1. Workers' Compensation--injury by accident--psychological disorder--investigation
of claim
The Industrial Commission did not err in a workers' compensation case by concluding
that plaintiff employee's psychological disorder was not the result of an injury caused by an
accident arising out of and in the course of her employment with defendant, but was the result of
the investigation of her claim for that injury or from perceived workplace retaliation for her
injury.
2. Workers' Compensation--psychological disorder_-investigation of claim not an
accident
The Industrial Commission did not err in a workers' compensation case by concluding as
a matter of law that plaintiff employee's psychological disorder was not compensable, because:
(1) although an accident occurred, the Commission found the investigation thereof caused
plaintiff's mental injury; and (2) the investigation into the accident cannot be considered an
accident as it is not an unlooked for and untoward event involving the interruption of the routine
of work and the introduction thereby of unusual conditions likely to result in unexpected
consequences.
Bailey and Bailey, by J. Todd Bailey, and Gum & Hillier, P.A.,
by Patrick S. McCroskey, for plaintiff-appellant.
Root & Root, P.L.L.C., by Louise Critz Root, for defendant-
appellee.
CALABRIA, Judge.
Thomasine F. Smith (“plaintiff”) appeals the opinion and award
of the North Carolina Industrial Commission (“Commission”) finding
plaintiff's psychological disorder was not the result of an injury
caused by an accident arising out of and in the course of her
employment with the Housing Authority of Asheville (“defendant”),but was “the result of the investigation of her claim for that
injury or from perceived workplace retaliation for her injury.”
The Commission concluded as a matter of law “[p]sychological
injuries resulting from legitimate personnel action, including
investigation of workers' compensation claims generally are not
compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act.” For the reasons
stated herein, we affirm.
The Commission found the following facts pertinent to this
appeal. Plaintiff was fifty-four years old, and had worked for
defendant for twenty-four years when, on 17 April 1997, plaintiff
was injured by an accident at work. When plaintiff was returning
from lunch, she discovered her new chair had arrived and was in her
cubicle.
5. . . .When she sat in the chair, it rolled
out from under her and plaintiff landed on the
floor. She was not seriously injured or
knocked unconscious. Her co-workers helped
her up. Plaintiff was not visibly shaken and
actually laughed at herself. She complained
only of some neck pain and later about her
knee.
Plaintiff was treated by a doctor for her minor physical injuries.
9. Within a week of the accident, plaintiff
had a difficult interaction with William Wynn,
the safety coordinator for the Asheville
Housing Authority. Mr. Wynn had instituted a
program to improve workplace safety. When he
heard about plaintiff's accident, Mr. Wynn
spoke with plaintiff about her accident
report. Plaintiff apparently believed that
Mr. Wynn was accusing her of filing a lawsuit
against the Housing Authority and she became
upset. Renee Crane, a co-worker overheard the
conversation and stated that Mr. Wynn was
somewhat arrogant in his manner, but, that she
did not recall Mr. Wynn stating that a suit
was filed. Ms. Crane explained that plaintiff
became upset and did not understand what Mr.
Wynn was saying. This encounter with Mr. Wynnwas upsetting to plaintiff, and Ms. Crane
reported it to Constance Proctor, her
supervisor.
Thereafter, plaintiff continued to work “without any apparent
difficulties.” However, “[i]n August 1997, she developed a panic
disorder” and throughout the Fall she was treated for mental
illness. Plaintiff was thereafter diagnosed as paranoid
delusional, a permanent condition “anticipated to preclude
plaintiff from employment.” Dr. Anthony Sciara, Ph.D., a
psychologist who has treated plaintiff since December 1997,
testified and the Commission found the following:
17. . . .Although Dr. Sciara stated that
plaintiff's paranoid delusions were caused by
the accident at work and the way it was
handled by the employer, he was not able to
explain how the accident (the fall in the new
chair) caused the injury. Dr. Sciara
explained that there was no evidence of a
brain or other injury caused by the fall which
would produce this condition and that her
symptoms were not consistent with a traumatic
head injury. In contrast, however, plaintiff
was described by Dr. Sciara as a person with a
significant moral structure who felt a need to
follow the rules, perceived that her employer
desired no lost day injuries at work, and that
any accident at work would not be acceptable.
Further, the perceived nature of the
confrontation from Mr. Wynn accusing her of
filing some type of legal action against the
employer would significantly undermine her
psychological stability and contribute to her
decompression.
In finding of fact 21, the Commission gave greater weight to Dr.
Sciara's testimony that the psychological condition was “the result
of the investigation of her claim for that injury or from perceived
workplace retaliation for her injury.” Based on these facts, the
Commission concluded that plaintiff's paranoid delusional disorder
is not compensable. Plaintiff appeals. Plaintiff asserts the Commission erred by: (I) failing to find
her psychological impairment arose out of her employment because
there is “no evidence” to support the conclusion that her disorder
did not arise from her fall; and (II) failing to conclude as a
matter of law that her mental injury is compensable.
This Court's review of workers' compensation cases is “limited
to the consideration of two questions: (1) whether the Full
Commission's findings of fact are supported by competent evidence;
and (2) whether its conclusions of law are supported by those
findings.” Calloway v. Memorial Mission Hosp., 137 N.C. App. 480,
484, 528 S.E.2d 397, 400 (2000). “This Court does not weigh the
evidence and decide the issue on the basis of its weight; rather,
this Court's duty goes no further than to determine whether the
record contains any evidence tending to support the finding.”
Devlin v. Apple Gold, Inc., 153 N.C. App. 442, 446, 570 S.E.2d 257,
261 (2002). “If there is competent evidence to support the
findings, they are conclusive on appeal even though there is
evidence to support contrary findings.” Boles v. U.S. Air, Inc.,
148 N.C. App. 493, 498, 560 S.E.2d 809, 812 (2002). “The
Industrial Commission's conclusions of law, however, are reviewable
de novo.” Absher v. Thomas Built Buses, Inc., 156 N.C. App. 697,
___ S.E.2d ___ (2003).
I. Findings of Fact
[1] Plaintiff appeals asserting the Commission erred in
findings of fact 17 and 21 because there was “no evidence” to
support these findings. In finding of fact 17, set forth above,
the Commission found that, although Dr. Sciara concluded “theincident” in April 1997 caused her illness, he could only explain
how the investigation into the accident caused plaintiff's
condition and he could not explain how the accident itself was the
cause. Finding of fact 21 reads:
Plaintiff has developed a paranoid delusional
disorder. The greater weight of the competent
evidence is that the paranoid delusional
disorder is related to the employer's
investigation of her claim for the April 17,
1997 injury, including plaintiff's perception
of her employer's desire for no work injuries
and perceived retaliation for being injured on
the job. The Commission gives greater weight
to the testimony of Dr. Sciara that
plaintiff's psychological condition was not
caused by a traumatic injury to her head or
other injury sustained in the fall.
Plaintiff's psychiatric condition was not due
to an injury by accident arising out of and in
the course of her employment on April 17,
1997. Rather, this condition is the result of
the investigation of her claim for that injury
or from perceived workplace retaliation for
her injury. Plaintiff has not established a
psychological injury from an accident or
untoward event.
Plaintiff's assertion that no evidence supports these findings
is incorrect. When asked to describe how the April 1997 incident
caused plaintiff's psychological demise, Dr. Sciara testified:
What I can do is to give you the best
understanding that I have of it; to say
absolutely beyond a doubt this is what
occurred, I'm not sure anybody can do.
Ms. Smith is somebody with a significant
moral structure in her own life, tries to
follow all the rules, believes in doing the
right thing, believes in taking absolute
responsibility for herself, somewhat
perfectionistic in her orientation to what she
does and has a true belief in kind of right
and wrong, that if you do the right things
then good things will happen to you.
The understanding that I have is that
while she had been an employee at the Housing
Authority and although it was stressful at
times, she felt she was doing a good thing,felt that she was following all the rules of
the agency. She indicated a significant
awareness that there were to be no lost day
injuries at work, that this was a significant
thing that was focused on a lot by the Housing
Authority and that people were admonished not
to take a day off if they didn't have to.
And, that any accident related lost work days
just was not acceptable and that's what she
understood. She felt then very guilty that
because of what happened to her and even
though she was in significant pain that she
wanted to take the day off and felt very
coerced that she was to come to work.
It then began that she believed people
were watching her to see if she was going to
do anything against the Housing Authority and
that began a psychological spiral from which
she's not recovered.
As the Commission found, none of Dr. Sciara's explanation supports
his conclusion that the patient's current psychiatric decomposition
“is a direct result of her work related injury. . . .” Rather, Dr.
Sciara referenced only the investigation in describing the cause of
plaintiff's illness and further explained the confrontational
investigation “would have significantly undermined her
psychological stability. . . .” Accordingly, the testimony
supports the Commission's finding that the investigation caused her
mental illness. Although the evidence may have supported alternate
findings, the Commission's findings are “conclusive on appeal”
where they are supported by any competent evidence. Accordingly,
we overrule plaintiff's assignment of error.
II. Conclusions of Law
[2] Plaintiff also asserts the Commission erred in concluding
as a matter of law that her injury was not compensable.
We note that “as long as the resulting disability meets
statutory requirements, mental, as well as physical impairments,are compensable under the Act.” Jordan v. Central Piedmont
Community College, 124 N.C. App. 112, 119, 476 S.E.2d 410, 414
(1996). Therefore, the essential question is not whether a mental
injury is compensable but rather whether the injury met the
statutory requirements.
Although plaintiff argues “[t]his case does not present the
claim of an individual who suffers mental injury merely as a result
of an investigation,” that is precisely the case the Commission
found was presented. Although plaintiff asserted the Commission's
findings were not supported by competent evidence, since Dr.
Sciara's testimony supports the Commission's findings, these
findings are conclusive on appeal. Accordingly, we must consider
whether a mental injury resulting from an investigation into an
accident, and not the accident itself, is compensable.
“[A]n injury is compensable under the North Carolina Workers'
Compensation Act only if (1) it is caused by an 'accident,' and (2)
the accident arises out of and in the course of employment.”
Pitillo v. N.C. Dep't. of Envtl. Health & Natural Res., 151 N.C.
App. 641, 645, 566 S.E.2d 807, 811 (2002) (emphasis added). “An
accident under the workers' compensation act has been defined as
'“an unlooked for and untoward event which is not expected or
designed by the person who suffers the injury,”' and which involves
'“ the interruption of the routine of work and the introduction
thereby of unusual conditions likely to result in unexpected
consequences.”'” Id., (quoting Calderwood v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Hosp. Auth., 135 N.C. App. 112, 115, 519 S.E.2d 61, 63 (1999)
(quoting Adams v. Burlington Industries, Inc., 61 N.C. App. 258,260, 300 S.E.2d 455, 456 (1983))); see also Lovekin v. Lovekin &
Ingle, 140 N.C. App. 244, 248, 535 S.E.2d 610, 613 (2000)
(discussing North Carolina's interpretation of the term
“accident.”) In Pitillo, this Court held plaintiff's mental
illness was not caused by an “accident” where plaintiff required
psychiatric treatment after a job performance review. Pitillo, 151
N.C. App. at 646, 566 S.E.2d at 812. Similarly, in the case at
bar, although an accident occurred, the Commission found the
investigation thereof caused plaintiff's mental injury. The
investigation into the accident cannot be considered an “accident”
as it is not “an unlooked for and untoward event” involving “the
interruption of the routine of work and the introduction thereby of
unusual conditions likely to result in unexpected consequences.”
Since the investigation is not an “accident,” and the Commission
found the investigation caused plaintiff's mental injury, we find
the Commission properly determined plaintiff's injury is not
compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act.
Affirmed.
Judges McGEE and McCULLOUGH concur.
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