STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v
.
JOHN LITTLETON THOMPSON
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney
General Lars F. Nance, for the State.
Thomas R. Sallenger for defendant appellant.
TIMMONS-GOODSON, Judge.
John Littleton Thompson (“defendant”) appeals from his
conviction and resulting sentence entered upon jury verdicts
finding him guilty of misdemeanor stalking and communicating
threats. For the reasons stated herein, we uphold defendant's
conviction.
The evidence before the trial court tended to show the
following: Adolph Bomba (“Bomba”) testified for the State. Bomba
stated that he was a resident of Emerald Isle, North Carolina, and
was acquainted with defendant as well as the alleged victim,
Saundra Wood (“Wood”). At the time of the alleged events, Wood
worked with Ashley Denton (“Denton”) at the Bogue Inlet Pier (“the
pier”), which was owned and operated by Mike Stanley (“Stanley”).
Bomba explained that he had known defendant on a casual basisfor several years and often encountered him while walking on the
beach. During one of their encounters, defendant informed Bomba
that he had been born at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, and that
“the government had planted a microchip in him to keep track of him
when he was a baby.” Bomba testified that he avoided further
conversations with defendant after this disclosure. On 18 November
2001, defendant approached Bomba on the beach, stating, “I have to
talk to you today.” Defendant then informed Bomba that
Emerald Isle police were harassing him and
that actually Ashley [Denton] had turned him
in for stalking and he had to go to court for
that and he felt the officials were harassing
him and that's why, and Mike Stanley had told
him that he couldn't come to the pier anymore
because he used to park at the pier and walk.
So he wasn't allowed up there, and that he was
going to get all of these people and that he
had something wrong up here. He tapped his
head and he was going to get disability and
when he got disability he was going to go out
and buy two guns, and he was going to blow
away some Emerald Isle police that had been
harassing him, Mike Stanley, Saundra [Wood]
and Ashley [Denton] and burn the pier down.
When Bomba warned defendant that he could “get in serious trouble
. . . making threats,” defendant responded that, “There's nothing
anybody can do to me. The judge can't do anything, the police
can't do anything, and I'm going to do it.” Defendant then
repeated his threat to purchase weapons and shoot various persons.
Following his conversation with defendant, Bomba walked to the pier
and related defendant's threats to Stanley, Wood, and Denton.
Bomba testified that he did not want to “be involved” but felt
that, “considering the events that have been happening in the last
year, [he would not be] doing the proper thing by not tellingthem.”
Saundra Wood gave further evidence for the State. Wood
testified that she had been acquainted with defendant for several
years, because he often visited the pier where she worked. Wood
often observed defendant at the pier's parking lot, where “he would
stretch like he was running or walking, exercising on the beach.”
According to Wood, defendant frequented the pier more often in
April of 2001, after Stanley hired nineteen-year-old Denton, in
whom defendant developed a romantic interest. Wood stated that,
once Denton began working, she observed defendant at the pier “at
least five times a week.” Wood confirmed, however, that her
relationship with defendant remained limited to a casual
acquaintance, and that she did not even know his last name.
During the summer of 2001, Wood's relationship with defendant
changed when he appeared unexpectedly at her residence. Defendant
departed after Wood informed him that she was not interested in
smoking marijuana with him. Wood testified that she resided “on a
dead-end [dirt] road” in Onslow County, and that she had never
informed defendant of her address. According to Wood, there was
“nothing on [her] road,” and she knew that defendant resided in
another county approximately thirty miles from her home.
In August of 2001, Wood had a further unpleasant encounter
with defendant at the pier during which he “threw a pack of
cigarettes at [her] and [she] picked them up and threw them back at
him and told him that [Denton] didn't want anything to do with
him.” Defendant responded by “storm[ing] out of the pier and heyelled back and he said, 'Women are not allowed to talk to men in
that tone of voice and you will be sorry.'” The following morning,
defendant telephoned Wood and told her again that she “had better
never speak to him like that again; that women could not talk to
men like that and [she] would live to regret it.”
Following this incident, Wood contacted law enforcement about
defendant's behavior. Stanley, Wood's employer, also informed
defendant that he was no longer welcome on the pier property.
Shortly thereafter, Wood observed defendant “going up and down
[the] road [leading to her residence]” at least five or six times.
When she inquired among her neighbors about his presence, they
informed Wood that, although they did not know him, defendant “was
telling people 'Don't let me catch you going to [or leaving] her
house.'” Because of defendant's behavior, law enforcement officers
informed Wood that “it probably wouldn't be safe for [her] to stay
home by [herself].” Frightened, Wood left her residence and lived
at a friend's house for two weeks. She also purchased a firearm
for personal protection. Wood testified that, although she
disliked guns, she felt the purchase was necessary
Because I had no idea what [defendant] was
going to do. He kept threatening to shoot me
and burn my house down, the pier down, shoot
other people, and I had no idea what he would
do after all of this stuff had happened, you
know, to other people in other parts of the
country. You know, you don't know.
On 20 November 2001, Wood summoned law enforcement when she
observed defendant standing on the steps of the pier where she
worked, in apparent violation of a restraining order. According toWood, the restraining order mandated that defendant remain at a
distance of at least five hundred feet from Wood. Responding law
enforcement officers took defendant into custody when they arrived.
Emerald Isle police officer Chris Cox (“Officer Cox”)
testified for the State and stated that he took defendant into
custody on 20 November 2001. While in custody, defendant informed
Officer Cox that he had “not tried to hurt anyone, but I am using
psychological warfare against the people that are trying to hurt
me.” Defendant confirmed that Wood was “one of the people trying
to hurt him.” During cross-examination, Cox confirmed that the
restraining order against defendant was signed on 6 September 2001
and restricted defendant's proximity to the pier to a distance of
one hundred feet. Cox stated that, when he arrested him, defendant
was approximately seventy-five feet away from the pier.
Defendant testified on his own behalf. Defendant
characterized his statements to Bomba concerning a government-
implanted microchip as “a joke.” Defendant further denied that he
threatened Wood or anyone else, but rather had told Bomba
that they [Wood, Denton and Stanley] were
being mean to me, and that if I wanted to be
mean to them I could go down there and shoot
the whole bunch and burn the bleeding pier
down, except I used a different word, and then
the next sentence, I said but I couldn't do
that because God had a'hold [sic] of me, and
I, you know, I couldn't do that.
Defendant further explained that he was self-employed as a
handyman, and that Wood had asked him to visit her house in order
to give her an estimate for repairing her roof. Defendant denied
driving on the road leading to Wood's residence at any other time. According to defendant, Wood was jealous because of his romantic
interest in Denton, and that she had once “mentioned something to
me about coming over to her house when her boyfriend was gone or
something, but I wasn't interested in her.” Defendant denied
stalking or threatening Wood.
Upon considering the evidence, the jury found defendant guilty
of stalking and communicating threats, for which the trial court
imposed a suspended sentence of forty-five days' imprisonment and
placed defendant on supervised probation. From his conviction and
resulting sentence, defendant appeals.
_____________________________________________________
On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred in (1)
denying his motion to dismiss the charge of misdemeanor stalking;
and (2) denying his motion to dismiss the misdemeanor charge of
communicating threats. Defendant asserts that there was
insufficient evidence to convict him of these charges. For the
reasons stated herein, we conclude that there was sufficient
evidence from which the jury could find defendant guilty of
stalking and communicating threats, and we therefore find no error
in the judgment of the trial court.
Upon a motion to dismiss in a criminal action, the trial court
must view all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the
State. See State v. Pierce, 346 N.C. 471, 491, 488 S.E.2d 576, 588
(1997). Contradictions or discrepancies in the evidence must be
resolved by the jury, and the State should be given the benefit of
any reasonable inference. See State v. Brown, 310 N.C. 563, 566,313 S.E.2d 585, 587 (1984). The trial court must then decide
whether there is substantial evidence of each element of the
offense charged. See State v. Smith, 300 N.C. 71, 78, 265 S.E.2d
164, 169 (1980). “Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.” Id. at 78-79, 265 S.E.2d at 169.
At the time of the alleged events, the offense of stalking
occurred
if the person willfully on more than one
occasion follows or is in the presence of
another person without legal purpose and with
the intent to cause death or bodily injury or
with the intent to cause emotional distress by
placing that person in reasonable fear of
death or bodily injury.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-277.3(a) (1999).
(See footnote 1)
Defendant argues that theState failed to present sufficient evidence that (1) he willfully
on more than one occasion followed or was in the victim's presence
without legal purpose and (2) that he had the necessary intent to
cause Wood emotional distress. We disagree.
The State presented evidence tending to show that, in August
of 2001, defendant and Wood were involved in an altercation during
which defendant informed Wood that “women are not allowed to talk
to men in that tone of voice and you will be sorry.” Defendant
telephoned Wood the following morning and warned her that she “had
better never speak to him like that again” and she “would live to
regret it.” Stanley then informed defendant that he was no longer
allowed on pier property, and Wood contacted law enforcement
concerning defendant. After these express warnings that his
presence was not welcome, defendant thereafter drove up and down
the isolated, dead-end dirt road leading to Wood's residence and
told her neighbors that he had better not “catch [them] going to
[or leaving] [Wood's] house.” There were no businesses or other
establishments on the road, and none of Wood's neighbors was
acquainted with defendant. On 20 November 2001, defendant appearedon the steps of the pier where Wood worked despite a restraining
order ordering him to remain either five hundred or one hundred
feet away from the pier or Wood. Defendant told Cox that he was
engaged in “psychological warfare” against Wood and told Bomba that
he intended to “buy two guns, and . . . blow away some Emerald Isle
police that had been harassing him, Mike Stanley, Saundra [Wood]
and Ashley [Denton] and burn the pier down.”
We conclude that there was sufficient evidence from which the
jury could find that defendant followed or was in the presence of
Wood on more than one occasion without legal purpose and with the
intent to cause her emotional distress by placing her in fear of
death or bodily injury. We therefore overrule defendant's first
assignment of error.
Defendant further assigns error to the trial court's denial of
his motion to dismiss the charge of communicating threats. A
person is guilty of communicating threats if without lawful
authority:
(1) He willfully threatens to physically
injure the person or that person's child,
sibling, spouse, or dependent or willfully
threatens to damage the property of another;
(2) The threat is communicated to the other
person, orally, in writing, or by any other
means;
(3) The threat is made in a manner and under
circumstances which would cause a reasonable
person to believe that the threat is likely to
be carried out; and
(4) The person threatened believes that the
threat will be carried out.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-277.1(a) (2001). Defendant asserts that therewas insufficient evidence of this offense in that there was no
evidence that he directly communicated his threats to Wood.
Rather, the evidence tended to show that after being banned from
the pier by Stanley and the restraining order, defendant told Bomba
that “he was going to go out and buy two guns, and he was going to
blow away some Emerald Isle police that had been harassing him,
Mike Stanley, Saundra [Wood] and Ashley [Denton] and burn the pier
down.” When warned that he could “get into serious trouble [by]
making threats,” defendant responded that, “There's nothing anybody
can do to me. The judge can't do anything, the police can't do
anything, and I'm going to do it.” Concerned, Bomba walked
directly to the pier and relayed defendant's threats to Wood,
Stanley and Denton. Defendant argues that, as he did not make
these statements directly to Wood, he cannot be found guilty of
communicating threats. We disagree.
Statutes should be construed to ensure that the purpose of the
legislature is accomplished. See Woodson v. Rowland, 329 N.C. 330,
338, 407 S.E.2d 222, 227 (1991); State v. Hines, 122 N.C. App. 545,
550, 471 S.E.2d 109, 112 (1996), disc. review improvidently
allowed, 345 N.C. 627, 481 S.E.2d 85 (1997). Additionally, in
construing a statute, undefined words should be given their plain
meaning if it is reasonable to do so. See Woodson, 329 N.C. at
338, 407 S.E.2d at 227. We first note that, on its face, section
14-277.1 contains no language requiring that a threat be directly
communicated to a victim by the perpetrator. Defendant
nevertheless urges this Court to adopt such a requirement byinterpreting the words of section 14-277.1(a)(2)--“the threat is
communicated”-- to encompass only direct communication between the
perpetrator and the victim. Defendant cites no authority
supporting his interpretation of the statute, nor have we
discovered any North Carolina cases dealing directly with this
issue. We therefore examine the language of the statute and the
apparent intent of the General Assembly in consideration of
defendant's argument.
The offense of communicating threats is codified in Article
35, entitled “Offenses Against the Public Peace,” of Chapter 14 of
the General Statutes. As an offense against the public peace, the
gravamen of communicating threats is the making and communicating
of a threat, and thus there is no requirement in section 14-277.1
that the threat actually be carried out. See State v. Roberson, 37
N.C. App. 714, 715, 247 S.E.2d 8, 9 (1978). Even conditional
threats, if made and communicated by a defendant in a manner and
under circumstances which would cause a reasonable person to
believe that the threat was likely to be carried out, can
constitute a violation of section 14-277.1, if the victim in fact
believed the threat would be carried out. See id. at 715-16, 247
S.E.2d at 9-10. The word “communicate” is not defined under the
statute. The ordinary meaning of the word “communicate” is “to
make known; impart.” The American Heritage Dictionary 299 (2nd ed.
1982). In apparent recognition of the numerous methods of
communication that might be employed to relate a threat, section
14-277.1 allows a threat to be communicated “orally, in writing, orby any other means.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-277.1(a)(2) (emphasis
added). This broad language, permitting a threat to be
communicated by any means, strongly rebuts defendant's position
that the legislature intended only direct threats to be punishable
as an offense against the public peace.
(See footnote 2)
Defendant's argument concerning the viability of an indirect
threat more reasonably relates to the statute's other essential
elements, namely, the requirements that the threat be made in a
manner and under circumstances which would cause a reasonable
person to believe that the threat is likely to be carried out, and
that the person threatened believes that the threat will be carried
out. Indeed, it is precisely such fear on the part of a victim
that offends the public peace and that the statute is designed to
prevent. See Roberson, 37 N.C. App. at 715, 247 S.E.2d at 9
(noting that there is no requirement that a threat be carried out,
merely that the person threatened believes that the threat will be
carried out). Other jurisdictions construing similar statutes have
concluded that indirect threats are functionally indistinguishable
from direct threats, and that “[t]he rationale for imposing
criminal liability for such indirect threats is especially strong
where . . . the defendant is prohibited from contacting the victimand therefore may resort to other means of communicating the
threat.” State v. Warsop, 124 N.M. 683, 687, 954 P.2d 748, 752
(1997) (affirming conviction of retaliation against a witness
where, upon being granted parole, the defendant told a correctional
officer he intended to kill a witness who testified against him),
cert. denied, 124 N.M. 589, 953 P.2d 1087 (1998); State v. Lance,
222 Mont. 92, 108, 721 P.2d 1258, 1269 (1986) (affirming the
defendant's conviction of intimidation based on indirect threats
and reasoning that, if only direct threats were punishable, “an
individual could contact the news media threatening to take the
life of a hostage if the Governor does not meet his demands, and he
could not be convicted under this statute. But it is this very
situation which the statute is aimed at outlawing.”). We conclude
that section 14-277.1 prohibits both direct and indirect threats
communicated to the victim.
In the present case, defendant was prohibited by the
restraining order from contacting Wood directly at the time he made
his threat against her. Defendant threatened to purchase weapons,
“blow away” Wood, and burn down the pier where she worked. Wood
took these threats seriously, abandoning her home and purchasing a
firearm for her protection. Defendant admitted that he was engaged
in “psychological warfare” against Wood. The fact that defendant
utilized a third person to communicate his threats as part of that
“psychological warfare” does not negate the criminality of
defendant's behavior. We conclude that there was sufficient
evidence from which the jury could find defendant guilty ofcommunicating threats. We therefore overrule this assignment of
error.
In conclusion, we hold that the trial court did not err in
denying defendant's motion to dismiss the charges against him. In
the judgment of the trial court, we find
No error.
Judges BRYANT and GEER concur.
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