CITY OF CHARLOTTE, NORTH CAROLINA,
Plaintiff,
v
PATRICIA E. KING,
Defendant.
Helms, Henderson & Associates, P.A., by Christian R. Troy, for
plaintiff-appellant.
William D. McNaull, Jr. for defendant-appellee.
WYNN, Judge.
Under Section 11-35(b) of the Charlotte Housing Code, the City
of Charlotte may fine an owner of a substandard dwelling who fails
to comply with an order of the code enforcement official to repair
or demolish the dwelling. In this case, the trial court concluded
that the City of Charlotte improperly imposed a fine on Patricia E.
King (a non-occupant owner of a substandard dwelling) because “the
penalty imposed by Section 11-35(b) of the Code applies only to
dwellings which are occupied by a non-owner.” Because Section 11-
35(b) allows the city to impose civil penalties for noncompliance
of its orders without regard to whether the dwelling is occupied,
we reverse the trial court's order and remand for further
proceedings.
Briefly stated, Ms. King failed to comply with an order underSection 11-35(b) to either repair or demolish a dwelling that she
owned on or before 22 December 1996. Ms. King did not use this
unoccupied house as her principal residence. Apparently, the City
of Charlotte granted Ms. King several extensions leading to a
completion of the repairs on 17 June 1998. Nonetheless, the City
of Charlotte imposed a civil penalty of $5500 which represented a
fine for each day of delay from the date of the initial order until
the repairs were completed. Thereafter, the City of Charlotte
brought an action to recover the penalty. After the trial court
found in Ms. King's favor, the City of Charlotte appealed
contending that the trial court erroneously concluded “the penalty
imposed by Section 11-35(b) of the Code [of the City of Charlotte]
applies only to dwellings which are occupied by a non-owner.” Upon
our de novo review of this matter, we agree with the City of
Charlotte. Overton v. Camden County, ___ N.C. App. ___, 574 S.E.2d
157, 160 (2002) (stating the proper interpretation of an ordinance
is a question of law requiring de novo review).
Under Section 11-35(b) of the Charlotte Housing Code:
Any owner of a dwelling, except an owner who
occupies the dwelling as his principal place
of residence, who fails to comply with an
order of the code enforcement official to
repair, alter or improve the dwelling or to
vacate and close and remove or demolish the
dwelling, within the time specified in the
order, shall be subject to a civil penalty in
the amount of one hundred dollars ($100.00)
for the first day of noncompliance and ten
dollars ($10.00) for each day thereafter until
the dwelling is brought into compliance with
the order. The civil penalty may be recovered
by the city in a civil action in the nature of
debt if the owner does not pay the same within
thirty (30) days after the initial day ofnoncompliance.
As Ms. King concedes, the only reference to occupancy in Section
11-35(b) is the civil penalty exemption for an owner who occupies
the substandard dwelling as his principal residence. Nonetheless,
Ms. King argues that Section 11-35(b) must be read in conjunction
with Section 11-35(a) which provides,
it shall be unlawful for the owner of any
dwelling or dwelling unit, with respect to
which an order has been issued pursuant to
section 11-28(b) of this chapter to occupy or
permit the occupancy of the same.
She contends that Sections 11-35(a) which prohibits the occupancy
of a substandard dwelling conflicts with Section 11-35(b) which
exempts the owner of a substandard dwelling who occupies the same
as a principal residence from civil penalties. Thus, she argues
that since the “no occupancy” provision of Section 11-35(a) is the
more stringent requirement, the trial court properly resolved this
conflict under Section 11-34 which states:
In the event any provision, standard or
requirement of this chapter is found to be in
conflict with any provision of any other
ordinance or code of the city, the provision
which establishes the higher standard or more
stringent requirement for the promotion and
protection of the health and safety of the
residents of the city shall prevail.
We find Ms. King's argument to be without merit. Section 11-
35(b) allows the city to impose civil penalties for noncompliance
with it orders. It does not establish a standard related to the
promotion and protection of the health and safety of the residents
of the city. “The rules applicable to statutes apply equally to the
construction and interpretation of municipal ordinances.”
Woodhouse v. Board of Comm'rs, 299 N.C. 211, 225, 261 S.E.2d 882,
891 (1980). “The principal goal of statutory construction is to
accomplish the legislative intent. The intent . . . may be found
first from the plain language of the statute, then from the
legislative history, the spirit of the act and what the act seeks
to accomplish. If the language of a statute is clear, the court
must implement the statute according to the plain meaning of its
terms so long as it is reasonable to do so.” Lenox, Inc. v.
Tolson, 353 N.C. 659, 664, 548 S.E.2d 513, 517 (2001).
In this case, the clear and unambiguous language of Section
11-35(b) states that only the “owner who occupies the dwelling as
his principal place of residence” is exempt from the civil penalty.
Accordingly, we hold that the trial court erroneously interpreted
the ordinance.
We note that Ms. King contends that the City of Charlotte
tacitly and expressly waived the imposition of civil penalties.
Moreover, she argues that there was sufficient evidence for the
trial court to conclude that she did not “fail, neglect, or refuse
to repair” the premises. However, because the record indicates the
trial court focused upon whether the substandard dwelling was
occupied in rendering its judgment and did not make any findings or
conclusions regarding the penalty, we remand this matter to the
trial court for a hearing to determine whether the penalty was
properly imposed against Ms. King. Reversed and remanded.
Judges McCULLOUGH and ELMORE concur.
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