1. Workers' Compensation--occupational disease--hepatitis C--increased risk
The Industrial Commission did not err in a workers' compensation case by finding that
plaintiff sewer worker was not exposed to an increased risk of hepatitis C at work, because: (1) a
defense expert's testimony that he could not identify plaintiff's job as the source of hepatitis C
infection when there was no evidence of direct exposure to infected blood was competent
evidence supporting this finding; and (2) the Commission's findings of fact cannot be overruled
merely based on plaintiff's presentation of evidence which would support a contrary finding.
2. Workers' Compensation--occupational disease--hepatitis C--causation--expert
testimony
The Industrial Commission did not err in a workers' compensation case by concluding
that plaintiff sewer worker's hepatitis C infection was not caused by his employment even though
plaintiff contends the Commission should have given greater weight to the deposition testimony
of plaintiff's expert witness rather than defendant's expert witness based on the fact that
plaintiff's expert actually treated plaintiff while defendant's expert merely reviewed material
about plaintiff, because: (1) the Commission does not have to explain its findings of fact by
attempting to distinguish which evidence or witnesses it finds credible; and (2) defense expert's
testimony is competent record evidence which supports the Commission's findings of fact.
Judge WYNN dissenting.
Stanley Law Firm, by Wade A. Stanley, for plaintiff-appellant.
Lewis & Roberts, P.L.L.C., by Jack S. Holmes, for defendants-
appellees.
LEVINSON, Judge.
Plaintiff appeals from an opinion and award of the North
Carolina Industrial Commission denying plaintiff's Workers'
Compensation claim. We affirm. Plaintiff was employed by the Town of Ayden, North Carolina,
in 1980 in the water and sewer department. His initial job duties
included tasks associated with installation, maintenance, and
repair of the Town's water and sewer system. In performing his
duties, plaintiff was regularly exposed to raw sewage containing
materials such as water, urine, feces, grease, feminine hygiene
products, prophylactics, small amounts of blood, and other items
and substances that people flush down toilets.
The sewage sometimes touched plaintiff's skin or entered his
eyes and mouth. When plaintiff had cuts or abrasions, the sewage
came into contact with his broken skin. Plaintiff was promoted to
foreman in 1984, and later to superintendent; after each promotion,
his exposure to raw sewage became less frequent.
In 1992, liver function tests conducted during a physical
examination of plaintiff indicated possible liver problems.
Testing revealed that plaintiff did not have hepatitis A or B. In
1998, routine blood work for an unrelated problem also yielded
abnormal liver function test results. Plaintiff's physician
referred him to Dr. Douglas F. Newton, an internist and
gastroenterologist, who diagnosed plaintiff with hepatitis C. In
Dr. Newton's opinion, plaintiff had been infected for about six
years and had acquired the infection due to contact with sewer
water.
Plaintiff filed a workers' compensation claim alleging that
his hepatitis C was a compensable occupational disease as defined
in N.C.G.S. § 97-53(13) (2001). In support of his claim, plaintiff
offered Dr. Newton's deposition testimony, in which the doctoroffered an opinion that, to a reasonable degree of medical
certainty, plaintiff was likely infected with hepatitis C through
work-related contact with sewage. Plaintiff also presented
evidence that his wife of twenty-seven years had tested negative
for hepatitis C, and testified that he had no history of blood
transfusions, tattoos or intravenous drug use, and had not had
extramarital sexual contact.
Defendant offered the deposition testimony of Dr. John F.
Campbell, an expert in infectious diseases. Dr. Campbell never
treated plaintiff; his testimony was based upon plaintiff's job
description and personnel file, interrogatories, and plaintiff's
medical file. Dr. Campbell testified that he was unaware of any
studies linking plaintiff's occupation with a greater-than-average
risk of hepatitis C infection. Moreover, Dr. Campbell indicated
that, while he could not determine the cause of plaintiff's
hepatitis C, he saw no evidence of plaintiff contracting hepatitis
C at work.
The Commission found, in pertinent part:
10. Because Dr. Newton attributed plaintiff's
hepatitis to his exposure to sewage at work,
plaintiff filed this workers' compensation
claim. Defendant then presented the issue to
Dr. Campbell, an internist and infectious
disease specialist who had worked for the
Center for Disease Control for two years
during his career. Dr. Campbell searched the
medical literature and found no studies which
showed Hepatitis C to be present in sewage or
that sewage could transfer the virus. There
was no scientific evidence to support the
theory that sewer workers were at an increased
risk of acquiring the infection and, in view
of the large number of sewage systems and
sewer workers, the doctor was of the opinion
that the risk would have been noticed if it
existed. Despite the large number of patientshe had treated for Hepatitis C, Dr. Campbell
had never had a patient claim to have
contracted the disease from exposure to
sewage.
11. Dr. Campbell explained that Hepatitis C is
a virus which is transmitted through a blood
borne route. . . . Hepatitis C is usually
transmitted by shared intravenous needles, but
there have been less frequent reports of
sexual transmission and rare cases of cuts or
punctures allowing the virus to enter the
blood stream when exposed to infected blood. .
. . In addition, the Hepatitis C virus has a
very short life span outside of the host,
which has hampered research since it cannot be
cultured. The fact that the Hepatitis C virus
does not survive long outside the host renders
transmission through sewer waste unlikely.
There has been considerable effort in medicine
to identify the routes of transmission for
Hepatitis C. Contact with sewer waste has not
been identified as a potential cause for
Hepatitis C.
12. Dr. Newton was too quick to attribute
plaintiff's condition to his exposure to
sewage. Not only did Dr. Newton not have
scientific authority to support his opinion,
he could not base his opinion on his own
experience in medical practice since he had
not treated another sewer worker for Hepatitis
C. In addition, as noted by Dr. Campbell,
there are disincentives for patients to
disclose the types of activities which could
lead to infection.
13. Although plaintiff was exposed to
untreated sewer water which would have
contained some blood and although he worked at
times with cuts or abrasions on his skin, he
has not proven by the greater weight of the
evidence to have been placed at an increased
risk of developing Hepatitis C by reason of
his exposure to untreated sewage in his
employment with defendant. Nor was his
exposure to untreated sewage proven to have
been a significant contributing factor in his
contraction of the disease.
14. Plaintiff has not proven that he developed
an occupational disease which was due to
causes and conditions characteristic of and
peculiar to his employment with defendant-employer and which excluded all ordinary
diseases of life to which the general public
was equally exposed.
The Commission made the following relevant conclusion of law:
1. Plaintiff's Hepatitis C was not an
occupational disease which was due to causes
and conditions characteristic of and peculiar
to his employment with defendant-employer and
which excluded all ordinary diseases of life
to which the general public was equally
exposed. G.S. §97-53(13); Booker v. Duke
Medical Center, 297 N.C. 458 (1979). Dr.
Newton's bald opinion is not accepted as
credible evidence of causation because his
opinion is not based on accepted medical
principles of differential diagnosis and is
not supported by the accepted medical
literature.
(citations omitted).
The Full Commission, with one Commissioner dissenting, denied
compensation. Plaintiff now appeals the Commission's opinion and
award, contending (1) the Commission erred in finding that
plaintiff was not exposed to hepatitis C at work, and (2) the
Commission erred in concluding that plaintiff's hepatitis C
infection was not caused by his employment.
Our review of the Commission's opinion and award is limited
to a determination of (1) whether the Commission's findings of fact
are supported by any competent evidence in the record; and (2)
whether the Commission's findings justify its conclusions of law.
Goff v. Foster Forbes Glass Div., 140 N.C. App. 130, 132-33, 535
S.E.2d 602, 604 (2000). The facts found by the Commission are
conclusive upon appeal to this Court when they are supported by
competent evidence, even when there is evidence to support contrary
findings. Pittman v. Int'l Paper Co., 132 N.C. App. 151, 156, 510
S.E.2d 705, 709, disc. review denied, 350 N.C. 310, 534 S.E.2d 596, aff'd per curiam, 351 N.C. 42, 519 S.E.2d 524 (1999). [T]his
Court is 'not at liberty to reweigh the evidence and to set aside
the findings . . . simply because other . . . conclusions might
have been reached.' Baker v. Sanford, 120 N.C. App. 783, 787, 463
S.E.2d 559, 562 (1995) (quoting Rewis v. Ins. Co., 226 N.C. 325,
330, 38 S.E.2d 97, 100 (1946)), disc. review denied, 342 N.C. 651,
467 S.E.2d 703 (1996). [T]he full Commission is the sole judge of
the weight and credibility of the evidence. . . . Deese v.
Champion Int'l Corp., 352 N.C. 109, 116, 530 S.E.2d 549, 553 (2000)
(citing Adams v. AVX Corp., 349 N.C. 676, 680-81, 509 S.E.2d 411,
413-14 (1998)). [T]he Commission does not have to explain its
findings of fact by attempting to distinguish which evidence or
witnesses it finds credible. Id. This Court reviews the
Commission's conclusions of law de novo. Griggs v. E. Omni
Constructors, 158 N.C. App. 480, 483, 581 S.E.2d 138, 141 (2003).
Under the Workers' Compensation Act, a compensable
occupational disease includes [a]ny disease . . . proven to be due
to causes and conditions which are characteristic of and peculiar
to a particular trade, occupation or employment, but excluding all
ordinary diseases of life to which the general public is equally
exposed outside of the employment. N.C.G.S. § 97-53(13) (2001).
For a disease to be occupational under G.S.
97-53(13) it must be (1) characteristic of
persons engaged in the particular trade or
occupation in which the claimant is engaged;
(2) not an ordinary disease of life to which
the public generally is equally exposed with
those engaged in that particular trade or
occupation; and (3) there must be a causal
connection between the disease and the
[claimant's] employment.
Rutledge v. Tultex Corp., 308 N.C. 85, 93, 301 S.E.2d 359, 365
(1983) (quoting Hansel v. Sherman Textiles, 304 N.C. 44, 52, 283
S.E.2d 101, 105-06 (1981)). [T]he first two elements are
satisfied if, as a matter of fact, the employment exposed the
worker to a greater risk of contracting the disease than the public
generally. Id. at 93-94, 301 S.E.2d at 365. Proof of the third
element, causal connection between the disease and the employee's
occupation, often will be based on circumstantial evidence. Booker
v. Duke Med. Ctr., 297 N.C. 458, 476, 256 S.E.2d 189, 200 (1979).
Among the circumstances which may be considered are the following:
(1) the extent of exposure to the disease or disease-causing agents
during employment, (2) the extent of exposure outside employment,
and (3) absence of the disease prior to the work-related exposure
as shown by the employee's medical history. Id.
[1] Plaintiff first contends that the competent record
evidence compelled a finding that his employment placed him at an
increased risk of contracting hepatitis C. This is so, plaintiff
argues, because (1) raw sewage came into contact with plaintiff's
cuts and abrasions, (2) plaintiff testified that he has not engaged
in other risk-enhancing behavior, and (3) plaintiff's treating
physician, Dr. Newton, offered an expert opinion that plaintiff's
employment resulted in his illness.
The Commission found that plaintiff's employment did not place
him at an increased risk of contracting hepatitis based in large
part on the deposition testimony of defendant's expert witness, Dr.
Campbell. Dr. Campbell testified that exposure to sewer water has
not been linked to the transmission of hepatitis C. Dr. Campbellalso testified that hepatitis C does not survive outside of a host
body for any significant amount of time, that transmission usually
requires exposure of the skin to fairly large volumes of infected
blood, and that no evidence exists that exposure to diluted amounts
of infected blood can transmit hepatitis C. Dr. Campbell concluded
that he could not identify plaintiff's job as the source of
hepatitis C infection because he had seen no evidence of direct
exposure to infected blood.
Dr. Campbell's testimony is competent evidence which supports
the Commission's finding that plaintiff was not at an increased
risk of contracting hepatitis C as a result of his employment-
related contact with raw sewage. We cannot overrule the
Commission's findings of fact merely because plaintiff presented
evidence which would support a contrary finding. See Pittman, 132
N.C. App. at 156, 510 S.E.2d at 709.
[2] Plaintiff next contends that the Commission erred in
concluding that his hepatitis C infection was not caused by his
employment. The gravamen of this contention is that the Commission
should have given greater weight to the deposition testimony of
plaintiff's expert witness, Dr. Newton, than to defendant's expert
witness, Dr. Campbell. This is so, plaintiff argues, because Dr.
Newton actually treated plaintiff while Dr. Campbell reviewed
material about plaintiff submitted to him by defense counsel.
[T]he Commission does not have to explain its findings of
fact by attempting to distinguish which evidence or witnesses it
finds credible. Deese, 352 N.C. at 116, 530 S.E.2d at 553. In
the present case, however, the Commission did explain itsassessment of the credibility of the witnesses; the findings of
fact indicate that the Commission found Dr. Campbell's testimony
more persuasive than Dr. Newton's tetimony. As already indicated,
Dr. Campbell's testimony is competent record evidence which
supports the Commission's findings of fact. These findings of fact
support the Commission's conclusion that compensation is
unwarranted.
The assignments of error are overruled. The Industrial
Commission's opinion and award is
Affirmed.
Judge WYNN dissents.
Judge TYSON concurs.
WYNN, Judge dissenting.
It is the duty of the Commission to consider all of the
competent evidence, make definitive findings, draw its conclusions
of law from these findings, and enter the appropriate award. In
making its findings, the Commission's function is to weigh and
evaluate the entire evidence and determine as best it can where the
truth lies. Harrell v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 45 N.C. App. 197, 205,
262 S.E.2d 830, 835 (1980). Moreover, in workers' compensation
cases, it is a general principle that the provisions of the
Workers' Compensation Act should be construed liberally so that
benefits are not denied to an employee based on a narrow or strict
interpretation of the statute's provisions. Grantham v. Cherry
Hosp., 98 N.C. App. 34, 37, 389 S.E.2d 822, 823 (1990). In this
case, because I believe the Commission did not consider all of the
competent evidence and did not base its decision upon a fair andliberal construction of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-53(13), I
respectfully dissent.
The record indicates the Commission was presented with
evidence of blood-borne pathogen regulations implemented by OSHA,
with which the Town of Ayden had to comply.
(See footnote 1)
Under OSHA standard
1910.1030, after reviewing all of the evidence in the rulemaking
record, OSHA determined that employees face a significant health
risk as the result of occupational exposure to blood and other
potentially infectious materials (OPIM) because they may contain
bloodborne pathogens. These pathogens include but are not limited
to HBV, which causes hepatitis B; HIV,..., hepatitis C virus . .
.. Included in the employees at risk were employees handling
regulated waste, custodial workers required to clean up
contaminated sharps or spills of blood or OPIM, ...maintenance
workers, such as plumbers. Therefore, OSHA required certain
standards to be implemented to minimize the risk of infection.
Therefore, even though both experts testified they were not aware
of any literature indicating sewer maintenance workers were at a
greater risk of contracting Hepatitis C than the general public,
there was competent evidence in the record indicating sewer
maintenance workers were indeed at a greater risk than the general
public. Accordingly, finding of fact 10, which states in part:
there was no scientific evidence to support the theory that sewer
workers were at an increased risk of acquiring the infection is
not supported by the record. Moreover, the Commission based its decision upon an improper
inference from the evidence presented. In Findings of Fact 11-12,
the Commission described the testimony of Dr. John Campbell and Dr.
Douglas F. Newton. Dr. Newton, a licensed physician for 26 years
and a board-certified expert specialist in gastroenterology and
internal medicine, treated plaintiff, analyzed plaintiff's medical
records and questioned plaintiff about his medical history, any
possible history of risky behaviors, and his employment. In
contrast, Dr. Campbell had been licensed in North Carolina for 13
years and had never treated plaintiff. Although Dr. Campbell had
worked for two years with the Center for Disease Control, he did
not conduct any research in Hepatitis C and has never published on
the subject. Rather, Dr. Campbell's worked in epidemic
intelligence at the CDC. In order to render an opinion, Dr.
Campbell researched medical literature and reviewed plaintiff's
medical and employment records.
In rendering its finding on Dr. Newton's testimony, the
Commission stated: Dr. Newton was too quick to attribute
plaintiff's condition to his exposure to sewage. Not only did Dr.
Newton not have scientific authority to support his opinion, he
could not base his opinion on his own experience in medical
practice since he had not treated another sewer worker for
Hepatitis C.
A close analysis of the depositions indicate the doctors
provided essentially the same testimony regarding Hepatitis C.
Both doctors testified that Hepatitis C is a blood-borne pathogen
that infects the liver and can possibly led to death. They bothtestified that most people get it through direct exposure through
cuts or injections and that IV drug use was the most common method.
They also testified that people could get it through blood
transfusions but that it was rare to get it through sexual conduct.
Finally, they both testified that they were unaware of any medical
literature linking Hepatitis C to sewer maintenance workers or
indicating Hepatitis C could be transmitted through sewer water and
neither doctor had treated another sewer worker for Hepatitis C.
Based upon a complete history of plaintiff's behaviors,
employment and medical care, Dr. Newton attributed plaintiff's
Hepatitis C infection to workplace exposure. However, without the
benefit of plaintiff's complete history and based upon his
assessment of the medical literature, Dr. Campbell testified that
plaintiff did not contract it from workplace exposure and could not
state a cause of his Hepatitis C.
Disregarding the OSHA standard and the similarities in the
testimony, the Commission based Findings of Fact 11 and 12 solely
upon the doctors' testimony that they were unaware of any medical
literature indicating Hepatitis C could be transmitted through
sewer water or that sewer workers were at a greater risk of
contracting the disease. Notably, neither doctor testified that
there was no scientific evidence of such a connection.
Finally, the Commission, disregarding plaintiff's work
environment and behavioral history, neglected its duty to apply a
fair and liberal construction to the statute. As plaintiff
explained to his doctor and the Commission, he began working for
the Town of Ayden as a water and sewer maintenance and lift stationtechnician in 1980. From 1980 until 1986, he worked on a daily
basis for an average of 4-5 hours in untreated, raw sewage that
contained needles, syringes, blood, urine, feces, feminine hygiene
products, prophylactics and any other thing people flushed down a
toilet. Because he was working with metal and rough surfaces, he
would frequently get cuts and abrasions which he treated with
antiseptic and covered with a band-aid. Plaintiff also had a
condition where his nose would bleed easily and it was not unusual
for plaintiff to come out of the sewer with a nosebleed. While
unclogging sewer mains and pipes, it was not unusual for plaintiff
to be showered with raw, untreated sewage and it was not uncommon
for sewage to enter his eyes and mouth. His rain suit and clothes
would become saturated with sewage and would come into contact with
his skin. His gloves would puncture and tear and raw sewage would
seep into his gloves and rubber boots. Dr. Newton testified that
given this exposure to blood and raw sewage and after eliminating
all other possible causes of infection, he opined that plaintiff
contracted Hepatitis C at work because there was no other source of
exposure.
Ignoring plaintiffs workplace exposure to blood, plaintiff's
testimony indicating he had not participated in any behaviors that
could have been another potential source of Hepatitis C infection,
Dr. Newton's expert opinion, and OSHA regulations indicating sewer
maintenance workers were at an increased risk of contracting
Hepatitis C, the Commission chose to rely upon the doctors' lack of
knowledge regarding medical literature on the subject. In my
opinion, the Commission failed to consider all of the competentevidence, did not fulfill its duty to apply a liberal construction
to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-53(13), and did not try to determine as
best it could where the truth lay. See Harrell v. J.P. Stevens &
Co., 45 N.C. App. 197, 205, 262 S.E.2d 830, 835 (1980). As the
determination of whether an occupational disease exists is a mixed
question of law and fact, I would conclude plaintiff established by
a preponderance of the evidence that he did suffer from an
occupational disease. See Hobbs v. Clean Control Corp., 154 N.C.
App. 433, 436, 571 S.E.2d 860, 862 (2002)(stating Plaintiff has
the burden of proving [an occupational disease] by a preponderance
of the evidence).
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