SHELIA D.P. LEA, individually and as the President of the
Guilford County Association of Educators, ELIZABETH H. SEEL,
CATHERINE L. HAZELTON, EDWARD C. MCMILLAN, III, GUILFORD COUNTY
ASSOCIATION OF EDUCATORS, and the NORTH CAROLINA ASSOCIATION OF
EDUCATORS,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v
.
DR. TERRY GRIER, SUPERINTENDENT, PUBLIC SCHOOLS OF GUILFORD
COUNTY, in his Official Capacity Only, and GUILFORD COUNTY BOARD
OF EDUCATION,
Defendants-Appellees.
Ferguson, Stein, Chambers, Wallas, Adkins, Gresham & Sumter,
P.A., by John W. Gresham and Corie Pauling, for plaintiffs-
appellants.
Brooks, Pierce, McLendon, Humphrey & Leonard, L.L.P., by Jill
R. Wilson and James C. Adams, II, for defendants-appellees.
WYNN, Judge.
In the aftermath of Hurricane Floyd, the Guilford County Board
of Education (“the Guilford County School Board”) restructured the
school calendar to satisfy statutory requirements for the minimum
hours of school instruction. Appellants, four Guilford County
teachers and the North Carolina Association of Educators(collectively “the teachers”), brought an action alleging the
calendar restructuring violated their constitutional, statutory,
and contractual rights. From the dismissal of their claims under
Rule 12(b)(6), the teachers appeal to this Court. We find no error
with respect to the dismissal of the teachers' statutory and
constitutional claims; however, we remand with instructions to
reinstate the teachers' breach of contract claims.
I. Facts
The underlying facts to this appeal tend to show that at the
outset of the 1999-2000 school year, the provisions of N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 115C-84.2 (1999) provided that:
(a) School Calendar - Each local board of
education shall adopt a school calendar
consisting of 220 days . . . . A school
calendar shall include the following: (1) A
minimum of 180 days and 1,000 hours of
instruction . . . . (2) A minimum of 10 annual
vacation leave days . . . . (3) The same or an
equivalent number of legal
holidays . . . . (4) Ten days, as designated
by the local board, for use as teacher
workdays . . . .
. . . .
(b) Limitations. - The following limitations
apply when developing the school calendar: (1)
The total number of teacher
workdays . . . shall not exceed 200 days.
After the devastation of Hurricane Floyd, the North Carolina
General Assembly recognized that many school districts had lost a
significant number of instructional days and faced problems inmeeting the required minimum of 180 instructional days.
Accordingly, the General Assembly enacted the “Hurricane Floyd
Recovery Act of 1999” which amended the school calendar by
providing for “a minimum of either 180 days or 1,000 hours of
instruction.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 115C-84.2(a)(1)(a) (1999)
(emphasis added). The Floyd Recovery Act, however, did not amend
any other provisions of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 115C-84.2.
By February 2000, the Guilford County School Board was forced
to cancel a total of twelve instructional days because of weather
conditions including Hurricane Floyd. Consequently, the existent
school calendar dropped to 168 days and less than 1,000 hours of
instruction. To meet the statutory hours minimum, the Guilford
County School Board voted on 3 February 2000 to (1) add thirty
minutes of instructional time to each school day, (2) alter six
scheduled teacher workdays to instructional days, and (3) various
other measures. These modifications allowed the Guilford County
School Board to provide 1,000 instructional hours in 174 days.
(See footnote 1)
In their 4 January amended complaint, the teachers alleged
that as a result of the modifications, they were (1) required towork extra hours without compensation; (2) forced to forfeit
planning periods in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 115C-301.1;
(See footnote 2)
and
(3) required to work 206 days, six more than permitted,
respectively, by N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 115C-84.2(4-5), 115C-84.2(a),
and 115C-84.2(b)(1),
(See footnote 3)
because the “Board's actions brought the
total number of teacher workdays to 26 days, [and] increased the
school calendar to 226 days.” Furthermore, the teachers alleged
that a number of schools under the Guilford County School Board's
authority “acknowledged that the increase in instructional time of
thirty minutes each day also increased teachers' overall workloads
and thus allowed teachers to use this additional time to substitute
for optional workdays.” The teachers contended the failure of theGuilford County School Board to adopt a uniform policy applicable
to all teachers contravened the equal protection guarantees of the
United States and North Carolina Constitutions.
Based on these modifications, the teachers initially sued the
Guilford County School Board in 2000; voluntarily dismissed the
action without prejudice; and on 24 September 2001, re-filed the
action under Rule 41(a) seeking declaratory, injunctive, and
monetary relief for alleged violations of statutory,
constitutional, and contract law. On 26 November 2001, the
Guilford County School Board filed a motion to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(6) of North Carolina's Rules of Civil Procedure for failure
to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. On 16 January
2002, the trial court granted the Guilford County School Board's
motion to dismiss and dismissed all of the teachers' claims with
prejudice. From that dismissal, the teachers timely filed a Notice
of Appeal making four assignments of error.
(See footnote 4)
II. Statutory Claims
By their first two assignments of error, the teachers contend
the trial court erred in granting the Guilford County SchoolBoard's motion to dismiss because the teachers stated a cognizable
claim for declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief for
violations of N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 115C-84.2 and 115C-301.1. We
disagree, and will address the standard of review, and the
teachers' claims for declaratory and private relief, in turn.
A. Standard of Review
We review de novo the grant of a motion to dismiss. See e.g.,
McCarn v. Beach, 128 N.C. App. 435, 437, 496 S.E.2d 402, 404
(1998). A motion to dismiss made pursuant to . . . Rule 12(b)(6)
tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. See e.g., Harris v.
NCNB Nat'l Bank, 85 N.C. App. 669, 670, 355 S.E.2d 838, 840 (1987).
“The system of notice pleading affords a sufficiently liberal
construction of complaints so that few fail to survive a motion to
dismiss.” Ladd v. Estate of Kellenberger, 314 N.C. 477, 481, 334
S.E.2d 751, 755 (1985) (citations omitted). Accordingly, when
entertaining “a motion to dismiss, the trial court must take the
complaint's allegations as true and determine whether they are
sufficient to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under
some legal theory.” Boyce & Isley, PLLC v. Cooper, __ N.C. App.
__, __, 568 S.E.2d 893, 897 (2002) (citations omitted). “This
rule . . . generally precludes dismissal except in those instances
where the face of the complaint discloses some insurmountable bar
to recovery.” Ladd, 314 N.C. at 481, 334 S.E.2d at 755. However,where the “requested relief [is] not authorized by statute, the
[complaint is necessarily]” defective because “the court [is]
powerless to grant [the relief] regardless of what facts could be
proved.” Forrester v. Garrett, 280 N.C. 117, 122, 184 S.E.2d 858,
861 (1971).
B. Declaratory Relief
North Carolina's Declaratory Judgment Act provides that: “Any
person . . . whose rights, status or other legal relations are
affected by a statute . . . may have determined any question of
construction or validity arising under the . . . statute . . . and
obtain a declaration of rights, status, or other legal relations
thereunder.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-254 (2002). “Although the North
Carolina Declaratory Judgment Act does not state specifically that
an actual controversy between the parties is a jurisdictional
prerequisite to an action thereunder, our case law does impose such
a requirement.” Sharpe v. Park Newspapers of Lumberton, Inc., 317
N.C. 579, 583, 347 S.E.2d 25, 29 (1986). Accordingly, where “the
complaint does not allege an actual, genuine existing controversy,
a motion for dismissal under . . . Rule 12(b)(6) will be granted.”
Gaston Bd. of Realtors, Inc. v. Harrison, 311 N.C. 230, 234-35, 316
S.E.2d 59, 62 (1984).
In this case, the teachers failed to allege “an actual genuine
existing controversy.” The teachers alleged that the GuilfordCounty School Board violated the mandates of N.C. Gen. Stat. §§
115C-84.2 and 115C-301.1 during the 1999-2000 school year.
Although the teachers state in their amended complaint that “the
actions of [the Guilford County School Board], if allowed to
continue, have created a legal controversy . . . and will lead to
unavoidable litigation,” the teachers failed to allege that the
Guilford County School Board has continued, or will continue,
violating the mandates of Sections 115C-84.2 and 115C-301.1. Our
Supreme Court has made it eminently clear that “a litigant [who]
seeks relief under the declaratory judgment statute, must set forth
in [the] pleading all facts necessary to disclose the existence of
an actual controversy between the parties.” Lide v. Mears, 231
N.C. 111, 118, 56 S.E.2d 404, 409 (1949). Here, the teachers did
not meet this threshold burden. Accordingly, the trial court
properly dismissed the teachers' request for declaratory relief
under the aforementioned statutes.
C. Private Right of Action
Next, the teachers sought injunctive and private relief under
N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 115C-84.2 or 115C-301.1. However, “[o]ur case
law generally holds that a statute allows for a private cause of
action only where the legislature has expressly provided a private
cause of action within the statute.” Vanasek v. Duke Power Co.,
132 N.C. App. 335, 339, 511 S.E.2d 41, 44 (1999). Here, neitherSection 115C-84.2 nor Section 115C-301.1 expressly creates a
private cause of action. Moreover, appellants have failed to make
any arguments that N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 115C-84.2 or 115C-301.1
implicitly create a private right of action.
Nonetheless, the teachers rely on our decision in Williams et.
al. v. Alexander County Bd. of Educ., 128 N.C. App. 599, 495 S.E.2d
406, for the proposition that a private right of action exists
under Sections 115C-84.2 and 115C-301.1. In Williams, however, the
statute, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15C-363 (1991) (repealed 1992),
implicitly created a private right of action by requiring school
boards to pay specific sums to teachers participating in the
Effective Teaching Training Program. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 115C-
363.11 (repealed 1992) (providing that: “If the pilot programs
established pursuant to the provisions of G.S. § 115C-363 are
discontinued, any employee who has received a salary increment
pursuant to the Career Development Plan shall continue to be paid
the salary increment”) (emphasis added). In Williams, the school
board refused to pay teachers vested in the pilot program the
salary, bonuses, and supplements which they were statutorily
entitled to receive after the program was discontinued. We
reversed the trial court's summary judgment, because “[t]he
statutes without a doubt enunciate the intent of the General
Assembly . . . to create statutory protection for teachers.” Williams, 128 N.C. App. at 604, 495 S.E.2d at 409. In the case sub
judice, the statutes at issue do not enunciate an explicit or
implicit intent on the part of the General Assembly to create a
statutory protection for teachers. Accordingly, the teachers
reliance on Williams is misplaced.
We, therefore, must hold that the trial court did not err by
dismissing the teachers' requests for monetary and/or injunctive
relief under the aforementioned statutes.
III. Constitutional Claims
By their third assignment of error, the teachers contend the
trial court erred in dismissing their claims under the Equal
Protection Clause of the United States and North Carolina
Constitutions. We disagree.
“Arbitrary and capricious acts by [the] government are []
prohibited under the Equal Protection Clauses of the United States
and the North Carolina Constitutions.” Dobrowolska v. Wall, 138
N.C. App. 1, 14, 530 S.E.2d 590, 599 (2000); see also U.S. Const.
amend. XIV, § 1; N.C. Const. art. 1, § 19. The equal protection
“principle requires that all persons similarly situated be treated
alike.” Wall, 138 N.C. App. at 14, 530 S.E.2d at 599 (citing
Richardson v. N.C. Dept. of Correction, 345 N.C. 128, 134, 478
S.E.2d 501, 505 (1996)). Accordingly, to state an equal protection
claim, a claimant must allege (1) the government (2) arbitrarily (3) treated them differently (4) than those similarly situated.
In this case, the teachers allege that some schools (but not
all) under the Guilford County School Board's authority decided to
allow teachers to count the accumulation of time, caused by the
extra thirty minute period, as optional workdays. The teachers
allege that the Guilford County School Board's failure to adopt a
uniform policy applicable to all teachers violates the equal
protection guarantees of the United States and North Carolina
Constitutions. However, North Carolina statutes expressly
authorize differential treatment among schools in the same
administrative unit. For instance, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 115C-
84.2(a)(1a) (1999) specifically provides that “the number of
instructional hours in an instructional day may vary according to
local school board policy and does not have to be uniform among the
schools in the [same] administrative unit.” Furthermore, N.C. Gen.
Stat. §§ 115C-84.2(a)(4) and (5) provide that “[a] school board
may schedule different purposes for different personnel on any
given day and is not required to schedule the same dates for all
personnel.”
Accordingly, this differential treatment was permitted by
North Carolina statutory law. Of course, this is not fatal to the
teachers' equal protection claims. See e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404
U.S. 71, 75-76 (1971) (“The Equal Protection Clause . . . [does notallow] States the power to legislate that different treatment be
accorded to persons placed by a statute into different classes on
the basis of criteria wholly unrelated to the objective of that
statute.”). Nevertheless, because the teachers concede at oral
argument that they are not mounting a facial challenge to the
statutes permitting differential treatment among teachers under one
school board's authority, a presumption exists that this
differential treatment, permitted by statutes duly enacted by the
General Assembly, have a rational, rather than arbitrary, basis.
See e.g., Peoples' Bank v. Loven, 172 N.C. 666, 670, 90 S.E. 948,
950 (1916).
However, in their amended complaint, the teachers failed to
allege that the Guilford County School Board exceeded its authority
under the aforementioned statutes, acted arbitrarily, or that the
challenged differential treatment was unrelated to the statutory
objectives. Accordingly, the teachers' allegations, even when
assumed correct and construed most favorably, merely express
disconcert with actions wholly consistent with the Guilford County
School Board's authority under state law. Because the teachers
failed to allege an essential element of an equal protection claim,
arbitrary or irrational state action, their equal protection claims
were properly dismissed and this assignment of error is overruled.
IV. Contract Claims By their fifth assignment of error, the teachers argue that
the trial court erred in dismissing their breach of contract
claims. We agree.
In their complaint, the teachers allege that the Guilford
County School Board's “unlawful acts violated the terms of [the
teachers'] valid contracts of employment.” Specifically, the
teachers allege that their contracts with the Guilford County
School Board “mandate . . . compliance with state law,” and,
consequently, the Guilford County School Board's unlawful acts
constituted a breach of contract.
(See footnote 5)
This breach caused damage, the
teachers allege, because the Guilford County School Board's
modifications of the school calendar required them to work six more
days than required by law. Taking the teachers' allegations as
true, “we conclude that the breach of contract claim as alleged in
the complaint was sufficient to withstand [the Guilford County
School Board's] . . . motion to dismiss.” Brandis v. Lightmotive
Fatman, 115 N.C. App. 59, 62, 443 S.E.2d 887, 888 (1994). Accordingly, we remand with instructions to reinstate the teachers'
breach of contract claims.
V. Association Standing
Finally, the teachers argue the trial court erred by
dismissing the North Carolina Association of Educators as a party-
plaintiff for lack of standing. On appeal, the teachers contend
the North Carolina Association of Educators is only seeking
injunctive and declaratory relief for violations of N.C. Gen. Stat.
§§ 115C-84.2 and 115C-301.
(See footnote 6)
We held supra, however, that the
teachers are entitled to neither declaratory nor private relief
pursuant to Section 115C-84.2 or Section 115C-301.1. Accordingly,
because the North Carolina Association of Educators concedes on
appeal that it seeks only declaratory and injunctive relief
pursuant to these statutes for its membership, it is no longer
necessary to resolve this assignment of error.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
Judges TIMMONS-GOODSON and LEVINSON concur.
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