REBECCA HARRISON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
.
LUCENT TECHNOLOGIES,
Employer-Defendant,
and
LUCENT TECHNOLOGIES DISABILITY BENEFITS,
Carrier-Defendant, Appellees.
Law Offices of Kathleen G. Sumner, by Kathleen G. Sumner, for
plaintiff.
Womble, Carlyle, Sandridge & Rice, by Clayton M. Custer and
Stan B. Green, for defendants.
WYNN, Judge.
Under the North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act, an injury
arising out of and in the course of employment is compensable only
if caused by an “accident.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2(6)(2001). In
this appeal, Rebecca Harrison contends the North Carolina
Industrial Commission erred in concluding that her injuries were
not compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act because the
injuries were not caused by an accident. We, however, find the
full Commission's findings of fact support the conclusion that Ms.
Harrison's injuries were not caused by a compensable accident;
accordingly, we affirm the decision of the full Commission. The underlying facts tend to show that Ms. Harrison had been
an employee of Lucent Technologies, and its predecessor AT&T, since
1969. At the time of her alleged accident, Ms. Harrison worked as
a secretary for Dale Posny in the Human Resources Department. Her
duties included typing, faxing, making airline reservations,
ordering and stocking supplies, and other similar activities.
According to Ms. Harrison, on 21 May 1999, she sat at her
cubicle, reached over the side of her chair to pick up a heavy box
of manila folders, got up and began carrying the box. After taking
a few steps, she felt a twinge in her left shoulder and neck that
almost caused her to pass out. One of her co-workers, Wendy Neely,
helped Ms. Harrison to the company's medical department for
assistance.
Five days later, Ms. Harrison went to her family physician and
was examined by a physician assistant, Margie Trent. As a result
of the examination, Ms. Trent ordered an MRI of her cervical spine
(which revealed narrowing and degenerative changes at C5-6 but no
evidence of disk herniation or spinal cord compression) and advised
her to stay out of work from May 31 until June 7. Thereafter,
Lucent Technologies' company doctor, Dr. Wilcockson, examined Ms.
Harrison on 1 June 1999 and concluded that she could return to work
the next day with restrictions of no lifting, pushing or pulling
more than five pounds. Consequently, Ms. Harrison reported to work
on 2 June 1999. During a return visit to Dr. Wilcockson, her
weight restriction was raised to ten pounds.
Ms. Harrison continued working and did not seek furthermedical treatment until a 9 August 1999 visit with Dr. Wilcockson.
At that time, she informed the doctor that although she had
improved, she still had some left shoulder pain. As a result, Dr.
Wilcockson continued her restrictions on a permanent basis.
On 11 August 1999, Ms. Harrison returned to her family
physician with multiple complaints, including persistent pain in
her left shoulder. Ms. Trent, concerned that Ms. Harrison might
have rotator cuff syndrome, ordered an x-ray to help determine
whether Ms. Harrison should be referred to an orthopedic surgeon.
On 19 August 1999, Ms. Harrison's supervisor, Ms. Posny,
instructed Ms. Harrison to help clean out an office by emptying
and removing several bound volumes. The binders varied in size
with some several inches thick. Ms. Harrison began opening the
binders, removing the papers and making several trips down the hall
to take the papers to the appropriate containers. On each occasion
she chose how much paper to carry and did not know the weights she
lifted. By the time the job was complete, her left shoulder was
bothering her more, but she did not complain of any problems to Ms.
Posny. However, on 23 August 1999, she went to Dr. Wilcockson and
complained she had developed soreness in her left shoulder while
emptying the binders on 19 August. He referred her to Dr. Gramig,
an orthopedic surgeon, who was under contract to render services to
Lucent Technologies' employees.
On 26 August, Dr. Gramig examined Ms. Harrison who informed
him that she could not lift her arm. According to Ms. Harrison,
Dr. Gramig attempted a left shoulder manipulation withoutanesthesia (which Ms. Harrison claims traumatized her), diagnosed
her with adhesive capsulitis of the left shoulder and ordered an
MRI of the shoulder. However, because Lucent Technologies denied
her claim and Dr. Gramig didn't accept her insurance, Ms. Harrison
had to see a different doctor.
Ms. Harrison returned to her family physician on 21 September
1999 and was referred to Dr. Riggin, another orthopedic surgeon.
Dr. Riggin saw her on 27 September 1999 and agreed that she had
adhesive capsulitis. He treated her with a procedure where her
shoulder was manipulated under anesthesia to break the adhesions.
She then underwent aggressive physical therapy.
Up until the spring of 1999, Ms. Harrison and Ms. Posny had a
good working relationship. However, after her injury, Ms. Harrison
felt that she was being harassed by her employer because of her
medical problems. On 3 September 1999, Ms. Posny imposed a
fifteen-minute time limit for errands and began to monitor Ms.
Harrison closely. If Ms. Harrison was unable to complete her
errands within fifteen minutes, she was to notify Ms. Posny of her
location. Although Ms. Harrison believes this was harassment, Ms.
Posny testified that the rule was imposed because she could not
locate Ms. Harrison for three hours during a workday in April. In
September 1999, Ms. Harrison received a verbal warning and an
unsatisfactory conduct notation in her personnel file. Because of
the imposition of the fifteen minute rule and the warning, Ms.
Harrison filed two grievances with her union. Ms. Harrison's
relationship with Ms. Posny became increasingly strained. After Ms. Harrison remained out of work pursuant to Dr.
Riggin's orders, Lucent Technologies began calling Ms. Harrison on
a daily basis to ascertain how she was doing and to determine when
she would return to work. Then in December 1999, Lucent
Technologies informed Ms. Harrison they were removing her from the
payroll although her surgeon had advised her not to work.
Thereafter, Ms. Harrison was admitted to the Forsyth Medical
psychiatric ward with symptoms of anxiety and depression with
suicidal threats. Dr. Williams, a psychiatrist, determined that
Ms. Harrison had experienced symptoms of rapid heart-beat, anxiety
and panic which had been aggravated by her shoulder injury,
associated hospitalization and conflict with her employer to the
point that she had developed a post-traumatic stress disorder with
associated depression and panic disorder. Ms. Harrison was
hospitalized and treated with medication and therapy until 31
December 1999.
Ms. Harrison filed workers' compensation claims for the 21 May
and 19 August 1999 incidents. Although Lucent Technologies
initially provided medical treatment for each injury, liability was
ultimately denied. The full Commission awarded Ms. Harrison
compensation for her neck only, and ordered Lucent Technologies to
pay all medical expenses rendered for the neck injury. Lucent
Technologies was also ordered to pay all medical expenses arising
from the treatment by Dr. Wilcockson and Dr. Gramig, which Lucent
Technologies authorized. However the full Commission denied any
compensation for Ms. Harrison's psychological problems and hershoulder injury. Ms. Harrison appeals.
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“Under the North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act, an injury
arising out of and in the course of employment is compensable only
if caused by an 'accident' and the claimant bears the burden of
proving an accident has occurred.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-
2(6)(2001); Calderwood v. The Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hospital
Authority, 135 N.C. App. 112, 115, 519 S.E.2d 61, 63 (1999). “An
accident is an unlooked for and untoward event which is not
expected or designed by the person who suffers the injury.” Id.
“The elements of an 'accident' are the interruption of the routine
of work and the introduction thereby of unusual conditions likely
to result in unexpected consequences.” Adams v. Burlington
Industries, Inc., 61 N.C. App. 258, 260, 300 S.E.2d 455, 456
(1983).
Ms. Harrison contends the full Commission erred when it
concluded Ms. Harrison did not have a compensable injury by
accident to her shoulder. “When considering an appeal from the
Commission, its findings are binding if there is any competent
evidence to support them, regardless of whether there is evidence
which would support a contrary finding. Therefore, our Court is
limited to two questions: (1) whether competent evidence exists to
support the Commission's findings, and (2) whether those findings
justify its conclusions of law.” Shaw v. Smith & Jennings, Inc.,
130 N.C. App. 442, 445, 503 S.E.2d 113, 116 (1998).
In this case, the Commission found 13. On 21 May 1999, plaintiff lifted a box of
manila envelopes in a normal manner. There
was nothing unusual about the weight of the
box or the circumstances when she lifted it.
She routinely lifted and carried boxes of
envelopes as part of her regular job duties of
placing office supplies in the supply cabinet.
...
15. On August 19, 1999 when plaintiff emptied
the binders, she was performing one of her
regular job duties. There was nothing unusual
or out of the ordinary in the manner that she
removed the papers from the binders or carried
them to the bins on that occasion. She did
not prove that she lifted an unusual or
excessive amount of weight on that date.
Consequently, she did not sustain a
compensable injury to her shoulder on August
19, 1999.
These findings were supported by Ms. Harrison's testimony that her
job duties included getting supplies out of the boxes on the floor
and putting them in the supply closet, removing papers from binders
and placing those papers in the appropriate bin. Ms. Harrison also
testified that the other secretaries had similar duties. Ann
Webster Whiddon, Lucent Technologies work force relations and
staffing manager, testified the job description for a secretary
position supporting a third-level manager, Ms. Harrison's position,
included things such as organizing offices, cleaning out an office,
taking proprietary materials to bins, stocking supply closets and
transporting those supplies. Dale Posny testified the box of
manila folders which allegedly caused the 21 May 1999 injury
contained a hundred letter size manila envelopes and weighed five
pounds. These facts constitute competent evidence to support the
findings of fact.
Based upon these findings of fact, the Commission concluded: 4. However, a shoulder injury must meet the
standards of an injury by accident in order to
be compensable. An “accident” must involve
more than merely carrying on the usual and
customary duties in the usual way, but rather
involves the interruption of the work routine
and the introduction thereby of unusual
conditions likely to result in unexpected
consequences.
5. On May 21, 1999, plaintiff did not sustain
a compensable injury by accident to her
shoulder arising out of and in the course of
her employment with defendant-employer.
6. Plaintiff is not entitled to benefits
under the Workers' Compensation Act for her
shoulder injury, except for the medical
treatment authorized by defendant-employer.
7. On August 19, 1999 plaintiff did not
sustain an injury by accident to her left
shoulder arising out of and in the course of
her employment with defendant-employer.
Consequently, plaintiff is not entitled to
benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act
for her shoulder injury or the subsequent
psychiatric problems related to her shoulder
injury.
8. However, because defendant authorized the
treatment by Dr. Wilcockson and Dr. Gramig,
defendant is liable for payment to those
providers.
We hold that the Commission's findings of fact justify its
conclusions of law. Indeed, the record shows that at the time of
Ms. Harrison's injuries, she was engaged in normal and routine job
activities. Accordingly, the circumstances of Ms. Harrison's
injury does not meet the criteria of injury by accident.
Nonetheless, Ms. Harrison argues that this Court's holding in
Kanipe v. Lane Upholstery, 141 N.C. App. 620, 540 S.E.2d 785
(2000), mandates that if the employer directs the medical treatment
of an employee allegedly injured at work, the employer is estoppedfrom denying liability for a workers' compensation claim arising
out of that alleged injury. We disagree.
In Kanipe, this Court held “an employer's right to direct
medical treatment (including the right to select the treating
physician) attaches once the employer accepts the claim as
compensable.” Kanipe, 141 N.C. App. at 624, 540 S.E.2d at 788.
What Ms. Harrison would have us do in her case is to invert this
holding to conclude that an employer accepts liability once the
employer directs medical treatment. We decline to do so because
neither the reasoning of Kanipe nor the facts of this case support
the illogical conclusion that providing medical treatment means
acceptance of liability. In this case, Lucent Technologies
provided a medical department in its facilities for its employees
which Ms. Harrison visited when she felt pain. Moreover, the
Commission properly determined that since Lucent Technologies
“authorized the treatment by Dr. Wilcockson and Dr. Gramig, [it] is
liable for payment to those providers.” These actions, however, do
not estop Lucent Technologies from denying liability for injuries
that the Commission determined were not caused by a compensable
accident.
An employee's right to workers' compensation is determined by
statute. In this case, the Commission's findings of fact support
its conclusion that Ms. Harrison's shoulder injury did not meet the
definition of injury as defined by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2(6)(2001)
and as interpreted by case law. Therefore, Ms. Harrison was not
entitled to workers' compensation benefits. Finally, we haveconsidered plaintiff's other assignments of error and find they are
without merit. Accordingly, the award of the full Commission is,
Affirmed.
Judges BRYANT and GEER concur.
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