STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v
.
CHRISTINE MARIE LIBERATO
Attorney General Roy A. Cooper, III, by Assistant Attorney
General R. Kirk Randleman, for the State.
Leslie C. Rawls for defendant-appellant.
HUNTER, Judge.
Christine Marie Liberato (“defendant”) appeals her conviction
for felony child abuse of her minor daughter, Ruth Liberato
(“Ruth”), born 4 November 1997. We conclude the trial court
committed no error.
On 2 October 2000, defendant was indicted by a Buncombe County
Grand Jury for felony child abuse inflicting serious injury, a
violation of Section 14-318.4(a) of the North Carolina General
Statutes. Beginning on 8 October 2001, defendant was tried before
a jury in Buncombe County Superior Court. The following evidence
was introduced at trial.
The State's evidence tended to show that on 27 August 1999,
Detective Connie Robinson (“Detective Robinson”) was called to
Mission Saint Joseph's Hospital in Asheville, North Carolina, toinvestigate injuries sustained by Ruth. During questioning,
defendant told Detective Robinson that at approximately noon on 26
August 1999, defendant had laid Ruth and her younger brother,
Thomas, down on a mattress in the living room for a nap while she
went to work on some bills. Defendant eventually fell asleep
herself, but was awakened when her boyfriend, Jorge, knocked on the
door. Following a short conversation with Jorge, defendant went to
the bathroom. In a matter of seconds, Jorge ran into the bathroom
carrying Ruth's limp body and yelling that the child was not
breathing. An ambulance was called, and Ruth was taken to the
hospital.
Defendant told the detective that she and Jorge had never been
abusive to the child. Defendant believed Ruth was injured as a
result of accidentally falling off the mattress that was lying on
the floor. Finally, defendant told Detective Robinson about
additional incidents involving Ruth that may have had some
relevance to Ruth's current condition, such as: (1) approximately
two weeks before the current incident, Ruth and Thomas were treated
by a hospital emergency room for ear infections; (2) approximately
a week before the current incident, the children had gotten sick
again and defendant had quit her job so that she could take care of
them; (3) four or five days before the current incident, Ruth had
fallen, but appeared to be unharmed despite vomiting, dizziness,
and excessive sleeping; and (4) two or three days before the
current incident, Ruth had fallen out of a chair before defendantcould catch her, hitting her head, face, and ear on a hardwood
floor.
At the hospital, Ruth was seen by Dr. Leon DeJournette, M.D.
(“Dr. DeJournette”), who was accepted by the court as an expert
witness in the field of pediatrics and pediatric critical care.
Dr. DeJournette testified that Ruth had been admitted with a brain
injury from a subdural hematoma, a blood clot near her brain. He
further stated that Ruth had two such blood clots, as well as a
small bruise on her right eyelid and bruises under her chin. In
his opinion, Ruth's injuries were intentionally inflicted just
before Ruth was admitted to the hospital and were not consistent
with falling off either a mattress six to eight inches high or a
chair three to four feet high. He believed that it would have
taken a vertical fall of close to ten feet high to produce the type
of injuries sustained by Ruth. Moreover, Dr. DeJournette testified
that the bruises under Ruth's chin were consistent with someone
putting their hand under the child's jaw and trying to push Ruth's
jaw up.
Dr. Cynthia Brown, M.D. (“Dr. Brown”) also attended to Ruth at
the hospital and testified during the trial. She was accepted by
the court as an expert witness in the fields of pediatrics and
child abuse. Dr. Brown's diagnosis of Ruth's injuries was the same
as that given by Dr. DeJournette. Dr. Brown testified that the
effects of injuries to a child's brain cause that child to become
less conscious close to the time of the injury. In her opinion,Dr. Brown did not believe defendant's assessment of how Ruth was
injured explained the severity of the child's brain injuries.
At the close of the State's evidence, defendant made a motion
to dismiss, which was denied. Thereafter, defendant's mother and
one of Ruth's teachers testified that Ruth acted and behaved as a
normal, healthy child and not one that was being abused. Also,
defendant testified on her own behalf and gave essentially the same
testimony given by Detective Robinson. Defendant testified that
Jorge told her Ruth had rolled off the mattress. Defendant further
testified that Jorge did not have time to hurt Ruth that day
because he was only alone with the child for a few seconds while
defendant was in the bathroom. Finally, defendant testified that
she had sole custody of Ruth during the entire time in which Ruth
could have sustained the injuries.
Defendant renewed her motion to dismiss at the close of all
the evidence. The motion was denied. Thus, following
deliberations, the jury returned a verdict finding defendant guilty
of felony child abuse. Defendant appeals.
By defendant's sole assignment of error she argues the trial
court erred by denying her motions to dismiss due to insufficiency
of the evidence.
In order to survive a motion to dismiss in a criminal action,
the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable
to the State, drawing every reasonable inference in favor of the
State. State v. Benson, 331 N.C. 537, 544, 417 S.E.2d 756, 761
(1992). The evidence considered must be “substantial evidence (a)of each essential element of the offense charged, or of a lesser
offense included therein, and (b) of defendant's being the
perpetrator of the offense.” State v. Earnhardt, 307 N.C. 62, 65-
66, 296 S.E.2d 649, 651 (1982). Whether the evidence presented is
substantial is a question of law for the court. State v. Stephens,
244 N.C. 380, 384, 93 S.E.2d 431, 433 (1956). “[T]he rule for
determining the sufficiency of evidence is the same whether the
evidence is completely circumstantial, completely direct, or both.”
State v. Wright, 302 N.C. 122, 126, 273 S.E.2d 699, 703 (1981)
(citations omitted).
In the present case, defendant was indicted and convicted of
child abuse inflicting serious injury in violation of Section 14-
318.4(a). This section provides:
A parent or any other person providing care to
or supervision of a child less than 16 years
of age who intentionally inflicts any serious
physical injury upon or to the child or who
intentionally commits an assault upon the
child which results in any serious physical
injury to the child is guilty of a Class E
felony . . . .
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-318.4(a) (2001). It is undisputed that
defendant is Ruth's mother and that Ruth is under sixteen years of
age. Thus, the State was only required to tender substantial
evidence that defendant intentionally inflicted serious physical
injury upon Ruth. Defendant contends that the State failed to meet
this burden due to insufficiency of the evidence. We disagree.
This Court has previously held that:
Intent is a mental attitude seldom
provable by direct evidence. It must
ordinarily be proved by circumstances fromwhich it may be inferred. In determining the
presence or absence of intent, the jury may
consider the acts and conduct of the defendant
and the general circumstances existing at the
time of the alleged commission of the offense
charged.
State v. Riggsbee, 72 N.C. App. 167, 171, 323 S.E.2d 502, 505
(1984) (citations omitted). See also State v. Noffsinger, 137 N.C.
App. 418, 424, 528 S.E.2d 605, 609 (2000). With respect to Section
14-318.4, this Court also held in Riggsbee that when an adult has
exclusive custody of a child for a period of time during which the
child suffers injuries that are neither self-inflicted nor
accidental, there is sufficient evidence to create an inference
that the adult intentionally inflicted those injuries. Riggsbee,
72 N.C. App. at 171, 323 S.E.2d at 505. See also State v. Perdue,
320 N.C. 51, 357 S.E.2d 345 (1987).
The evidence before this Court in the case sub judice is
sufficient to infer defendant's guilt. Doctors DeJournette and
Brown both testified that in their expert opinion, Ruth's injuries
were intentionally inflicted. They opined that the amount of force
required to cause such injuries was greater than that resulting
from Ruth falling off either a mattress or a chair, which was the
explanation given by defendant. Moreover, defendant testified that
(1) Jorge was not alone with Ruth long enough to inflict any
injuries on the child, and (2) Ruth was in defendant's sole custody
the entire time during which the child's injuries were sustained.
This testimony provided sufficient circumstantial evidence by which
a jury could infer that defendant intentionally inflicted theinjuries upon Ruth, especially when considering the court's holding
in Riggsbee.
When viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the
evidence is sufficient to withstand defendant's motions to dismiss.
Thus, we conclude that the trial court did not err in denying
defendant's motions to dismiss due to insufficiency of the
evidence.
No error.
Judges McGEE and CALABRIA concur.
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