NO. COA02-803
Appeal by defendant from judgment dated 19 February 2002 by
Judge Abraham Penn Jones in Durham County Superior Court. Heard in
the Court of Appeals 30 December 2002.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney
General T. Lane Mallonee, for the State
James M. Bell for defendant appellant.
GREENE, Judge.
Winslow Monte Brown (Defendant) appeals the trial court's
denial of his motion to suppress his statements to the police.
Judgment was entered against Defendant on 19 February 2002
consistent with an Alford plea agreement in which Defendant pled
guilty to robbery with a dangerous weapon but reserved the right to
appeal the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress.
On 28 December 2000, at approximately 12:15 p.m., Defendant
was spotted entering a vehicle previously used in a robbery and was
placed under arrest. Defendant was handcuffed and placed in the
back of a patrol car. Defendant was then transported to the Durham
Police Department an hour or two later and placed in an interviewroom. At 5:42 p.m., Corporal John Shelton (Corporal Shelton) of
the Durham Police Department informed Defendant of his Miranda
rights, and Defendant signed a form waiving those rights and
agreeing to be interviewed by the police. Defendant subsequently
signed an Acknowledgment of Gang Affiliation form and accompanying
questionnaire, indicating he was a member of a gang called “Friend
of Folk.” Corporal Shelton again advised Defendant of his Miranda
rights at 8:00 p.m. Defendant then gave Corporal Shelton an oral
statement in which he admitted to the robbery. Corporal Shelton
took notes and compiled a written statement outlining Defendant's
confession. Corporal Shelton read the written statement to
Defendant, and Defendant signed the statement at approximately
10:00 p.m. Defendant was taken before a magistrate at
approximately 12:00 a.m., at which time an arrest warrant was
issued against him.
Prior to trial, Defendant moved to suppress the statements he
had made to the police. In his motion, Defendant denied having
been informed of his Miranda rights. Defendant further argued the
statements were not freely, knowingly, and voluntarily made.
Finally, Defendant alleged a violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-
501(2), arguing he was not brought before a judicial official
without unnecessary delay.
At the hearing, Defendant stated he was intoxicated on the day
of his arrest. Defendant denied signing the waiver of rights form
or ever talking with Corporal Shelton. Defendant admitted that his
initials were on the gang affiliation form and that his signaturewas on the confession. Defendant, however, denied making the
statements contained on the form and questionnaire.
At the motion to suppress hearing, Corporal Shelton testified
Defendant had been informed of his Miranda rights at both 5:42 p.m.
and at 8:00 p.m. Corporal Shelton also indicated Defendant did not
appear to be under the influence of any impairing substance. The
reason Defendant was not immediately taken to the police station
was because the police were still locating other suspects and were
trying to determine Defendant's level of involvement. After
locating other suspects, the police first had to find
accommodations for three children found with the suspects. The
police also conducted searches of the suspects' vehicles, the hotel
where they were found, and the hotel parking lot. Another reason
Defendant was not immediately questioned was the fact that the
investigator on the case was on vacation and the investigation file
had to be located and reviewed.
Based on this testimony, the trial court found Defendant was
not intoxicated on the day of his arrest and Defendant had been
given his Miranda warnings. Because the trial court further
concluded the period of time between Defendant's arrest and his
receipt of Miranda warnings was not unreasonable, it denied
Defendant's motion to suppress.
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The issues are whether: (I) the evidence supports the trial
court's findings and conclusions that Defendant had been read his
Miranda rights, was not intoxicated during the interrogation, andwas not subjected to un unreasonable delay; (II) Defendant's
statements were made while he was in police custody in violation of
section 15A-501(2); and (III) the trial court erred by denying
Defendant's motion to suppress because the police did not have
probable cause to arrest him.
I
Defendant argues the trial court erred by denying the motion
to suppress his oral and written statements because he was not
advised of his Miranda rights until he had been in custody for over
five hours. In fact, Defendant contends that, despite the findings
of the trial court to the contrary, he was never given his Miranda
rights. Defendant also argues he was intoxicated the entire day of
his arrest. Moreover, even if this Court were to accept the
State's evidence that Defendant received his Miranda rights,
Defendant asserts the unreasonable delay prior to bringing him
before a magistrate violated his constitutional rights.
“The scope of review on appeal of the denial of a defendant's
motion to suppress is strictly limited to determining whether the
trial court's findings of fact are supported by competent evidence,
in which case they are binding on appeal, and in turn, whether
those findings support the trial court's conclusions of law.”
State v. Corpening, 109 N.C. App. 586, 587-88, 427 S.E.2d 892, 893
(1993). In this case, the trial court found Defendant was given
his Miranda warnings before he confessed. There is competent
evidence in the record to support the trial court's findings of
fact. Corporal Shelton testified Defendant was informed of hisMiranda warnings at 5:42 p.m. and again at 8:00 p.m. At both
times, Defendant did not appear to be intoxicated. Furthermore,
Corporal Shelton's testimony was corroborated by the juvenile
rights form, in which Defendant acknowledged he understood his
rights and expressed his desire to talk to the police.
The trial court also concluded that the period of time between
Defendant's arrest and his receipt of Miranda warnings was not
unreasonable. The trial court's conclusion was supported by
Corporal Shelton's testimony that Defendant was not immediately
taken to the police station because the police were locating other
suspects and were trying to determine Defendant's level of
involvement. Additionally, after locating other suspects, the
police needed to find accommodations for three children found with
the suspects. The police also searched the suspects' vehicles,
their hotel, and the adjacent parking lot. Finally, Defendant was
not immediately questioned because the investigator on the case was
on vacation. Based on this evidence, the trial court properly
concluded the period of detention before Defendant received his
Miranda warnings was reasonable. Accordingly, this assignment of
error is overruled.
II
We next consider whether the trial court erred by denying
Defendant's motion to suppress his confession because his
statements were made while in police custody in violation of
section 15A-501(2). Defendant notes that thirteen hours passed
before he was taken before a judicial official. Defendant arguesthis delay was unreasonable, especially in light of the fact that
he had not received his Miranda warnings.
Under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-501(2), when a person is arrested
without a warrant, he must be taken “before a judicial official
without unnecessary delay.” N.C.G.S. § 15A-501(2) (2001).
Evidence must be suppressed if it has been obtained by a
substantial violation of Chapter 15A provisions.
See N.C.G.S. §
15A-974(2) (2001). “In order for mandatory suppression to apply,
[however,] 'a causal relationship must exist between the violation
and the acquisition of the evidence sought to be suppressed.'”
State v. Wallace, 351 N.C. 481, 517, 528 S.E.2d 326, 348 (2000)
(quoting
State v. Richardson, 295 N.C. 309, 322, 245 S.E.2d 754,
763 (1978)). In this case, Defendant was advised of his
constitutional rights before he was interrogated. “Defendant has
not shown he would not have confessed had he been advised of the
same rights again by a magistrate.”
Id. at 518, 528 S.E.2d at 349;
State v. Littlejohn, 340 N.C. 750, 758, 459 S.E.2d 629, 633-34
(1995).
Furthermore, there was no unnecessary delay. As noted above,
there was a delay bringing Defendant to the police station because
officers were locating other suspects, conducting searches, and
trying to determine Defendant's level of involvement in the crime.
When the original investigating officer was not available to
continue conducting the investigation, the investigation file had
to be located and reviewed. Defendant was then subjected to
interrogation by the Hillsborough police who were investigating aseparate robbery. Thereafter, time was spent completing the gang
affiliation questionnaire and taking Defendant's statement. These
activities were all part of the investigative process.
See State
v. Chapman, 343 N.C. 495, 499, 471 S.E.2d 354, 356 (1996) (delay of
over ten hours not unreasonable because officers had right to
conduct interrogation). Accordingly, we find there was no
substantial violation of section 15A-501(2) that would require
Defendant's confession to be suppressed.
III
Finally, Defendant argues the trial court erred by denying the
motion to suppress his statements because the police did not have
probable cause to arrest him. Defendant, however, did not bring
forth this argument in his motion to suppress. Accordingly, this
issue has not been properly preserved for appellate review.
See
State v. Smarr, 146 N.C. App. 44, 56, 551 S.E.2d 881, 888 (2001),
(“a defendant may not assert on appeal a new theory for suppression
which was not asserted at trial”),
disc. review denied, 355 N.C.
291, 561 S.E.2d 500 (2002).
No error.
Judges TIMMONS-GOODSON and TYSON concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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