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STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JEFFERY RICARDO ROBINSON
NO. COA02-1412
Filed: 7 October 2003
Jury--conversions with jury foreman alone--failure to summon full jury into courtroom for
instructions
The trial court erred in a conspiracy to traffic in cocaine, trafficking in cocaine, and
possession with intent to sell or deliver cocaine case by engaging in three conversions with the jury
foreman alone regarding the charges and jury deliberations outside the presence of the remainder of
the jury, and defendant is granted a new trial, because: (1) the full jury must be summoned into the
courtroom when giving instructions on the law applicable to the case under N.C.G.S. § 15A-1234;
(2) it cannot be known whether the jury foreman truly understood the answers provided to him by
the trial court or whether he conveyed them correctly to the other jurors; and (3) it is impossible to
know whether the other jurors themselves understood the instructions provided to them by the
foreman when deliberating and deciding their verdict.
Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 14 September 2001 by
Judge Russell G. Walker, Jr., in Guilford County Superior Court.
Heard in the Court of Appeals 9 September 2003.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General
Edwin Lee Gavin, II, for the State.
Walter L. Jones, for defendant-appellant.
TYSON, Judge.
Jeffery Ricardo Robinson (defendant) appeals from a jury's
verdict finding him guilty of conspiracy to traffic in cocaine and
possession with intent to sell or deliver cocaine. We reverse and
grant a new trial.
I. Background
Defendant was indicted on 13 December 1999 on charges of
conspiracy to traffic in cocaine, trafficking in cocaine, and
possession of cocaine with intent to sell and deliver. Included
with this last charge was the lesser included offense of possessionof cocaine. At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court
instructed the jury on the charges in the indictment and the lesser
included offense of possession of cocaine. The trial court also
instructed the jury on the defense of entrapment. Defendant made
no objection to the jury instructions.
After the instructions were given, the jury retired to
deliberate. At 3:45 p.m., the jury sent out questions to the
court. The court instructed the bailiff to bring in the jury
foreman, Mr. Meisner (Meisner). The court addressed Meisner as
follows:
THE COURT: Mr. Meisner, if you would, I'm going
to answer these two questions to you
and let you convey the answers to
the jury. The first question was,
'Does Robinson have to conspire with
only one other person to commit
conspiracy to traffic in cocaine and
be found guilty?' The answer to
that question is 'yes.' And your
second question was, 'Is Thomas
Benton the correct name to appear in
the conspiracy to traffic charge?'
The answer to that question is
'yes.' If you would communicate
that to your other jurors.
Meisner then returned to the jury room to resume deliberations. At
4:55 p.m., the court inquired of Meisner as to whether progress was
being made. Meisner responded that progress was being made. Ten
minutes later, the court informed counsel that the jury had sent in
another question. The question was, Why does the third charge not
show count three? The court instructed Meisner, alone, to again
be brought in. When Meisner entered, the court addressed him as
follows:
THE COURT: Mr. Meisner, to answer your
question, case number 99-97658 was atwo-count indictment. The first
count was trafficking; the second
count was possession with intent to
sell or deliver. There is a lesser
included offense of that second
count, which is the possession of
cocaine. So, it was not numbered as
a count.
Meisner indicated that he understood and returned to the jury. At
5:15 p.m., the jury returned with its verdicts. The jury found the
defendant guilty of conspiracy to traffic in cocaine, not guilty of
trafficking in cocaine, and guilty of possession with intent to
sell or deliver cocaine.
II. Issue
The sole issue is whether the trial court erred by engaging in
numerous conversations with the jury foreman alone regarding the
charges and jury deliberations outside the presence of the
remainder of the jury.
III. Conversations Outside the Presence of the Full Jury
A. Application of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1233(a)
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1233(a) (2001) requires:
(a) If the jury after retiring for
deliberation requests a review of certain
testimony or other evidence, the jurors must
be conducted to the courtroom. The judge in
his discretion, after notice to the prosecutor
and defendant, may direct that requested parts
of the testimony be read to the jury and may
permit the jury to reexamine in open court the
requested materials admitted into evidence.
In his discretion the judge may also have the
jury review other evidence relating to the
same factual issue so as not to give undue
prominence to the evidence requested.
In State v. Ashe, our Supreme Court held:
This statute imposes two duties upon the trial
court when it receives a request from the jury
to review evidence. First, the court mustconduct all jurors to the courtroom. Second,
the trial court must exercise its discretion
in determining whether to permit requested
evidence to be read to or examined by the jury
together with other evidence relating to the
same factual issue.
314 N.C. 28, 34, 331 S.E.2d 652, 656 (1985). While the statute
does not expressly say that the trial judge must have the jurors
conducted to the courtroom, we have no doubt that the legislature
intended to place this responsibility on the judge presiding at the
trial. Id. at 35, 331 S.E.2d at 657. Our Supreme Court concluded
that:
Our jury system is designed to insure that a
jury's decision is the result of evidence and
argument offered by the contesting parties
under the control and guidance of an impartial
judge and in accord with the judge's
instructions on the law. All these elements of
the trial should be viewed and heard
simultaneously by all twelve jurors. To allow
a jury foreman, another individual juror, or
anyone else to communicate privately with the
trial court regarding matters material to the
case and then to relay the court's response to
the full jury is inconsistent with this
policy. The danger presented is that the
person, even the jury foreman, having alone
made the request of the court and heard the
court's response firsthand, may through
misunderstanding, inadvertent
editorialization, or an intentional
misrepresentation, inaccurately relay the
jury's request or the court's response, or
both, to the defendant's detriment. Then, each
juror, rather than determining for himself or
herself the import of the request and the
court's response, must instead rely solely
upon their spokesperson's secondhand
rendition, however inaccurate it may be.
Thus, we hold that for the trial court in this
case to hear the jury foreman's inquiry and to
respond to it without first requiring the
presence of all jurors was an error in
violation of N.C.G.S. § 15A-1233.
Id. at 36, 331 S.E.2d at 657 (emphasis supplied). This Court, in State v. Tucker found that the Supreme Court's
reasoning in Ashe concerning N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1233(a) equally
applies to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1234(a). 91 N.C. App. 511, 515,
372 S.E.2d 328, 331 (1988). N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1234(a) (2001)
states:
(a) After the jury retires for deliberations,
the judge may give appropriate additional
instructions to: (1) Respond to an inquiry of
the jury made in open court; or (2) Correct or
withdraw an erroneous instruction; or (3)
Clarify an ambiguous instruction; or (4)
Instruct the jury on a point of law which
should have been covered in the original
instructions.
This Court held that the same danger present in Ashe was present in
this case: the question presented and the trial court's response
may be inaccurately relayed by the foreman to the remaining
jurors. Tucker, 91 N.C. at 515, 372 S.E.2d at 331. This Court
held:
[t]he situation in this case may present more
danger because the request involved the
court's instructions on the elements necessary
to prove each offense, and not just a request
to review the transcript as was the case in
Ashe. We hold it was error for the trial
court to fail to bring the entire jury to the
courtroom to respond to the jury's question.
Id. This Court held that the full jury must be summoned into the
courtroom when giving instructions on the law applicable to the
case under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1234(a). Id.
Here, the trial court spoke to the jury foreman on three
different occasions outside of the presence of the full jury. The
court answered questions concerning the charges against defendant
on two different occasions. The other communication concerned the
progress of the jury's deliberations. Each time, the court statedto the jury foreman that it would allow him to convey the answers
to the jury. This is in direct violation of the requirements of
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1234(a), the holdings of this Court, and our
Supreme Court. By failing to summon all twelve jurors to the
courtroom before providing answers to various questions, the trial
court violated statutes and case law.
B. Reversible Error
After finding that the trial court erred in communicating with
the jury foreman outside the presence of the full jury, we must
determine whether this error was prejudicial to the defendant. We
hold that it was.
In Tucker, this Court found reversible error in failing to
summon the full jury into the courtroom. Again, following the
reasoning in Ashe, this Court held:
Although the foreman might have relayed this
exact message, he might have as easily have
conveyed some altered message or phrased the
judge's response in his own words in such a
way as to alter its connotation and its
import. The manner in which he reported his
request and the response might have led the
other jurors to believe the trial court
thought the evidence which the jury wanted
reviewed unimportant or not worthy of further
consideration.
Id. at 516, 372 S.E.2d at 331. As our Supreme Court stated in
Ashe, the purpose of the statute is to prevent the jury foreman
through misunderstanding, inadvertent editorialization, or an
intentional misrepresentation, from inaccurately relaying the
jury's request or the court's response, or both, to the defendant's
detriment. Ashe, 314 N.C. at 36, 331 S.E.2d at 657.
Here, we cannot know whether the jury foreman truly understoodthe answers provided to him by the trial court or whether he
conveyed them correctly to the other jurors. Further, it is
impossible to know whether the other jurors themselves understood
the instructions provided to them by the foreman when deliberating
and deciding their verdict. If all twelve jurors had been summoned
to the courtroom as required by the statute and case law, there
would be no question whether all twelve were conveyed the same
answers in the same manner. We hold that it was reversible error
by the trial court to not summon the full jury into the courtroom
before answering their questions.
IV. Conclusion
The trial court committed reversible error. Defendant is
granted a new trial.
New trial.
Judges WYNN and LEVINSON concur.
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