The trial court erred by failing to dismiss the charges of possession of a firearm by a felon
and being an habitual felon, because both charges were supported by defendant's prior
convictions for possession of cocaine which are statutorily defined as misdemeanors.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General
Lisa Granberry Corbett, for the State.
Daniel Shatz for the defendant-appellant.
WYNN, Judge.
Defendant, Corey Tyrone Sneed, argues on appeal that the trial
court erroneously failed to dismiss the charges of possession of a
firearm by a felon indictment and being an habitual felon because
both charges were supported by his prior convictions for possession
of cocaine, which are statutorily defined as misdemeanors. For
reasons given in this Court's recent opinion in State v. Jones, 161
N.C. App. 60, ____ S.E.2d ____ (2003), we are compelled to agree
with Defendant.
The underlying facts tend to show that on the morning of 3
March 2002, a police officer observed Defendant make a U-turn at an
intersection, stop and exit his vehicle and begin talking with
another individual on the street. After being informed Defendant'slicense plates were registered to a different car, the officer
drove behind the parked car and activated his lights. Upon being
detained for driving with fictitious tags, Defendant voluntarily
informed the officer a gun was under the driver's seat of his car.
After confirming a gun was underneath the driver's seat, the
officer contacted dispatch and was informed Defendant was a
convicted felon.
Defendant contended that he carried the gun for the protection
of his three businesses--Contra Youth at 13th and Dock Street, Good
Times at 907 Castle Street, and Contra Headquarters at 521 South
10th Street. According to Defendant, he had been having trouble
at Good Times, a club, which was in a high-crime area. His club
had experienced a break-in, had shots fired into it and the adult
crowd was often rowdy. Defendant also felt he needed protection
going home from the club at 3:00 or 4:00 in the morning with the
proceeds. At the time of the police stop, Defendant was coming
from Contra Youth Headquarters and was on his way to the Good Times
club, which opened at 8:00. Defendant had stopped to pick up his
cousin, who worked security at the nightclub.
Defendant was convicted of possession of a firearm by a felon
and as having attained habitual felon status, and sentenced to 100-
129 months imprisonment. Defendant appeals.
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Defendant contends the indictment charging him with possession
of a firearm by felon in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-415.1
(2001) and as having attained habitual felon status as defined by
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-7.1 (2001) should have been dismissed becausehis prior convictions for possession of cocaine were not felony
convictions. We agree.
In the indictment charging Defendant with possession of a
firearm by felon, the State alleged:
...the defendant named above unlawfully,
willfully and feloniously did possess a
Browning Hi-Power 9mm, which is a handgun,
while not at his home or lawful place of
business. The defendant had previously been
convicted of the felony of Possession of
Cocaine, which is a Class I Felony punishable
by a maximum sentence of 5 years. This felony
was committed on 1-7-94 and the defendant was
convicted of the felony on 5-16-95 in New
Hanover County Superior Court and received a 5
year sentence.
Under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-415.1 (2001), it is unlawful for any
person who has been convicted of a felony to purchase, own,
possess, or have in his custody, care, or control any handgun or
other firearm with a barrel length of less than 18 inches or an
overall length of less than 26 inches... Therefore, one must have
a prior felony conviction to be in violation of this provision.
In a separate indictment, the State alleged Defendant had
attained habitual felon status. The State alleged Defendant had
three prior felony convictions on 16 May 1995, 27 July 1992 and 27
June 1990 for possession of cocaine in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 90-95.
In the recent case of State v. Jones, 161 N.C. App. 60, ____
S.E.2d _____ (2003), this Court, after applying the applicable
rules of statutory interpretation, stated:
the specific statute defining the crime of
possession of cocaine plainly states it is a
misdemeanor that is punishable as a felony. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-95(d)(2). Although
felonies are broadly defined in N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 14-1 to include any crime punishable
in State prison, we cannot interpret this
general statute as overcoming the plain
language of the specific statute defining the
crime. Moreover, we have previously held that
where a crime is defined as one Class but
defendant is sentenced at another Class, the
definitional classification controls. State
v. Vaughn, 130 N.C. App. 456, 460, 503 S.E.2d
110, 112-13 (1998)(holding a defendant was
convicted of a prior Class H felony, but was
sentenced for a Class C felony due to
increased punishment as a habitual felon, is
nevertheless considered to have been convicted
of a prior Class H felony for calculating his
prior record level). Accordingly, although
possession of cocaine may be punished as a
felony, the statute plainly defines it is a
misdemeanor.
See State v. Jones, 161 N.C. App. 60, _____ S.E.2d ____ (2003).
Despite the clear language of the statute, the State argues
that in State v. Chavis, 134 N.C. App. 546, 555, 518 S.E.2d 241,
248 (1999), this Court stated N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-95(d)(2)
clearly states that the possession of any amount of cocaine is a
felony. In addressing a similar argument in State v. Jones, this
Court stated that the statute states possession of cocaine is a
misdemeanor that is punishable as a felony but does not state it is
a felony. Since the only analysis in Chavis is the language of the
statute, which does not state, as asserted, that 'possession of any
amount of cocaine is a felony,' we find we are bound by the
language of the statute. Id.
Moreover, we note that in this case, the State acknowledged at
oral argument that it was within the authority of the General
Assembly to establish that a crime could be punishable as a felony
and yet be classified as a misdemeanor. Indeed, the statuteexplicitly states that one who possesses a Schedule II substance
(cocaine) shall be guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor. Thereafter,
the statute directs that such misdemeanor offense shall be
punishable as a Class I felony. Nothing could be clearer. Since
the General Assembly made this law, it is not within the province
of this Court to employ legal gymnastics to read the clear language
differently than what it states. The plain language of the statute
makes the crime of cocaine possession a misdemeanor which is
punishable as a felony. Thus, to be clear, drug possession of
cocaine remains as the General Assembly says it is--punishable as
a Class I felony. Thus, neither this opinion nor State v. Jones
affects prior sentences for possession of cocaine, including the
derivative drug crack. However, in all other respects the
offense is as the General Assembly says it is--a Class 1
misdemeanor.
Following State v. Jones, the plain language of the statute,
and the applicable rules of statutory interpretation, we are
compelled to follow the clear mandate of the General
Assembly_possession of a Schedule II controlled substance (cocaine)
is a Class 1 misdemeanor. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-95(d)(2). Since
the General Assembly classifies possession of cocaine as a
misdemeanor, it follows that it may not be used as a felony to
support convictions for possession of a firearm by a felon and
being an habitual felon.
Vacated.
Judges TIMMONS-GOODSON and ELMORE concur.
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