RICKY LYNN BOYD
v
.
Catawba County
No. 00 CVD 3412
PATRICIA ANN HOFFMAN BOYD
John Cutchin and Steve Dolley, Jr. for plaintiff-appellee.
Matthews Law Firm by Scott A. Matthews for defendant-
appellant.
STEELMAN, Judge.
Defendant, Patricia Ann Hoffman Boyd, appeals an order
granting plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and dismissing her
counterclaims and further defenses. We affirm.
Defendant and plaintiff, Ricky Lynn Boyd, were married on 8
May 1998. On 30 October 1999, the parties separated. On or about
5 November 1999, the parties entered into a Separation and Property
Settlement Agreement. On 11 July 2000, defendant recorded the
agreement in the Office of the Register of Deeds for Catawba County
in order to facilitate a real estate purchase. Subsequently,defendant pled the agreement as the basis of a counterclaim in
another action in the District Court of Catawba County (00 CVS
3156).
On 7 November 2000, plaintiff filed this action seeking an
absolute divorce based on a one year separation. Defendant filed
an answer asserting an affirmative defense that she executed the
agreement under duress. She also asserted the following
counterclaims: (1) fraud and undue influence; (2) punitive damages;
(3) notice of lis pendens; (4) post-separation support and alimony;
(5) equitable distribution; and (6) attorney fees.
Plaintiff replied to defendant's answer, asserting that
defendant's claims were barred by acts of defendant which ratified
the agreement. Plaintiff moved for summary judgment under Rule 56
of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. This motion was
granted on 8 October 2001, dismissing defendant's defenses and
counterclaims.
Defendant first assigns as error that the trial court
erroneously granted summary judgment for plaintiff based upon
defendant's ratification of the agreement.
Summary judgment is appropriate where the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that any party is entitled to ajudgment as a matter of law. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 56(c)
(2001).
Parties to a marriage may, by written agreement, forego their
statutory right to equitable distribution and decide between
themselves how their marital estate will be divided following
divorce. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-20(d) (2001). Separation agreements
are treated as contracts and subject to the same rules enforcing
and protecting contracts. Haynes v. Haynes, 45 N.C. App. 376, 263
S.E.2d 783 (1980). To be valid, a separation agreement must be
without fraud, reasonable, fair and just, and, entered into without
coercion or the exercise of undue influence with full knowledge of
all the circumstances, conditions, and rights of the contracting
parties. McIntosh v. McIntosh, 74 N.C. App. 554, 328 S.E.2d 600
(1985).
A transaction procured by fraud, duress, or undue influence
may be ratified by the victim so as to preclude a subsequent suit
to set the transaction aside. Link v. Link, 278 N.C. 181, 179
S.E.2d 697 (1971). Ratification occurs when a party retroactively
authorizes or otherwise approves of it, either expressly or by
implication. Goodwin v. Webb, ___ N.C. App. ___, 568 S.E.2d 311
(2002).
In Lowry v. Lowry, 99 N.C. App. 246, 393 S.E.2d 141 (1990),
this Court found ratification where a party executed a separationagreement, incorporated it into a consent judgment, and received
benefits under the agreement for three years. In Hill v. Hill, 94
N.C. App. 474, 380 S.E.2d 540 (1989), summary judgment was affirmed
based upon ratification where the plaintiff continued to accept the
benefits under a separation agreement long after she discovered the
alleged wrongdoing of the defendant.
In the instant case, defendant unequivocally ratified the
agreement on at least two separate occasions. On 11 July 2000, she
recorded it in the office of the register of deeds. In addition,
she affirmatively pled the agreement in the Catawba County District
Court in case number 00 CVS 3156 as the basis of a counterclaim
against plaintiff. Defendant further benefitted by receiving and
using all household and kitchen furniture and a 1997 Toyota Land
Cruiser, pursuant to the agreement. The trial court properly
granted summary judgment in favor of plaintiff on the issue of
ratification.
By her second assignment of error, she argues the trial court
erred in upholding the separation agreement because there were
material issues as to whether it was: (1) improperly procured by
false and misleading statements; (2) signed as a result of her
being under duress; and (3) procedurally and substantively
unconscionable. Once a party ratifies an agreement, that party is
estopped from denying its authority. Pulley v. Pulley, 255 N.C.423, 121 S.E.2d 876 (1961), dismissed, 371 U.S. 22, 9 L. Ed. 2d 96
(1962). This assignment of error is overruled.
AFFIRMED.
Judges MARTIN and HUDSON concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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