Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General
Harriet F. Worley, for the State.
Glenn, Mills & Fisher, P.A., by Stewart W. Fisher and George
Hausen, for defendant-appellants.
Per Curiam.
Following this Court's affirmance of defendants' convictions
of second degree trespass in State v. Marcoplos,154 N.C. App.
581, 572 S.E.2d 820 (2002), defendants appealed by right to the
Supreme Court of North Carolina based upon Judge Greene's
dissent. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-30(2) (2002). That Court
affirmed our decision without opinion (Per Curiam). However,
upon noting that [d]efendants . . . sought review . . . of a
constitutional issue originally presented to but not addressed bythe Court of Appeals, our Supreme Court, decline[d] to
consider this constitutional issue in the first instance and
remanded to [this Court] so that this [constitutional] issue may
be addressed. In essence, defendants contended before our
Supreme Court that the second degree trespassing statute, as
applied to defendants, violated the First Amendment of the United
States Constitution and Article 1 § 14 of the North Carolina
Constitution.
On remand, we can say it no better than the Supreme Court
did in an analogous case over 20 years ago, State v. Felmet, 302
N.C. 173, 273 S.E.2d 708 (1981). Like defendants in this case,
defendant in Felmet contended that North Carolina's trespass
statute was unconstitutional. Justice Huskins held that
[d]efendant's conduct was not protected under the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution . . . . [n]or were
defendant's actions protected under Article I, section 14 of the
North Carolina Constitution . . . . Felmet, at 178, 273 S.E.2d
at 712.
Accordingly, for the reasons stated in State v. Felmet, 302
N.C. 173, 273 S.E.2d 708 (1981), we hold that these assignments
of error are without merit in law or fact.
Affirmed.
Panel consisting of: WYNN, MARTIN, McGEE
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