IN THE MATTER OF: ELONDIA Cabarrus County
HARVEY, a minor child No. 99 J 91
Kathleen Arundell Widelski for Cabarrus County Department of
Social Services, petitioner appellee.
Scott C. Robertson for respondent appellant.
McCULLOUGH, Judge.
Respondent Shana Cadelle-Celeste King, mother of the minor
child Elondia Sheba-Qamar Harvey, appeals from the district court's
order terminating her parental rights. We affirm.
Respondent gave birth to the minor child on 7 August 1998. On
11 June 1999, while living with her mother, Linda King (King),
respondent was arrested for assaulting King with a kitchen knife
while the minor child sat on the porch of the residence in a car
seat. A social worker who was dispatched to the scene by the
Cabarrus County Department of Social Services (DSS) was forced to
flee the house after she was physically threatened by respondent.
Respondent was involuntarily committed to the psychiatric care unit
of Stanley Memorial Hospital on 13 June 1999. The district courtentered an order on 14 June 1999, granting non-secure custody of
the minor child to DSS, which placed her in foster care. A
psychological evaluation by Catawba County Mental Health Services
diagnosed respondent with schizophrenia. The evaluation concluded
that respondent's ability to care for the minor child was
contingent upon her taking her medications and receiving treatment
for her disorder.
In September 1999, the minor child was adjudicated a dependent
juvenile under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-101(9) (2001). After an
initial review hearing, the district court entered an order on 19
January 2000, establishing a permanent plan of reunification and
allowing respondent unsupervised overnight visitation. The court
found that respondent had made reasonable progress addressing the
issues that led to the finding of dependency. The court reviewed
the case on 27 April 2000, found respondent had made only “minimal
progress[,]” and changed the placement plan from reunification to
guardianship with a relative. On 10 August 2000, the court entered
an order finding no progress by respondent and establishing a
permanent plan for adoption of the minor child.
DSS petitioned to terminate respondent's parental rights on 8
November 2000. In a review order entered 22 February 2001, the
court again found respondent had made no progress in addressing the
issues leading to the child's dependent status. A court summary
incorporated into the review order found that petitioner “continues
to use illegal drugs” and had tested positive for cocaine on 9
October 2000. After petitioner refused to return the child to thefoster home, the court reduced respondent's visitation with the
minor child to DSS-supervised forty-five-minute visits and
scheduled a hearing on the petition to terminate her parental
rights.
At the termination hearing held 10 May 2001, respondent
testified that she had been living at Catawba Village, an assisted-
living facility, for more than three weeks. She described her
daily routine as follows:
Well, I shower and dress, breakfast, I usually
watch a little television, listen to a little
music until I get tired and then I lay down
and rest; lunch, the same thing, watch a
little television, listen to a little music
until I get tired, lay down and rest; and then
the same thing, I watch a little T.V. and
listen to a little music until I get tired and
then I lay down and rest; and usually after
dinner if I lay down and rest I will turn in
for the night.
Respondent stated she had “[n]ot yet” participated in any
activities other than watching television and listening to music,
and had not interacted with the other residents. She admitted
smoking crack cocaine as recently as March 2001, while she was
pregnant with her second child. She has admitted to using illegal
drugs since age 15/16. She expressed an intention to enroll in a
nursing assistant's program and to obtain employment in that field
after leaving Catawba Village. However, she acknowledged she had
not worked or looked for employment since 1996. Respondent stated
she was on a waiting list for Section 8 housing in Kannapolis and
explained that she would need a “three bedroom apartment” in order
to care for her two children. If she was unable to obtainsubsidized housing, respondent “was hoping [she] could come back
home” to live with King.
Upon findings of fact based on “clear, cogent and convincing
evidence,” the district court found the following three grounds for
termination of respondent's parental rights under N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 7B-1111(a)(1), (2), and (6) (2001): (1) respondent had neglected
the minor child with probability of repetition of neglect; (2) the
minor child was a dependent juvenile as defined by N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 7B-101(9), and would remain so for the foreseeable future; and
(3) respondent willfully left the minor child in foster care for a
period of more than twelve months without making reasonable
progress to correct the conditions leading to the foster care
placement. The court further found that the adoption by the foster
family would “provide a stable loving home for the child[,]” and
concluded that termination of respondent's parental rights was in
the child's best interests.
Respondent argues on appeal that the district court erred in
finding each of the three grounds for termination. Respondent also
claims that the court abused its discretion in finding termination
to be in the child's best interest, despite respondent's testimony
that she loves her child and wants to keep her.
The termination of a party's parental rights is a two-stage
process. During the initial, adjudication stage, the district
court must determine if clear, cogent and convincing evidence
establishes grounds for termination under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-
1111. See In re Brim, 139 N.C. App. 733, 741, 535 S.E.2d 367, 371(2000). Our review, in turn, addresses whether the court's
findings of fact are supported by clear, cogent and convincing
evidence, and whether its findings of fact support its conclusions
of law. See In re Blackburn, 142 N.C. App. 607, 612, 543 S.E.2d
906, 909 (2001).
If one or more grounds exist for termination of parental
rights, the district court proceeds to the disposition stage under
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1110 (2001), where it must decide if
termination would serve the best interests of the child. See
Blackburn, 142 N.C. App. at 610, 543 S.E.2d at 908 (2001). We
review the district court's ruling at the disposition stage only
for abuse of discretion. See id. at 614, 543 S.E.2d at 911.
We begin our review at the adjudication stage. The district
court concluded that the minor child was a dependent juvenile as
defined by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-101 and that there was a
“reasonable probability” that she would remain so for the
foreseeable future. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(6). A dependent
juvenile is one "whose parent, guardian, or custodian is unable to
provide for the care or supervision and lacks an appropriate
alternative child care arrangement." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-101(9)
(2001). Under the statute, a parent's inability to care for or
supervise the juvenile "may be the result of substance abuse,
mental retardation, mental illness, organic brain syndrome, or any
other similar cause or condition." N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 7B-1111(a)(6). The court also concluded that respondent
“willfully left the [minor child] in foster care . . . for morethan 12 months without showing to the satisfaction of the court
that reasonable progress under the circumstances has been made in
correcting those conditions which led to the removal of the
juvenile.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(2). For the purpose of
the statute, “[w]illfulness is established when the respondent had
the ability to show reasonable progress, but was unwilling to make
the effort.” In re McMillon, 143 N.C. App. 402, 410, 546 S.E.2d
169, 175, disc. review denied, 354 N.C. 218, 554 S.E.2d 341 (2001);
In re Bluebird, 105 N.C. App. 42, 411 S.E.2d 820 (1992)). A
finding of willfulness under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(2) does
not require a showing of fault on the part of the respondent. In
re Oghenekevebe, 123 N.C. App. 434, 439, 473 S.E.2d 393, 398
(1996). A respondent's prolonged inability to improve her
situation, despite some efforts in that direction, will support a
finding of willfulness “regardless of her good intentions.” In re
Bishop, 92 N.C. App. 662, 669, 375 S.E.2d 676, 681 (1989).
Although the district court's findings of fact are fully
reviewable under the clear, cogent and convincing evidence
standard, respondent has raised only general exceptions to the
grounds for termination entered below. Therefore, the court's
findings of fact are binding on appeal. See In re Caldwell, 75
N.C. App. 299, 301, 330 S.E.2d 513, 515 (1985). We address whether
the findings of fact support the conclusions of law. Id.
We believe the trial court's findings fully support its
conclusions (1) that the minor child was a dependent juvenile and
would probably remain so for the foreseeable future, and (2) thatrespondent had willfully left the child in foster care for at least
twelve months without making reasonable progress toward correcting
the causes of the initial placement. The minor child entered
foster care in June of 1999, in conjunction with respondent's
involuntarily hospitalization for schizophrenia. DSS filed the
motion to terminate her parental rights in November 2000. As
reflected in the review orders and accompanying court summaries
which were incorporated by reference into the termination order,
see, e.g., In re Reyes, 136 N.C. App. 812, 814, 526 S.E.2d 499, 501
(2000), respondent consistently demonstrated an unwillingness or
inability to control her mental illness outside of an assisted-
living or institutional environment. From August to December of
1999, respondent was treated at Heritage House, a residential care
facility. During her stay, she made “steady progress” and took her
medication “regularly and compliantly.” Upon her release from
Heritage House and her return to King's home in January of 2000,
however, respondent quickly regressed. She failed to follow her
medication regimen or obtain the individual therapy prescribed by
her psychological evaluation. On 21 February of 2000, King was
forced to call the police when respondent refused to surrender the
minor child after an overnight visitation. Respondent exhibited
erratic behavior such as leaving food unattended on the stove,
staying out all night, talking to herself, and defying her mother,
her case manager, and the DSS social worker. Moreover, respondent
resumed her use of illegal drugs. King testified that respondent
sold her stereo equipment and videocassette recorder, and the minorchild's toys, high chair, and playpen in order to buy crack
cocaine. After testing positive for cocaine on 9 October 2000,
respondent entered a drug rehabilitation program but was asked to
leave after she again stopped taking her medication. At the
termination hearing, respondent admitted using crack cocaine as
recently as March 2001, while she was pregnant with her second
child. Although respondent's condition did stabilize when she
entered the assisted-living environment at Catawba Village in April
2001, her activity there was limited to watching television,
listening to music, eating, and sleeping. Nothing in the record
suggests that respondent has made meaningful progress toward
assuming the responsibilities involved in caring for a child.
Moreover, the court's findings reflect respondent's lack of an
alternative child care arrangement for her child, as required to
show dependency under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-101(9). King was
physically unable to assume custody due to her arthritis. No other
relative was willing to care for the child.
Because any single ground under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)
is sufficient to support a termination of parental rights, we need
not address the third ground for termination found by the court.
See In re Huff, 140 N.C. App. 288, 293, 536 S.E.2d 838, 842 (2000),
appeal dismissed and disc. review denied, 353 N.C. 374, 547 S.E.2d
9 (2001).
We further find no abuse of discretion by the district court
in terminating respondent's parental rights. The evidence showed
the minor child was thriving in an attentive and caring fosterfamily, which hoped to adopt her. King testified that she
supported the minor child's adoption by the foster family,
characterizing the child's progress in their care as “amazing” and
“fantastic.” Likewise, the minor child's DSS Social Worker, Libby
Moss, expressed strong support for the foster family's adoption of
the minor child.
Affirmed.
Chief Judge EAGLES and Judge HUDSON concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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