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All opinions are subject to modification and technical correction prior to official publication in the North Carolina Reports and North Carolina Court of Appeals Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the electronic version of an opinion and the
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JIMMY SPRINGER, Employee, Plaintiff, v. McNUTT SERVICE GROUP, INC.,
Employer, SELF-INSURED (KEY RISK MANAGEMENT SERVICES, Servicing
Agent), Defendant
NO. COA02-1514
Filed: 7 October 2003
1. Workers' Compensation_disability_burden of proof_not met
The Industrial Commission did not err by concluding that a workers' compensation plaintiff
failed to meet his burden of proving that he was disabled. The Commission found that no physician
prohibited plaintiff from working or had found that plaintiff could not work in any employment,
defendant offered expert testimony that an average person could have found suitable employment,
taking into account plaintiff's limitations, and the Commission found that plaintiff had suffered only
minor injuries from his fall and that his testimony about his limitations was not credible.
2. Workers' Compensation_no further medical treatment_findings
The Industrial Commission's findings that a workers' compensation plaintiff was not in need
of further medical treatment as a result of his injuries were supported by competent evidence.
3. Workers' Compensation_denial of disability_grounds
The Court of Appeals did not reach the question of whether a workers' compensation
plaintiff was denied disability payments for his refusal of light duty work. The Industrial
Commission correctly found that plaintiff had not met his burden of showing disability.
Appeal by plaintiff from Opinion and Award of the North
Carolina Industrial Commission filed 26 August 2002 by Commissioner
Bernadine S. Ballance. Heard in the Court of Appeals 9 September
2003.
David Gantt, for plaintiff-appellant.
Young Moore and Henderson P.A., by Jeffrey T. Linder, for
defendant-appellee.
TYSON, Judge.
Jimmy W. Springer (plaintiff) appeals from the Opinion and
Award of the Full Commission of the Industrial Commission
(Commission) denying his worker's compensation claim. We affirm.
I. Facts
Plaintiff was employed as a heating and air mechanic on 3
August 1999 by McNutt Service Group, Inc. (defendant). Plaintiff
claimed that he sustained an injury by accident to his left knee
and right hip when he slipped and bumped his left knee while
walking across some boards at work. Plaintiff is fifty-two years
old and has worked the majority of his life as a heating/cooling
(HVAC) duct work installer. This work involves lifting duct work
weighing as much as 150 pounds and requires plaintiff to work in
cramped areas to install equipment for HVAC units. Prior to
starting work with defendant in February 1999, plaintiff had not
worked for ten years. Plaintiff had been receiving Social Security
Disability benefits due to injuries he sustained at his prior job
to his left arm and right shoulder and due to a right hip
dislocation he suffered in a motorcycle accident. Plaintiff
received written clearance from the Social Security Administration
before going back to work in February 1999.
On 3 August 1999, plaintiff was installing duct work in the
attic of Rex's Gun Shop when his left boot slipped off of a 2 x 4
wooden stud. He fell and struck his left knee. Plaintiff had not
experienced or complained of knee problems prior to this injury.
The following day, plaintiff returned to work experiencing pain in
his left knee and right hip. He was assigned to a job at the Bath
and Body Shop. On this job, plaintiff aggravated the injuries from
the previous day when he slipped on an attic sprinkler line.
Plaintiff notified defendant verbally and by leaving a written note
in the office of Mark Sawyer, defendant's vice president.
Plaintiff left a telephone message that he was hurt and would beseeking medical attention. Plaintiff did not seek medical
attention until a week later on 10 August 1999. During this period
of time, Scarlet Laughter, defendant's director of personnel,
repeatedly called plaintiff to advise him that company policy
required him to schedule an examination with Western Carolina
Occupational Health Center. An appointment was set for 10 August
1999 and plaintiff was seen by Dr. John B. Lange. Plaintiff was
diagnosed with right hip and left knee contusions, given work
restrictions, and told to return in a week.
On 23 August 1999, plaintiff went to Dr. Louis Schroeder, his
personal physician. Dr. Schroeder noted that Plaintiff was not
limping and that there were no other findings other than
tenderness. Plaintiff returned to Western Carolina Occupational
Health Center and was again seen by Dr. Lange. Dr. Lange
prescribed Celebrex and continued the prior work restrictions for
two weeks. Subsequently, plaintiff was examined by Dr. Jon Silver
and Dr. Tally Eddings. Dr. Eddings diagnosed plaintiff as having
illotibial band friction syndrome. On 19 September 2000, Dr. James
Lipsey, who in the past had examined plaintiff for his right hip
condition, performed an independent medical examination. Dr.
Lipsey found no evidence of significant injury to plaintiff's right
hip attributable to his fall at work. Dr. Lipsey had no treatment
recommendation for plaintiff's left knee injury.
After the initial medical examination by Western Carolina
Occupational Health Center, defendant offered plaintiff light duty
work. Plaintiff did not return to work or return phone callsregarding his return to work. Plaintiff was terminated. Plaintiff
testified that he has not sought any type of work since his injury.
II. Issues
The issues are whether the Commission erred in: (1) ruling
plaintiff was not disabled, (2) ruling plaintiff does not need
further medical treatment, and (3) denying plaintiff disability
benefits after finding plaintiff refused light duty employment.
III. Disability
In reviewing a decision of the Commission, an appellate court
is limited to a consideration of whether competent evidence
supports the findings of fact and whether the findings of fact
support the conclusions of law. Deese v. Champion Int'l Corp., 352
N.C. 109, 116, 530 S.E.2d 549, 553 (2000). Findings of fact by the
Commission are conclusive upon appeal if supported by competent
evidence, even though other evidence supports contrary findings.
Pittman v. International Paper Co., 132 N.C. App. 151, 156, 510
S.E.2d 705, 709 (1999). The Commission's conclusions of law,
however, are reviewed de novo. Bailey v. Western Staff Servs.,
151 N.C. App. 356, 359, 566 S.E.2d 509, 511 (2002).
The employee bears the burden of proving each and every
element of compensability. Harvey v. Raleigh Police Dep't, 96 N.C.
App. 28, 35, 384 S.E.2d 549, 553 (1989). The employee can prove
that he is disabled in one of four ways by production of: (1)
medical evidence that he is physically or mentally, as a
consequence of the work related injury, incapable of work in any
employment; (2) evidence that he is capable of some work, but has
after a reasonable effort been unsuccessful in his efforts toobtain employment; (3) evidence that he is capable of some work but
that it would be futile because of preexisting conditions, i.e.,
age, inexperience, lack of education, to seek other employment; or
(4) evidence that he has obtained other employment at a wage less
than that earned prior to the injury. Russell v. Lowes Prod.
Distrib., 108 N.C. App. 762, 765, 425 S.E.2d 454, 457 (1993).
[1] Plaintiff contends the Commission erred when it concluded
that plaintiff failed to meet his burden of proving he was disabled
under prong three of the Russell test. We disagree.
The Commission found no physician had prohibited plaintiff
from working or had found that plaintiff could not work in any
employment as a result of his knee and hip complaints. Dr. Lange
never totally restricted plaintiff from work. Dr. Eddings did not
find plaintiff to be totally disabled from any work. The
Commission also found that it would not be futile under prong three
of the Russell test for plaintiff to have sought work.
Defendant offered expert evidence by Jane Veal, a vocational
rehabilitation professional, who testified that an average person
with some effort could have found suitable employment taking into
account plaintiff's physical limitations. She specifically
identified several jobs, including security guard positions, motel
clerk, and forklift operators plaintiff was capable of performing
if he had searched for work. The Commission also found
plaintiff's testimony regarding his physical limitations was not
credible and plaintiff only suffered minor injuries from his fall.
The Commission's finding that a search for work would not befutile, as required by prong three of Russell, is supported by
competent evidence. Plaintiff's assignment of error is overruled.
IV. Further Medical Treatment
[2] The Commission found that plaintiff was not in need of
further medical treatment as a result of his injuries. Plaintiff
contends competent medical evidence does not support this finding.
Dr. Lipsey examined plaintiff for his earlier hip injury and
testified that any changes in plaintiff's hip condition were
associated with a progression of his preexisting degenerative
condition. Dr. Lipsey also testified that he found no evidence of
significant injury related to plaintiff's 3 August 1999 accident.
The Commission noted that Dr. Lipsey was in the best position to
opine on plaintiff's hip condition as he was the only doctor who
examined plaintiff before and after his 3 August 1999 accident.
The Commission also found plaintiff was not in need of further
medical treatment as a result of his left knee contusions. Dr.
Lipsey testified that no treatment recommendations were indicated
for plaintiff's left knee condition and that no structural injuries
to that knee were evident. The Commission's findings are supported
by competent evidence. Plaintiff's second assignment of error is
overruled.
V. Refusal of Light Duty Work
[3] Plaintiff's third assignment of error is that his
disability payments could not be denied based on an alleged refusal
of a make work job that was not available to the general public.
The Commission did not deny plaintiff disability compensation
on these grounds. The Commission found plaintiff failed to meethis burden of proving he was disabled irrespective of whether he
refused an offer of suitable employment. The Commission's findings
of fact that plaintiff failed to meet his burden of proving he was
disabled is supported by competent evidence. We do not reach the
merits of plaintiff's third assignment of error.
VI. Conclusion
The Commission's findings of fact and conclusions of law
concerning plaintiff's failure to prove his disability and that he
requires no further medical attention are supported by competent
evidence in the record. We need not reach the merits of the denial
of plaintiff's disability compensation due to his refusal of light
duty work. The Opinion and Award of the Commission is affirmed.
Affirmed.
Judges WYNN and LEVINSON concur.
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