Appeal by juvenile from order entered 11 December 2001 by
Judge John J. Carroll, III in New Hanover County District Court.
Heard in the Court of Appeals 8 January 2003.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General
Richard H. Bradford, for the State.
Benjamin M. Turnage, for juvenile-appellant.
HUDSON, Judge.
Respondent, M.G., who was fourteen years old at the time of
the hearing, was adjudicated delinquent on 11 December 2001 in the
district court in New Hanover County upon a violation of N.C. Gen.
Stat. . 14-288.4(a)(6), which prohibits,
inter alia, disorderly
conduct on or around school grounds. We affirm.
Evidence at the hearing tended to show that on 11 October
2001, at approximately 11:00 a.m. at the Williston Middle School,
Scott Slocum, a physical education teacher, heard respondent yell
“shut the f--k up” to a group of students in the hallway,
approximately thirty yards away. Mr. Slocum was assigned to lunch
duty in the cafeteria and was on his way to the cafeteria at the
time this incident occurred.
The hallway in question is long and narrow and contiguous with
a lobby area. At the time of this incident, classes were in
session in the four classrooms on the hallway. Mr. Slocum noted
that the hallway should have been empty at this time. Mr. Slocum left his position in the cafeteria and escorted
Respondent to the school detention center. New Hanover Sheriff's
Deputy Greg Johnson, the school's resource officer, and Clint
Hardy, the dean of students, were present in the detention center.
Mr. Slocum described the incident to Deputy Johnson and Mr. Hardy,
then returned to the cafeteria and resumed his assigned duties.
The matter was heard on 5 December 2000 by Judge Carroll in
the district court in New Hanover County. At the close of the
evidence, Respondent moved to dismiss the disorderly conduct
charge, which motion was denied. The court ordered that Respondent
receive a Level 3 Disposition, committing him to the Department of
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention for training school
placement for a minimum period of six months, and on an indefinite
commitment.
On appeal, Respondent argues that the trial court erred by
failing to dismiss the disorderly conduct charge based on the
insufficiency of the evidence. For the following reasons, we
affirm the district court.
“[I]n order to withstand a motion to dismiss the charges
contained in a juvenile petition, there must be substantial
evidence of each of the material elements of the offense charged.”
In re Bass, 77 N.C. App. 110, 115, 334 S.E.2d 779, 782 (1985).
“The evidence must be considered in the light most favorable to the
State, and the State is entitled to receive every reasonable
inference of fact that may be drawn from the evidence.”
In re
Brown, 150 N.C. App. 127, 129, 562 S.E.2d 583, 585 (2002) (citing
State v. Easterling, 300 N.C. 594, 604, 268 S.E.2d 800, 807
(1980)).
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-288.4(a)(6) prohibits the following:
(a) Disorderly conduct is a public disturbance
intentionally caused by any person who:
(6) Disrupts, disturbs or interferes with the
teaching of students at any public or private
educational institution or engages in conduct
which disturbs the peace, order or discipline
at any public or private educational
institution or on the grounds adjacent
thereto.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-288.4(a)(6) (2001). Our Supreme Court has
held that the conduct must cause “a substantial interference with,
disruption of and confusion of the operation of the school in its
program of instruction and training of students there enrolled.”
State v. Wiggins, 272 N.C. 147, 154, 158 S.E.2d 37, 42 (1967),
cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1028, 20 L.Ed.2d 285 (1968);
see also In re
Eller, 331 N.C. 714, 417 S.E.2d 479 (1992).
Previous decisions of this Court and the Supreme Court shed
light on the level of interference necessary to sustain a
conviction of disorderly conduct. In
Wiggins, the students were
picketing the high school to protest alleged racial discrimination
in the local jury pool. Classes were interrupted because students
were leaving their seats and classrooms to see the demonstration
outside. The Supreme Court sustained the convictions because the
picketing created disorder in the entire school.
Wiggins, 272 N.C.
at 150-52, 158 S.E.2d at 39-41.
In
State v. Midgett, the defendants took over the school
office by force, telling the school's secretary that “'they weregoing to interrupt [the school] that day.'”
State v. Midgett, 8
N.C. App. 230, 231, 174 S.E.2d 124, 126 (1970). Defendants
barricaded themselves in the office, overturned cabinets, and
operated the school's bell system.
Id. This disruption was so
great that it necessitated early dismissal.
Id. at 233, 174 S.E.2d
at 127. This court held that such evidence “amply” satisfied the
statute and upheld the convictions.
Id. at 234, 174 S.E.2d at 128.
To the contrary, the Supreme Court reversed a disorderly
conduct conviction where a teacher saw one defendant swing
something at another student. When first asked, that defendant
gave the teacher a carpenter's nail that he had in his hand.
Later, that same defendant and another student banged the
classroom's radiator while class was in session. The two students
did so a couple of times, distracting a class of fifteen students
each time. The Supreme Court held that the evidence did not show
substantial interference within the meaning of
Wiggins.
In re
Eller, 331 N.C. 714, 718, 417 S.E.2d 479, 482 (1992).
Most recently, this Court affirmed the disorderly conduct
conviction of a juvenile where the evidence showed that while
teaching mapping skills to her class, the teacher heard defendant
state in a loud, angry voice, “[f]--k you.”
In re Pineault, 152
N.C. App. 196, 197, 566 S.E.2d 854, 856 (2002),
disc. review
denied, 356 N.C. 302, 570 S.E.2d 728 (2002). This required the
teacher to stop teaching the class and escort the defendant to the
principal's office. This Court noted that “[w]hile the record does
not indicate how long [the teacher] was away from the classroom, itdoes establish that she escorted respondent to the principal's
office and explained to office staff what had happened, thereby
indicating she was away from the classroom for more than several
minutes.”
Id. at 199, 566 S.E.2d at 857. We went on to hold that
“given the severity and nature of respondent's language, coupled
with the fact that [the teacher] was required to stop teaching her
class for at least several minutes, that respondent's actions
substantially interfered with the operation of [the teacher's]
classroom in the manner contemplated in
Wiggins.”
Id.
Here, Mr. Slocum was on his way to his assigned cafeteria duty
when he heard Respondent yell “shut the f--k up” to a group of
students. Mr. Slocum then escorted Respondent to the detention
center, where he explained to Deputy Johnson and Mr. Hardy what had
transpired. After that, Mr. Slocum returned to the cafeteria to
carry out his assigned duties.
This evidence is very similar to that presented in
Pineault,
in both the nature and the duration of the disruption. Although
the record before us does not reflect how long Mr. Slocum was kept
from his cafeteria duties, it does establish that he escorted
Respondent to the detention center and related what had happened to
the proper personnel. As in
Pineault, this evidence indicates that
Mr. Slocum was away from his assigned duties for at least several
minutes. Thus, we conclude that the evidence, viewed in the light
most favorable to the State, was sufficient to establish that
Respondent's conduct substantially interfered with the operation of
the school. Affirmed.
Judges MARTIN and STEELMAN concur.
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