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NO. COA02-720
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed: 15 April 2003
HARLEYSVILLE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY,
Plaintiff
v
.
ZURICH-AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY and ST. PAUL FIRE AND MARINE
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendants.
Appeal by plaintiff from order filed 12 March 2002 by Judge
Ronald E. Spivey in Guilford County Superior Court. Heard in the
Court of Appeals 12 March 2003.
Pinto Coats Kyre & Brown, PLLC, by David L. Brown and John I.
Malone, Jr., for plaintiff-appellant.
Bailey & Thomas, P.A., by David W. Bailey, Jr. and John R.
Fonda, for defendant-appellee St. Paul Fire and Marine
Insurance Company.
TYSON, Judge.
I. Background
On 12 July 1999, an employee of Briggs, Inc. d/b/a Briggs &
Sons Tire (Briggs) was test driving a car owned by Frank
Consolidated Enterprises, Inc. d/b/a Wheels, Inc. (Wheels, Inc.)
and leased to Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company (Nationwide)
when he collided with an automobile owned and operated by Helen
Harris. Harris sustained injuries as a result of the accident and
filed a lawsuit against Briggs, Wheels, Inc., and Nationwide,
Harris v. Briggs in Cumberland County. Wheels, Inc. and Nationwide
settled with Harris prior to trial. The jury awarded $1.5 million
to plaintiff. At the time of the accident, Harleysville Mutual Insurance
Company (Harleysville) had issued a Commercial Garage Owners
Liability Policy to Briggs. Zurich-American Insurance Company
(Zurich) issued a business automobile liability policy naming
Nationwide as the insured. St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance
Company (St. Paul) issued both a commercial automobile liability
insurance policy and an umbrella policy naming Wheels, Inc. as the
insured.
On 23 October 2000, Harleysville brought the present
declaratory judgment action against Zurich and St. Paul for
contribution and a pro rata share of the costs. Zurich and
Harleysville settled and Zurich was dismissed. Harleysville and
St. Paul filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The trial court
granted summary judgment in favor of St. Paul. We reverse.
II. Issue
The issue is whether the insurance policies issued by St. Paul
provides coverage to Briggs and its employee.
III. Standard of Review
Summary judgment is proper if the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Integon Indem. Corp. v. Universal
Underwriters Ins. Co., 131 N.C. App. 267, 270, 507 S.E.2d 66, 68
(1998) (Integon II). The meaning of specific language used in a
policy of insurance is a question of law. Id.
IV. Liability Coverage
Harleysville contends that language in St. Paul's policy is in
direct conflict with N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-279.1 et seq. (1999)(Financial Responsibility Act) and that coverage is provided to
the statutory minimum amounts based on the Financial Responsibility
Act. St. Paul argues that its policy satisfies the Financial
Responsibility Act and does not provide any coverage.
A. St. Paul's Basic Automobile Liability Protection Policy
St. Paul's basic Automobile Liability Protection policy
provides:
Bodily injury and property damage liability.
We'll pay amounts any protected person is
legally required to pay as damages for covered
bodily injury or property damage that:
. results from the ownership, maintenance,
use, loading or unloading of a covered auto;
and
. is caused by an accident that happens while
this agreement is in effect.
Protected person is defined as any person or organization who
qualifies as a protected person under the Who Is Protected Under
This Agreement section. Protected person under the policy
includes:
Any permitted user. Any person or
organization to whom you've given permission
to use a covered auto you own, rent, lease,
hire or borrow is a protected person.
However, we won't consider the following to be
a protected person:
...
. Anyone using a covered auto while working in
the business of selling, servicing, repairing,
storing or parking autos, unless the business
is yours.
The policy provides that This agreement is primary insurance for
covered autos you own and excess insurance for those you don't
own. An endorsement to the policy provides:
Your Automobile Liability Protection is
broadened to protect your business when you
lease or rent autos to others.
We'll provide Automobile Liability Protection
for a covered leased or rented auto if you
have required the person or organization who
leased or rented the auto from you to provide
primary liability insurance for you.
COVERED LEASED OR RENTED AUTO means an auto
you lease or rent to someone under a written
lease or rented agreement; which requires the
person or organization to whom you lease or
rent the auto to provide primary liability
insurance for you. A leased or rented auto
also includes a substitute or additional auto
when part of the same agreement.
Limit of this coverage. The limit of this
coverage for you or your employees or agents
is excess liability protection over the amount
of primary liability insurance that the person
or organization who leased or rented the auto
from you has.
However, we won't protect the person or
organization to whom you lease or rent the
auto, including employees, agents, or anyone
using such auto with their permission.
The named insured on the St. Paul policy was Frank Consolidated
Enterprises, Inc., Wheels, Inc., Four Wheels Company, Wheels
Leasing Canada, Ltd. Wheels, Inc. owned the vehicle that was
leased by Nationwide. Nationwide gave Briggs and its employee
permission to drive the leased vehicle when it was delivered to
Briggs for service. The employee of Briggs caused the accident
involving the leased vehicle and injured Ms. Harris. St. Paul contends the express terms of the policy do not
provide insurance to Nationwide because the lease agreement
requires Nationwide to provide its own insurance. St Paul argues
in its brief that lessees of vehicles and their permittee drivers
are not protected persons.
B. Financial Responsibility Act
Where the policy does not provide voluntary coverage, we must
determine whether coverage is mandated by the provisions of N.C.
Gen. Stat. §§ 20-281 and 20-279.21. The two statutes 'prescribe
mandatory terms which become part of every liability policy
insuring automobile lessors.' Ins. Co. Of N. America v. Aetna
Life and Casualty Co., 88 N.C. App. 236, 242, 362 S.E.2d 836, 840
(1987) (quoting American Tours, Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co.,
315 N.C. 341, 346, 338 S.E.2d 92, 96 (1986)). The Financial
Responsibility Act requires each automobile owner to carry a
minimum amount of liability insurance. When a statute is
applicable to the terms of a policy of insurance, the provisions of
that statute become part of the terms of the policy to the same
extent as if they were written in it. American Tours, 315 N.C. at
344, 338 S.E.2d at 95. The provisions of the Financial
Responsibility Act are written into every automobile policy as a
matter of law. Integon Indemnity Corp. v. Universal Underwriters
Ins. Co., 342 N.C. 166, 168, 463 S.E.2d 389, 390-91 (1995) (Integon
I).
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-279.21(b) provides:
Such owner's policy of liability insurance:
... (2) Shall insure the person named thereinand any other person, as insured, using any
such motor vehicle or motor vehicles with the
express or implied permission of such named
insured, or any other persons in lawful
possession, against loss from the liability
imposed by law for damages arising out of the
ownership, maintenance or use of such motor
vehicle or motor vehicles within the United
States of America or the Dominion of Canada
subject to limits exclusive of interest and
costs, with respect to each such motor
vehicle, as follows: twenty-five thousand
dollars ($25,000) because of bodily injury to
or death of one person in any one accident
and, subject to said limit for one person,
fifty thousand dollars ($50,000) because of
bodily injury to or death of two or more
persons in any one accident, and fifteen
thousand dollars ($15,000) because of injury
to or destruction of property of others in any
one accident.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-281 makes it unlawful:
for any person, firm or corporation to engage
in the business of renting or leasing motor
vehicles to the public for operation by the
rentee or lessee unless such person, firm or
corporation has secured insurance for his own
liability and that of his rentee or lessee, in
such an amount as is hereinafter provided,
.... Each such motor vehicle leased or rented
must be covered by a policy of liability
insurance insuring the owner and rentee or
lessee and their agents and employees while in
the performance of their duties against loss
from any liability imposed by law for damages
including damages for care and loss of
services because of bodily injury to or death
of any person and injury to or destruction of
property caused by accident arising out of the
operation of such motor vehicle, subject to
the following minimum limits: twenty-five
thousand dollars ($25,000) because of bodily
injury to or death of one person in any one
accident, and fifty thousand dollars ($50,000)
because of bodily injury to or death of two or
more persons in any one accident, and fifteen
thousand dollars ($15,000) because of injury
to or destruction of property of others in any
one accident.
These sections were amended, with an effective date of 1 July 2000,
to increase the minimums; however, the above amounts were in effect
at the time of the accident. Section 281, which applies
specifically to automobile owners who lease their cars for profit,
is a companion section to and supplements § 279.21, which applies
to automobile owners generally. American Tours, 315 N.C. at 346,
338 S.E.2d at 96.
C. Coverage
The terms of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-281 expressly require that
the insurance policy secured by Wheels, Inc. provides coverage for
its lessee, Nationwide, and to Nationwide's agents for the set
minimum amounts. The terms of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-279.21(b)(2)
require that the insurance policy secured by Wheels, Inc. provide
coverage for at least the statutory minimum amounts for anyone in
lawful possession, including the employee of Briggs. If the
policy's language does not provide coverage, then coverage in the
amounts of the statutory minimum is written into the policy.
Our Courts have held that the Financial Responsibility Act is
satisfied if the terms of the policy exclude coverage in the event
the driver of a vehicle is covered under some other policy for the
minimum amount of liability coverage required by law. Integon I,
342 N.C. at 169, 463 S.E.2d at 391 (citing Allstate Ins. Co. v.
Shelby Mut. Ins. Co., 269 N.C. 341, 352, 152 S.E.2d 436, 444-45
(1967)). In Integon I, Universal's policy expressly limited
coverage by stating With respect to persons or organizations
required by law to be an INSURED, the most WE will pay, in theabsence of any other applicable insurance, is the minimum limits
required by the Motor Vehicle Laws of North Carolina. When there
is other applicable insurance, WE will pay only OUR pro rata share
of such minimum limits. Id. at 169-70, 463 S.E.2d at 391. This
Court found that, even though the driver of the vehicle had other
insurance, she was still required by law to be an insured based
on the Financial Responsibility Act. Id. Universal was required
to pay its pro rata share of the minimum limits. Id.
Unlike the policy in Integon I and the policy in United
Services Auto Assn. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 332 N.C.
333, 420 S.E.2d 155 (1992), relied upon in Integon I, St. Paul's
policy does not make reference to the Financial Responsibility Act
and the obligations statutorily imposed upon the insurance
companies and their policies. St. Paul's policy does not limit its
exclusion of coverage to when the driver of the vehicle was covered
under some other policy for the statutory minimum amount. It
provides that, regardless of whether the lessee or the person in
lawful possession had insurance, the lessee and anyone driving with
permission of the lessee are not covered under the policy. This
provision does not satisfy the Financial Responsibility Act.
Because the policy does not satisfy N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 20-281 and
20-279.21, the terms of those statutes are written into St. Paul's
basic Automobile Liability Protection policy. There is coverage in
the statutory minimum amounts for claims against Briggs' employee,
a person in lawful possession of the vehicle and operating with thepermission and authority of Nationwide. The trial court erred in
granting summary judgment to St. Paul.
D. St. Paul's Umbrella Policy
Harleysville contends that under the Umbrella Policy, St. Paul
is required to pay its pro rata share of liability in excess of
$1 million. We disagree.
The St. Paul Umbrella policy protects Any person or
organization who is a protected person under your automobile Basic
Insurance for the use of an auto is a protected person under this
agreement. As discussed above, Briggs is excluded from being a
protected person under the terms of the policy. Thus, Briggs is
not covered by the umbrella policy. The Financial Responsibility
Act only requires coverage to the minimum limits, not additional
umbrella coverage.
Further, the St. Paul's Umbrella policy expressly states:
If there is any other insurance for injury or
damage covered by this agreement, we won't
make any payments until the other insurance
has been used up with the payment of damages.
Because Harleysville has a policy for $1,000,000 and an excess
liability policy for $1,000,000, there is other insurance which has
not been used up with the payment of damages. By the terms of
the policy, St. Paul's umbrella policy does not provide excess
coverage.
V. Expenses and Costs
The express terms of St. Paul's insurance policy do not
provide coverage for Briggs and its employee. St. Paul does not
have a contractual duty to defend Briggs. Coverage is availableonly through the Financial Responsibility Act. Because the
Financial Responsibility Act does not impose on the insurance
company a duty to defend, no duty to defend is written into the
policy as a matter of law.
VI. Conclusion
The trial court erred in granting summary judgment to St.
Paul. The policy, by virtue of N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 20-281 and
279.21, has statutory minimums written into the policy to provide
coverage for claims against Briggs. St. Paul's umbrella policy
does not provide excess liability coverage. Harleysville is
entitled to summary judgment to the extent of St. Paul's pro rata
share of the statutory coverage.
Affirmed in part, reversed and remanded in part.
Judges MCCULLOUGH and CALABRIA concur.
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