent juveniles as part of his investigation of
the incident. Detective Barr testified that respondents told him
they had seen Steven Castle damage the tractor and the forklift.
They were able to provide detailed information about the damage and
the manner in which it was inflicted. They denied participating in
the acts and denied any knowledge of the fuel spill. After
receiving the information from the respondent juveniles, Detective
Barr was able to determine that Steven Castle had been away at
Eckerd Wilderness Camp since Friday, 16 February.
Respondent Sherman offered evidence tending to show that the
juveniles had been disciplined by their father, Harold Russell, on
the morning of 17 February and had been required to stay inside
their residence for the remainder of the day until they went
shopping with their mother about 3:00 p.m. They returned home
about 5:00 or 5:30 p.m. Neither of their parents saw them carry
any boxes into their residence. Harold Russell also testified that
Jacob Riley had admitted, and subsequently denied, having released
the fuel, and that Steven Castle had damaged the equipment and had
shot windows with a B-B pistol on 13 February. Harold Russell
testified that he took the pistol from Steven Castle and gave it to
Steven's father. Russell denied that respondent juveniles had told
Detective Barr that they had gone to the airport with Steven Castleon Saturday, 17 February.
Respondent Russell offered no evidence.
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Respondent juveniles assign error to the denial of their
motions, made at the close of the State's evidence and at the close
of all the evidence, to dismiss the charges, and to the trial
court's adjudications of their delinquency. They argue, in support
of those assignments of error, that the evidence was insufficient
to prove that respondents were the perpetrators of the acts
alleged.
The same standards of proof that apply in criminal proceedings
against adults are also used to evaluate the evidence presented
against juveniles in a delinquency adjudication proceeding.
See In
re Heil, 145 N.C. App. 24, 28, 550 S.E.2d 815, 819 (2001). Upon a
motion to dismiss by a juvenile respondent, the trial court must
determine whether there is “'substantial evidence (1) of each
essential element of the offense charged, . . . and (2) of
[juvenile's] being the perpetrator of such offense.'”
Id.
(citations omitted). “Substantial evidence is such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
a conclusion.”
State v. Franklin, 327 N.C. 162, 171, 393 S.E.2d
781, 787 (1990). In making this determination, the trial court
must assess the evidence in the light most favorable to the State
and disregard respondents' evidence where it contradicts that of
the State.
See State v. Jones, 147 N.C. App. 527, 556 S.E.2d 644
(2001),
disc. review denied, 355 N.C. 351, 562 S.E.2d 427 (2002). “Substantial evidence” may consist of direct or circumstantial
evidence or both.
State v. Butler, 356 N.C. 141, 145, 567 S.E.2d
137, 139-40 (2002). “For purposes of a motion to dismiss,
evidence is deemed less than substantial if it raises no more than
mere suspicion or conjecture as to the defendant's guilt.”
Id.
Respondent juveniles argue that the State introduced
exculpatory statements by respondents and then failed to contradict
them by other evidence. Specifically, respondent juveniles contend
the State's evidence showed, at most, their “mere presence” at the
scene of the alleged acts and, citing
State v. Aycoth, 272 N.C. 48,
157 S.E.2d 655 (1967), such evidence is insufficient to rebut their
exculpatory statements introduced by the State. Thus, they argue,
relying on
State v. Gaines, 260 N.C. 228, 132 S.E.2d 485 (1963),
they were entitled to dismissal of the charges. After a thorough
review of the transcript, we reject respondents' arguments.
While the State introduced statements by respondent juveniles
to Detective Barr in which they denied involvement in the vandalism
and alleged it had been done by Steven Castle, there was other
evidence which contradicted their statements. Billy Chatman of
K.W. Dodson Construction testified that a foreman of Dodson had
been present at the site on the morning of 17 February and had not
reported any damage to the forklift at that time. Mr. McPherson
testified that he had last seen his tractor undamaged sometime
during the week before 17 February. There was also evidence that
respondent juveniles had been seen leaving the airport property on
the late afternoon of 17 February, carrying boxes, and that StevenCastle, the person they claimed was responsible for the damage, was
not even in town at the time. Such evidence adequately contradicts
respondents' exculpatory statements with respect to the damage done
to the machinery and supports a reasonable inference, i.e.,
substantial evidence, that respondent juveniles were responsible
for the damage to the equipment.
Respondents made no exculpatory statements concerning the
tools that were taken from Mr. McPherson's tractor. The State's
evidence also tended to show, however, that the missing tools had
been located in an unlocked toolbox in the floorboard of the
tractor and that defendants were seen coming through the hole in
the fence on 17 February carrying boxes of a size sufficient to
hold the hammers, wrenches, and keys allegedly stolen.
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to survive a motion to
dismiss if it is substantial,
State v. Butler, supra, and, “in
considering circumstantial evidence, an inference may . . . be made
from an inference.”
State v. Childress, 321 N.C. 226, 232, 362
S.E.2d 263, 267 (1987);
State v. Bostic, 121 N.C. App. 90, 101, 465
S.E.2d 20, 26 (1995). We hold that, from the State's evidence, a
finder of fact could reasonably infer that respondent juveniles
stole Mr. McPherson's tools from the tractor in the course of their
vandalism of the tractor.
With respect to the charges of injury to personal and real
property arising from the release of LabCorp's jet fuel and
gasoline, the State introduced into evidence statements by the
respondent juveniles in which they denied any knowledge of the fuelspill. However, the State also introduced evidence that the valves
to the fuel storage reservoirs had been forced open, most likely,
in the time period between the morning of 17 February when the
Dodson foreman was present and 9:00 a.m. on 18 February when the
spill and damage were discovered. Viewed in the light most
favorable to the State and coupled with the evidence that
respondent juveniles committed the other offenses at the site, we
hold the evidence shows more than respondents' “mere presence” at
the site during the period the offense was likely committed and
contradicts respondents' exculpatory statements. Mr. Mundy's
testimony included descriptions of other damage at the site,
including fire extinguishers that had been discharged and thrown on
the ground, boxes of lights and other building supplies from Dodson
Construction thrown down a hill, and tools lying around on the
ground. A reasonable inference may be drawn from the evidence of
widespread damage and disarray at the site that the fuel spill,
coming from valves forced open with tools found nearby, was part of
a common plan of vandalism.
We hold the trial court properly denied respondent juveniles'
motions to dismiss the charges and the orders from which they
appeal are affirmed.
Affirmed.
Judges GREENE and BRYANT concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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