STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v. Guilford County
Nos. 98 CRS 23683-4
MICHAEL ANTHONY DILWORTH 98 CRS 65055-8
98 CRS 65210
98 CRS 102191-92
99 CRS 23257
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General
Christopher W. Brooks, for the State.
Terry W. Alford for defendant-appellant.
McGEE, Judge.
Defendant pled guilty on 23 April 1999, pursuant to a plea
agreement, to four counts of felony larceny, common law robbery,
assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious
injury, and assault with a deadly weapon. Defendant also admitted
to attaining the status of habitual felon. The terms of the plea
agreement were as follows:
The State agrees that these cases be
consolidated for judgment as an habitual
felon. The parties stipulate [to] the fact
that the Defendant has 19 prior points and is
a level VI offender.
The Defendant shall be sentenced as a
Class C felon to a minimum 168 months, maximum
211 months in the State Department ofCorrection[]. The Defendant admits that this
plea of guilty constitutes a violation of his
probation in 95CRS56885 and any other case he
is currently on probation in Guilford County.
The State agrees that these sentences be
invoked and that the Defendant serve these
sentences concurrently with the sentence
imposed this date. In 98CRS12300, a High
Point case, the Defendant elects to serve an
active sentence and the State agrees that the
sentence imposed in 98CRS12300 run concurrent
with the sentence imposed this date.
In accordance with the plea agreement, the trial court
consolidated defendant's convictions for judgment and sentenced
defendant to a minimum term of 168 months and a maximum term of 211
months. Defendant's sentence is within the presumptive range for
a Class C felony at a prior record level of VI. Defendant did not
appeal his convictions.
Defendant filed a pro se petition for writ of certiorari on 7
August 2001 with this Court requesting a belated appeal. Our Court
allowed defendant's petition for the purpose of reviewing the
judgment, but limited the review "to those issues upon which
defendant had a right to direct appeal under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-
1444(a2)(1999)."
Defendant contends the record on appeal does not support his
nineteen prior record level points. We agree. N.C. Gen. Stat. §
15A-1340.14 provides that a felony offender's prior record level is
to be determined "by calculating the sum of the points assigned to
each of the offender's prior convictions." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-
1340.14(a) (2001). Subsection (b) discusses "Points":
(b) Points. _ Points are assigned as follows:
(1) For each prior felony Class A conviction,10 points.
(1a) For each prior felony Class B1
conviction, 9 points.
(2) For each prior felony Class B2, C, or D
conviction, 6 points.
(3) For each prior felony Class E, F, or G
conviction, 4 points.
(4) For each prior felony Class H or I
conviction, 2 points.
(5) For each prior misdemeanor conviction as
defined in this subsection, 1 point. For
purposes of this subsection, misdemeanor is
defined as any Class A1 and Class 1
nontraffic misdemeanor offense[.] . . .
Subsection (c) lists the six prior record levels (I through VI) and
their corresponding point totals; Level V is defined as "[a]t least
15, but not more than 18 points[,]" while Level VI is "[a]t least
19 points." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.14(c).
Defendant argues the trial court improperly used one of his
convictions obtained in a single calendar week to establish his
habitual felon status and then used another separate conviction,
obtained during the same week, to determine his prior record level.
Defendant concedes "this procedure is allowed pursuant to the
holding in State v. Truesdale, 123 N.C. App. 639, 473 S.E.2d 670
(1996)." Where one panel of this Court has decided an issue, a
subsequent panel is bound by that precedent unless it has been
overturned by a higher court. Heatherly v. Industrial Health
Council, 130 N.C. App. 616, 621, 504 S.E.2d 102, 106 (1998).
Accordingly, defendant's argument is without merit.
Defendant also argues the trial court improperly added a priorrecord level point for the South Carolina misdemeanor conviction of
theft of a vehicle. He asserts that because South Carolina
classifies the conviction as a misdemeanor, North Carolina should
treat the conviction as a Class 3 misdemeanor which does not carry
prior record level points pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.14
(e). Section 15A-1340.14(e) provides:
(e) Classification of Prior Convictions From
Other Jurisdictions _ Except as otherwise
provided in this subsection, a conviction
occurring in a jurisdiction other than North
Carolina is classified as a . . . Class 3
misdemeanor if the jurisdiction in which the
offense occurred classifies the offense as a
misdemeanor. . . . If the State proves by the
preponderance of the evidence that an offense
classified as a misdemeanor in the other
jurisdiction is substantially similar to an
offense classified as a Class A1 or Class 1
misdemeanor in North Carolina, the conviction
is treated as a Class A1 or Class 1
misdemeanor for assigning prior record level
points.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.14 (e)(2001).
The record on appeal does not show that the State presented
evidence that the South Carolina misdemeanor conviction was
"substantially similar to an offense classified as a Class A1 or
Class 1 misdemeanor in North Carolina." Accordingly, it was error
to assign the one record level point under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-
1340.14(b)(5). However, because each sentencing hearing in a
particular case is a de novo proceeding, see State v. Jones, 314
N.C. 644, 336 S.E.2d 385 (1985), upon remand, the State may present
evidence to support the classification of the South Carolina
misdemeanor as a Class A1 or Class 1 misdemeanor.
Defendant argues the trial court used more than one convictionobtained during the same session of court in calculating his prior
record level in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.14(d).
Defendant first argues that the misdemeanor larceny conviction in
96 CR 14675 and the felony forgery and uttering in 95 CRS 56885
both have a conviction date of 7 April 1997. N.C.G.S. § 15A-
1340.14(d) provides:
(d) Multiple Prior Convictions Obtained in One
Court Week. _ For purposes of determining the
prior record level, if an offender is
convicted of more than one offense in a single
superior court during one calendar week, only
the conviction for the offense with the
highest point total is used. If an offender
is convicted of more than one offense in a
single session of district court, only one of
the convictions is used.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.14(d)(2001).
The only document which shows the dates of both offenses as
being 7 April 1997 is defendant's worksheet. Defendant has not
included the judgment and commitment in 95 CRS 56885. Therefore,
based on the record before this Court, we cannot say the trial
court improperly included two convictions on 7 April 1997 when it
calculated defendant's prior record level points. As noted above
each sentencing hearing in a particular case is a de novo
proceeding, see Jones, 314 N.C. 644, 336 S.E.2d 385; therefore,
defendant may present evidence of the actual conviction date for 95
CRS 56885 upon remand of his case to the trial court.
Defendant also asserts, and the State agrees, two convictions
obtained on 7 July 1989 were included in the calculation of
defendant's prior record points. Based on the record before this
Court, the actual conviction date of the forgery and utteringconviction in 89 CRS 31044 was "7/7/89." Defendant, however, also
received points for the larceny conviction obtained on the same
date in 89 CRS 25227. This was error under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-
1340.14(d)(2001).
Defendant next argues, and the State agrees, the trial court
improperly used the Class H felony of obtaining property by false
pretense in 89 CRS 32463 to calculate defendant's prior record
level because the State dismissed this conviction on 7 July 1989.
The State also agrees with defendant that the trial court treated
defendant's misdemeanor larceny in 96 CRS 43663 as a class H felony
when it calculated defendant's prior record level. Based on the
inclusion of these offenses alone, it appears the trial court added
improper points to defendant's prior record level calculation.
Accordingly, we remand this case for resentencing.
Defendant finally contends he received ineffective assistance
of counsel. Because this Court allowed defendant's writ of
certiorari to review only "those issues upon which defendant had a
right to direct appeal under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-
1444(a2)(1999)[,]" we do not address defendant's argument that he
received ineffective assistance of counsel based on defendant's
stipulations to his prior record level. This decision does not
prejudice defendant's right under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1415 (2001)
to file a motion for appropriate relief in the trial court, which
is the preferred forum for addressing his claim. See State v.
Milano, 297 N.C. 485, 496, 256 S.E.2d 154, 160 (1979) (ineffective
representation claim is normally raised in post-convictionproceedings at trial level, where the defendant may be granted a
hearing on the matter with the opportunity to introduce evidence),
overruled on other grounds, State v. Grier, 307 N.C. 628, 300
S.E.2d 351 (1983).
Remanded for re-sentencing.
Judges WYNN and CAMPBELL concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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