Appeal by plaintiff from order entered 7 November 2001 by
Judge Zoro J. Guice, Jr. in Avery County Superior Court. Heard in
the Court of Appeals 16 October 2002.
Phyllis A. Palmieri for plaintiff appellant.
WOMBLE CARLYLE SANDRIDGE & RICE, A Professional Limited
Liability Company, by James R. Morgan, Jr. and Robert D.
Mason, Jr. for defendant appellees.
TIMMONS-GOODSON, Judge.
S. Wayne Johnson (“plaintiff”) appeals an order of summary
judgment granted by the trial court in favor of The County of
Avery, The Board Of Commissioners For Avery County, Sam Laws, Troy
Clark, Kenny Poteat, Clay Houston and Jake Owens (hereinafter
collectively, “defendants”). For the reasons stated herein, we
affirm the trial court. This is the second lawsuit brought by plaintiff against
defendants. The facts of this case and the relationship between
the two suits brought by plaintiff are essential to an
understanding of this matter. An examination of the pleadings,
exhibits, and depositions filed in response to defendants' summary
judgment motion, considered in the light most favorable to
plaintiff, show the following sequence of events: On 5 October
1999, plaintiff, Director of the Avery Elections Board, filed suit
(“first lawsuit”) against defendants claiming that he suffered
monetary damages when defendants wrongfully “withheld [his] wages
and salary.” The complaint further alleged that the Avery County
Board of Commissioners (“the Board of Commissioners”) adopted a
directive mandating that plaintiff submit to drug testing. As a
result of the mandate, a dispute between the Board of Commissioners
and the Avery County Board of Elections (“the Board of Elections”)
arose over whether the Board of Commissioners had the authority to
require drug testing of plaintiff, or any person serving as
Elections Board Director.
On 26 August 1999, the Board of Commissioners approved a
motion “not to release any paycheck to any County board of
elections [member who denies] that their employees are subject to
the County personnel policy outside of appointment, termination,
grievance or disciplinary procedures.” On 27 August 1999, Gary O.
Bartlett (“Bartlett”), the Executive Secretary of the North
Carolina State Board of Elections, advised the Board of
Commissioners, in writing, that withholding plaintiff's paycheckwas the equivalent of firing him. Bartlett also advised the Board
of Commissioners that only the Board of Elections from North
Carolina or Avery County had the authority to discipline or
terminate plaintiff. The letter from Bartlett (“Bartlett letter”)
was included in the first lawsuit filed by plaintiff and entitled
“Exhibit B, Letter from Gary O. Bartlett.”
Plaintiff's first lawsuit sought a writ of mandamus. On 15
October 1999, the trial court heard testimony from plaintiff on the
matter of defendants refusal to pay plaintiff his wages. The trial
court set the matter for hearing on 15 November 1999, for
defendants to appear and show cause why a writ of mandamus should
not be issued. On 15 November 1999, plaintiff and defendants
appeared before the trial court and advised the court that certain
matters in controversy were resolved by the parties. On 17
November 1999, as a result of the court being advised that certain
matters had been resolved, Judge Marcus Johnson entered findings in
an order entitled “Stipulation of Judgment.” The Stipulation of
Judgment order ended the first lawsuit.
On 26 June 2001, plaintiff filed a second lawsuit, which is
presently before this Court. Plaintiff's second lawsuit names the
same defendants included in the first lawsuit. The June 2001
complaint asserts that defendants violated: (1) the election laws
of the State of North Carolina and tortiously interfered with
plaintiff's rights under those laws; (2) public policy by
wrongfully discharging plaintiff from his position as Director ofthe Avery Elections Board; and (3) 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the North
Carolina Constitution.
On 7 August 2001, defendants filed a motion for summary
judgment, arguing that the suit was barred by res judicata and
collateral estoppel. On 1 October 2001, the trial court heard
arguments on this matter. On 7 November 2001, the trial court
issued an order granting summary judgment in favor of defendants.
From this order, plaintiff appeals.
______________________________
Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in granting
summary judgment in favor of defendants when his claims were not
barred by
res judicata or collateral estoppel. For the reasons
stated herein, we affirm the order of the trial court.
Plaintiff contends that summary judgment was improperly
granted for defendants, because his lawsuit was not barred by the
doctrines of
res judicata or collateral estoppel. Plaintiff
asserts that neither doctrine barred his action because (1) the
causes of action in the two suits are different, (2) the relief
sought is different, (3) plaintiff did not know the full extent of
his injuries at the time the first lawsuit was filed, and (4) there
was not a final judgment on the merits in the first lawsuit. We
disagree.
Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that any party is entitled tojudgement as a matter of law. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 56(c)
(2001). The moving party has the burden of showing there is no
genuine issue of any material fact.
Whitley v. Coltrane, 65 N.C.
App. 679, 683, 309 S.E.2d 712, 716 (1983). In reviewing a motion
for summary judgment, the record should be viewed in the light most
favorable to the non-movant, and all inferences will be drawn
against the non-movant.
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Oxendine, 149 N.C.
App. 466, 468, 560 S.E.2d 858, 860 (2002).
“The companion doctrines of
res judicata (claim preclusion)
and collateral estoppel (issue preclusion) have been developed by
the courts for the dual purposes of protecting litigants from the
burden of relitigating previously decided matters and promoting
judicial economy by preventing needless litigation.”
Bockweg v.
Anderson, 333 N.C. 486, 491, 428 S.E.2d 157, 161 (1993).
Res
judicata “entirely bars an identical party or those in privity,
from relitigating a second action identical to the first where a
court of competent jurisdiction rendered a final judgment on the
merits.”
Wilson v. Watson, 136 N.C. App. 500, 502, 524 S.E.2d 812,
813 (2000). Under the doctrine of
res judicata, “'a final judgment
on the merits in a prior action will prevent a second suit based on
the same cause of action between the same parties or those in
privity with them.'”
Clancy v. Onslow Cty., 151 N.C. App. 269,
271, 564 S.E.2d 920, 922-23 (2002) (quoting
Thomas M. McInnis &
Assoc., Inc. v. Hall, 318 N.C. 421, 428, 349 S.E.2d 552, 556
(1986)). “
Res judicata operates as a bar not only against matters
litigated or determined in the prior proceeding but also against'all material and relevant matters within the scope of the
pleadings, which the parties, in the exercise of reasonable
diligence, could and should have brought forward.'”
Ballance v.
Dunn, 96 N.C. App. 286, 290, 385 S.E.2d 522, 524-25 (1989) (quoting
Burton v. Light., Co., 217 N.C. 1, 7, 6 S.E.2d 822, 826 (1940)).
In
,
Northwestern Financial Group v. County of Gaston, 110 N.C.
App. 531, 430 S.E.2d 689,
disc. review denied, 334 N.C. 621, 435
S.E.2d 337 (1993), the plaintiff filed two separate lawsuits
against the defendants for equitable relief in the form of an
injunction, a writ of mandamus, or a writ of certiorari compelling
the defendants to issue a building permit to the plaintiff for a
mobile home park.
Id. at 534-35, 430 S.E.2d at 692. In the first
action, the trial court issued an injunction in favor of the
plaintiff requiring the defendants to issue the permit; however,
the plaintiff filed a second lawsuit seeking compensation for
damages and discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Id. The
Northwestern Court concluded that although the plaintiff claimed
not to know the full extent of the damages at the filing of the
first action, the second action was barred.
Id. at 540, 430 S.E.2d
at 695. The Court further concluded that the plaintiff was
required to bring all “claims for relief . . . in the same action”
if the plaintiff incurred monetary damages at the time the initial
lawsuit was filed.
Id. at 541, 430 S.E.2d at 695.
Here,
plaintiff contends that he only knew that his wages were
wrongfully withheld by defendants, but that he did not know the
full extent of his damages when the first lawsuit was filed. However, a review of the record reveals that in the complaint in
the first lawsuit, plaintiff alleged monetary damages and was
awarded his wages with interest as the result of a court order.
Therefore, it would violate the rule against claim splitting to
allow plaintiff to again seek monetary relief in the present action
whether or not plaintiff knew the full extent of his damages.
In the instant case, plaintiff contends that defendants
violated the election laws of North Carolina, through tortious
interference with his rights under those laws; violated public
policy by wrongfully discharging plaintiff from his employment; and
violated plaintiff's civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when
plaintiff was deprived of his income. “[T]he common law rule
against claim-splitting is based on the principle that all damages
incurred as the result of a [
single wrong] must be recovered in one
lawsuit.”
Bockweg, 333 N.C. at 492, 428 S.E.2d at 161. It is well
established that a plaintiff must in his first suit seek all the
relief to which he is entitled.
Northwestern, 110 N.C. App. at
538-39, 430 S.E.2d at 694. Judgment in the first suit bars a
second suit seeking different or additional relief.
Id.
A review of the record reveals that the Bartlett letter, which
was included as an exhibit in plaintiff's October 1999 complaint,
placed plaintiff on notice that the claims presented in this action
were present at the time the first suit was filed. The Bartlett
letter specifically stated that withholding plaintiff's pay was
“tantamount to firing” him and also informed the Board of
Commissioners that they had “no authority to terminate ordiscipline [plaintiff] or anyone in the position of Director.”
This evidence tends to show that the claims presently before this
Court were material, relevant, and within the scope of the
pleadings in the first lawsuit. Therefore, in an exercise of
reasonable diligence, plaintiff could have and should have brought
forth a complaint in the first lawsuit, which included defendants'
violation of public policy by wrongfully discharging plaintiff;
interference with plaintiff's duties as the Director of the Board
of Elections; and violation of plaintiff's civil rights under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, in that defendants sought to deprive plaintiff of
his liberty and property under color of state law.
Plaintiff nevertheless contends that the “Stipulation of
Judgment” entered in the initial complaint was not a final judgment
and therefore
res judicata does not apply. We disagree.
Any material fact that has been in controversy between the
plaintiff and defendant may be established by stipulation.
Thomas
v. Poole, 54 N.C. App. 239, 241, 282 S.E.2d 515, 517 (1981),
cert.
denied, 304 N.C. 733, 287 S.E.2d 902 (1982). “Where the
stipulations of plaintiff and defendant have been entered of
record, and there is no contention that the attorney for either
party was not authorized to make such stipulations, the parties are
bound and cannot take a position inconsistent with the
stipulations.”
Id. The effect of a stipulation by the parties
withdraws a particular fact from the realm of dispute.
Despathy v.
Despathy, 149 N.C. App. 660, 662, 562
S.E.2d 289, 291 (2002)
.
“'An
admission in a pleading or a stipulation admitting a material factbecomes a judicial admission in a case and eliminates the necessity
of submitting an issue . . . to the jury.'”
Id. (quoting
Crowder
v. Jenkins, 11 N.C. App. 57,
62, 180 S.E.2d 482, 485 (1971)).
In
order to set aside a stipulation, one of the parties to the
stipulation may or should seek a motion to set aside the
stipulation in the court where the action is pending.
See R. R.
Co. v. Horton and R. R. Co. v. Oakley, 3 N.C. App. 383, 389, 165
S.E.2d 6, 10 (1969).
In the present case, the record reveals that plaintiff and
defendants stipulated to certain facts which were entered in an
order styled “Stipulation of Judgment” by the trial court dated
November 1999, which read in pertinent part:
. . . .
On the fifteenth day of November, pursuant to
the order of this Court, the parties appeared,
and this court having reviewed the evidence of
record, and having heard the arguments of
counsel, and having been advised that certain
matters in controversy are resolved by
agreement of the parties, finds as follows:
That respondents have acknowledged that the
laws of the State of North Carolina require
payment of wages due to Petitioner as those
wages fall due, and, the Respondent being
without grounds to show cause why a writ of
mandamus should not issue, that those wages
withheld to date are to be provided to the
Petitioner forthwith, along with the agreed
upon amount of interest of $75, from the date
of the filing of the Petition for the writ of
mandamus; and
That the [defendants] reserving the right to
continue with their efforts to seek review of
the legal basis of [their] obligations under
the law, the [defendants] agrees to continue
to pay the [plaintiff], or any Director of the
Avery County Board of Elections or other employee of the Avery County Board of
Elections whom it is bound to pay by law
without interruption or interference of any
kind, until such time as that legal obligation
is lifted. . . .
. . . .
It is therefore ordered that the findings
herein and the stipulations of the parties as
to the obligation to provide payment to the
Petitioner as Director of the Avery County
Board of Elections, to any subsequent holder
of that office or employee of the Board of
Elections; the payment of interest on the
wages withheld, and the payment of attorney
fees to the Petitioner, are adopted as the
judgment of this Court,. . .
. . . .
An examination of the record reveals that plaintiff did not
make a motion to set aside the stipulation, nor was there any
showing that plaintiff's attorney was not authorized to enter into
a stipulation. The evidence tends to show that while the
Stipulation of Judgment order left open the issues of attorney's
fees and the defendants' “right to explore the legal basis” of
their obligations, the order certainly resolved any claims of
monetary damages to plaintiff. The trial court could determine
that summary judgment was proper, because the initial lawsuit and
the present action are brought against the same defendants; there
was a final judgment on the merits in the first lawsuit as to all
of plaintiff's claims; and in an exercise of due diligence,
plaintiff could have presented all claims for relief in the first
lawsuit. Therefore, plaintiff's claims are barred by the doctrine
of res judicata. In light of the foregoing analysis, we decline to address the
issue of collateral estoppel.
Affirmed.
Judges WYNN and HUNTER concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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