In the Matters of: WILLIAM RYAN HARTON, FREDONIA RUTH ADAMS, ANNA
LEE ADAMS, and JACK CORBIN ADAMS.
Stephen M. Schoeberle for petitioner-appellee Burke County
Department of Social Services.
Mary R. McKay attorney-advocate for juveniles.
Maitri “Mike” Klinkosum for respondent-appellant mother.
BRYANT, Judge.
Holly Harton Adams (respondent) appeals from an order filed 24
October 2001 from a permanency planning review hearing (Permanency
Planning Review Order) continuing custody of respondent's children
with the Burke County Department of Social Services (DSS).
On 28 November 2000, DSS filed a juvenile petition alleging
respondent's children were neglected in that they were not
receiving “proper care, supervision or discipline” and were living
“in an environment injurious to their welfare.” Specifically, the
petition alleged respondent's children had been exposed to numerous
incidents of domestic violence between respondent and her live-in
boyfriend Mitch Houser, including two separate incidents where Mr.
Houser, while intoxicated, bit one of the children in the eye and
had attempted to run over respondent with a car. Respondent had
subsequently been voluntarily admitted to a hospital after anapparent suicide attempt. The petition also alleged Mr. Houser had
threatened the children, and respondent had failed to seek
assistance against domestic violence or to separate from Mr.
Houser, as DSS had advised.
Following an 11 January 2001 hearing, the trial court in an
order filed 22 January 2001 found as fact that the allegations in
the petition were true and concluded as a matter of law that
respondent's children were neglected juveniles. The trial court
entered disposition based on additional findings of fact
incorporating the reports of the guardian ad litem and DSS. Based
on these reports, the trial court further concluded that DSS had
made reasonable efforts to prevent the removal of the children from
respondent's home, but continuation in the home “would be contrary
to [the children's] best interests.” As a result, DSS was granted
custody over respondent's children. The trial court further
ordered respondent to complete a substance abuse assessment, attend
group counseling, complete parenting classes, submit to random drug
testing, and obtain and maintain stable housing and employment
independent of Mr. Houser.
A custody review hearing was held on 5 April 2001, and the
trial court filed an order on 2 May 2001 that adopted the updated
reports of the guardian ad litem and DSS as findings of fact and
further found respondent had complied with portions of the 22
January 2001 order, including obtaining a substance abuse
assessment, completing parenting classes, and submitting to a
random drug test. The trial court also found as fact, however,that Mr. Houser was regularly at respondent's residence, and
despite the children's desire for reunification with respondent,
respondent had not obtained housing or employment independent of
Mr. Houser. Moreover, respondent's problems, including criminal
charges against her, continued due primarily to the influence of
Mr. Houser. The trial court concluded as a matter of law that DSS
had made reasonable efforts to reunite the children with respondent
but reunification was not in their best interests. The trial court
ordered that DSS continue custody of respondent's children and that
respondent and her children have no contact with Mr. Houser.
At the permanency planning review hearing held 18 October
2001, evidence was presented by witnesses called by respondent,
including representatives from DSS, a school official, two public
safety officers, and Mr. Houser. In addition, respondent testified
in her own behalf, was examined by the other parties, and admitted
to continuing a relationship with Mr. Houser and having no
intentions of separating from him. In the Permanency Planning
Review Order, the trial court adopted more recent reports of DSS
and the guardian ad litem as findings of fact and further found
respondent had no intention, at the time of the custody review or
at the permanency planning review, of ending her relationship with
Mr. Houser and had lied to DSS about her relationship with him.
(See footnote 1)
The trial court concluded as a matter of law that DSS had made
reasonable efforts to reunite the juveniles with respondent, butthe efforts had been unsuccessful and should cease. Further
concluding it would be in the best interests of respondent's
children for DSS to continue custody over the children and for all
reunification efforts to cease, the trial court then proceeded to
outline a permanent plan for the custody and guardianship of each
child.
(1) Whether it is possible for the juvenile to
be returned home immediately or within the
next six months, and if not, why it is not in
the juvenile's best interests to return home;
(2) Where the juvenile's return home is
unlikely within six months, whether legal
guardianship or custody with a relative or
some other suitable person should be
established, and if so, the rights and
responsibilities which should remain with the
parents;
(3) Where the juvenile's return home is
unlikely within six months, whether adoption
should be pursued and if so, any barriers to
the juvenile's adoption;
(4) Where the juvenile's return home is
unlikely within six months, whether the
juvenile should remain in the current
placement or be placed in another permanent
living arrangement and why;
(5) Whether the county department of social
services has since the initial permanency planhearing made reasonable efforts to implement
the permanent plan for the juvenile;
(6) Any other criteria the court deems
necessary.
Id.
Respondent first contends the trial court erred by failing to
require DSS as custodian of the children to present evidence
instead of relying only on the written reports of DSS
representatives. The record, however, reflects DSS representatives
were called as witnesses by respondent and cross-examined by an
attorney from DSS and counsel for other parties, including the
guardian ad litem. The trial court considered information from
respondent, DSS reports, and heard testimony from DSS
representatives, a school official, and public safety officers.
Further, the DSS reports themselves contain information from
relevant sources under section 7B-907(b). Thus, we conclude the
trial court had sufficient evidence to consider in determining the
best interests of respondent's children. See In re Shue, 311 N.C.
586, 597, 319 S.E.2d 567, 574 (1984) (essential requirement in a
child custody hearing is the presentation of sufficient evidence to
determine what is in the best interests of the juveniles).
Respondent further argues the trial court failed to make the
required findings of fact under section 7B-907(b). We agree.
Section 7B-907(b) requires a trial court to make written findings
on all of the relevant criteria as provided in the statute. See
N.C.G.S. § 7B-907(b). When a trial court is required to make
findings of fact, it must make the findings of fact specially. SeeIn re Anderson, 151 N.C. App. 94, 96, 564 S.E.2d 599, 601 (2002);
see also N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 52 (2001) (“findings by the court”).
The trial court may not simply “recite allegations,” but must
through “'processes of logical reasoning from the evidentiary
facts'” find the ultimate facts essential to support the
conclusions of law. Anderson, 151 N.C. App. at 97, 564 S.E.2d at
602 (quoting Appalachian Poster Advertising Co. v. Harrington, 89
N.C. App. 476, 479, 366 S.E.2d 705, 707 (1988)).
In this case, the trial court in its findings of fact in the
Permanency Planning Review Order found that respondent had no
intention of separating from Mr. Houser and adopted DSS and
guardian ad litem reports as the remaining facts. The trial court,
however, made no findings of fact under the specific criteria
provided in section 7B-907(b). By stating a single evidentiary
fact and adopting DSS and guardian ad litem reports, the trial
court's findings are not “specific ultimate facts . . . sufficient
for this Court to determine that the judgment is adequately
supported by competent evidence.” Anderson, 151 N.C. App. at 97,
564 S.E.2d at 602 (internal quotations omitted) (citation omitted).
Accordingly, we must vacate the Permanency Planning Review Order
and remand this case for the trial court to specially make the
required findings of fact under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-907(b).
Vacated and remanded.
Judges HUNTER and ELMORE concur.
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