An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Proced ure.

NO. COA02-525

NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS

Filed: 6 May 2003

ROBERT SCOTT HENDERSON,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,

v .                         Catawba County
                            No. 98 CVD 2297
SHERRY S. HENDERSON,
    Defendant-Appellant.

    Appeal by defendant from order entered 11 December 2001 by Judge C. Thomas Edwards in District Court, Catawba County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 30 January 2003.

    No brief for plaintiff-appellee.

    Wesley E. Starnes for defendant-appellant.

    McGEE, Judge.

    Robert Scott Henderson (plaintiff) and Sherry S. Henderson (defendant) were married on 3 October 1981 and separated 25 August 1998. Plaintiff filed a complaint for equitable distribution on 3 August 1998. Defendant filed an answer and counterclaim for equitable distribution, alimony, and post-separation support. Plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss defendant's counterclaim pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 12(b)(6), which the trial court denied following a hearing on 20 October 1998. Plaintiff moved for interim allocation of marital assets and sought an injunction against defendant to prohibit defendant from wasting or disposing of marital assets. Plaintiff filed his response to defendant's counterclaim on 9 November 1998. The parties enteredinto a temporary memorandum of judgment as to plaintiff's motion for interim allocation and injunctive relief on 10 November 1998.     Plaintiff filed an amended reply to defendant's counterclaim for alimony on 24 November 1998. Plaintiff filed his equitable distribution affidavit on 21 January 1999 and an addendum on 29 March 1999. Defendant filed her equitable distribution affidavit on 19 April 1999.
    Plaintiff again moved for an interim allocation of marital assets on 28 April 1999. Plaintiff filed a supplemental equitable distribution affidavit on 2 July 1999. The trial court filed a pre-trial order for equitable distribution on 14 December 1999.
    Defendant filed a notice of voluntary dismissal of her alimony claim and represented herself at the 3 April 2001 hearing on divorce and equitable distribution. The trial court entered a judgment granting plaintiff an absolute divorce on 24 April 2001 and entered an equitable distribution order on 11 December 2001. Defendant appeals from the equitable distribution order.

I.

    Defendant assigns as error the finding by the trial court that plaintiff's medical bills with Viewmont Urology, Catawba County Ambulance, and Unifour Anesthesia were marital debts. "A marital debt . . . is one incurred during the marriage and before the date of separation by either spouse or both spouses for the joint benefit of the parties." Huguelet v. Huguelet, 113 N.C. App. 533, 536, 439 S.E.2d 208, 210, disc. review denied, 336 N.C. 605, 447 S.E.2d 392 (1994). "'The party who claims that any debt is maritalbears the burden of proof on that issue.'" Riggs v. Riggs, 124 N.C. App. 647, 652, 478 S.E.2d 211, 214 (1996), disc. review denied, 345 N.C. 755, 485 S.E.2d 297 (1997) (quoting Tucker v. Miller, 113 N.C. App. 785, 791, 440 S.E.2d 315, 319 (1994)).
    Defendant argues that plaintiff did not meet his burden of showing that the challenged medical bills were "for the joint benefit of the parties." Our Court held in Becker v. Becker, 127 N.C. App. 409, 489 S.E.2d 909 (1997), that the defendant did not meet his burden of showing that the dental debt incurred was a marital debt and we stated that "the evidence that the debt was for work performed on [the] defendant and that the bill was in [the] defendant's name was sufficient to show the debt was incurred for [the] defendant's benefit only rather than for the joint benefit of the parties." Id. at 415, 489 S.E.2d at 913-14. We noted in Becker that the "defendant presented no evidence tending to show the debt was incurred for the parties' joint benefit." Id.; see also Riggs, 124 N.C. App. at 652, 478 S.E.2d at 214 (refusing to classify credit card debt as marital debt where there was no competent evidence in the record that the debt was for the joint benefit of the parties).
    The only evidence offered by plaintiff concerning the Viewmont Urology bill was plaintiff's testimony:
        Q.    Viewmont Urology, who was that for?

        A.    That was--that was for me.

        Q.    And what was that?

        A.    That was--
        Q.    Was that before you separated?

        A.    Yes, sir.

        Q.    And what was that incurred for?

        A.    That was a kidney stone operation.

        Q.    Okay. Was there any insurance to cover that?

        A.    No, sir.

        Q.    Was that like some emergency you had to go in and have it operated on, or was that just something you saw over time you needed operating--

        A.    I went in for emergency, and then this a [sic] urology thing was recommended after.

        Q.    And whose name was that in?

        A.    That's in my name.

        Q.    Is that still owed?

        A.    Yes, sir.

        Q.    Is that what you owe, $4,670?

        A.    I'm not real sure exactly the number on that one.

        Q.    Have you paid any money on it?

        A.    No, not on that particular one, no.

        Q.    So the full amount is still owed then?

        A.    Yes, sir.

    Plaintiff's testimony tends to establish only that the debt was incurred during the marriage, that the debt was in his name, and the debt was for work done upon plaintiff. As in Becker and Riggs, we note that plaintiff has presented no evidence that the debt was for the joint benefit of the parties. While medical billsincurred by one spouse during a marriage could be for the joint benefit of the parties, in the present case plaintiff failed to meet his burden of introducing evidence showing a joint benefit.
    Plaintiff's evidence concerning the Catawba County Ambulance bill consisted solely of the following testimony:
        Q.    And again, this is [a] listing [of] debts. The first one on that sheet is a Catawba County [A]mbulance.

        A.    Yes, sir.

        Q.    Do you know if that has been paid or--

        A.    It has not.

        Q.    And who--who was that incurred for?

        A.    That was for me.

        Q.    For you?

        A.    Uh-huh.

        [Q.]    Okay. And that is just a bill you hadn't paid yet; is that correct?

        A.    Correct.

        Q.    Do you get notices from them?

        A.    Not anymore, no.
        
    As to the Unifour Anesthesia bill, plaintiff's evidence consisted of the following testimony:
        Q.    . . . . Unifour Anesthesia, who is that
            for?

        A.    That's for me, also.

        . . .

        Q.    Unifour Anesthesia?

        A.    That was--that's also in the same group.
        Q.    That was on the kidney stone?

        A.    Yes, sir.

        . . .

        Q.    Okay. And has that been under your name?

        A.    Yes.

    This testimony similarly fails to meet plaintiff's burden of producing evidence tending to show that either of these debts were incurred for the joint benefit of the parties. See Becker, 127 N.C. App. at 415, 489 S.E.2d at 913-14; Riggs, 124 N.C. App. at 652, 478 S.E.2d at 214. In fact, plaintiff's own statement was that these debts were incurred for him. The trial court erred in classifying the Viewmont Urology, the Catawba County Ambulance, and the Unifour Anesthesia bills as marital debts. We remand this case to the trial court with instructions to properly classify these three debts as plaintiff's separate debt and to enter a new equitable distribution order reflecting this classification.
    
II.

    In defendant's third assignment of error she contends that the trial court erred when it relied upon testimony by plaintiff as to the value of property when plaintiff's testimony was merely a guess. "The subjective opinions of the owner of property as to its value are admissible and competent." Patterson v. Patterson, 81 N.C. App. 255, 261, 343 S.E.2d 595, 600 (1986) (citation omitted). It is well established that "'[a] non-expert witness who has knowledge of value gained from experience, information, and observation may give his opinion of the value of personalproperty.'" Maintenance Equipment Co. v. Godley Builders, 107 N.C. App. 343, 355, 420 S.E.2d 199, 206 (1992), disc. review denied, 333 N.C. 345, 426 S.E.2d 707 (1993) (quoting Williams v. Hyatt Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 48 N.C. App. 308, 317, 269 S.E.2d 184, 190, disc. review denied, 301 N.C. 406, 273 S.E.2d 451 (1980)); see also Allen v. Allen, 61 N.C. App. 716, 720, 301 S.E.2d 514, 516-17 (1983) (allowing husband to testify as to the value of personal property where he had knowledge of and familiarity with the items through ownership); Whitman v. Forbes, 55 N.C. App. 706, 711, 286 S.E.2d 889, 892 (1982) (noting that lay opinions as to value are admissible if witness has knowledge and a basis for his opinion). "Any weight to be given to the opinion is for the trier-of-fact to determine." State v. Cobb, 150 N.C. App. 31, 36, 563 S.E.2d 600, 605, disc. review denied, 356 N.C. 169, 568 S.E.2d 618 (2002) (citations omitted).
    Our review of the record and transcript shows that the trial court correctly admitted plaintiff's testimony as to the value of the parties' personal property. All of the items in question were owned by the parties during their marriage, and plaintiff was able to show a familiarity with each item. While plaintiff was more familiar with some items than others, he still established a basis to give his opinion as to the value of the personal property. The trier-of-fact correctly considered the testimony and determined the weight it should be given. Cobb, 150 N.C. App. at 36, 563 S.E.2d at 605. Defendant's argument is without merit and this assignment of error is overruled.
III.

    In defendant's fourth assignment of error she contends that the findings of fact are not supported by competent evidence because the trial court should not have considered the testimony by plaintiff as to the value of various items of personal property. In light of our ruling on defendant's third assignment of error, that it was proper for the trial court to consider plaintiff's testimony, defendant's fourth assignment of error is overruled.
IV.

    In defendant's fifth assignment of error she argues that the findings of fact and conclusions of law are insufficient to support the trial court's order. Defendant specifically challenges the trial court's unequal division of the marital property, arguing that the trial court did not make sufficient findings of fact to support its decision. In Khajanchi v. Khajanchi, 140 N.C. App. 552, 537 S.E.2d 845 (2000), this Court stated:
            The North Carolina Equitable Distribution Act is "a legislative enactment of public policy so strongly favoring the equal division of marital property that an equal division is made mandatory 'unless the court determines that an equal division is not equitable.' N.C.G.S. 50-20(c). The clear intent of the legislature was that a party desiring an unequal division of marital property bear the burden of producing evidence concerning one or more of the twelve factors in the statute and the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that an equal division would not be equitable. Therefore, if no evidence is admitted tending to show that an equal division would be inequitable, the trial court must divide the marital property equally."
Id. at 557-58, 537 S.E.2d at 849 (quoting White v. White, 312 N.C. 770, 776-77, 324 S.E.2d 829, 832-33 (1985)).
    While the party seeking an unequal distribution bears the burden of proving the required statutory factors, the trial court can divide the property unequally on the basis of a single statutory factor. Id. at 558, 537 S.E.2d at 849; Patterson, 81 N.C. App. at 259-60, 343 S.E.2d at 599. A trial court's decision to make an unequal distribution of the marital property will only be overturned upon a showing of abuse of discretion. Khajanchi, 140 N.C. App. at 558, 537 S.E.2d at 849-50. However, "[i]f the trial court divides property unequally, it must make findings of fact based on the evidence in support of its conclusion that an equal division would not be equitable." Id. at 558, 537 S.E.2d at 849.
    The trial court must list the distributional factor or factors which "are supported by the evidence and which justify an unequal distribution." Patterson, 81 N.C. App. at 259-60, 343 S.E.2d at 599 (citation omitted). In the present case, the trial court listed several factors appropriate to justify an unequal distribution. The pertinent part of the 11 December 2001 equitable distribution order states:
            20. The Court has considered the following post Date of Separation costs of the Plaintiff and the Defendant to preserve martial [sic]/maintain marital assets as post date of separation payments of marital debts:

            A. The Plaintiff and the Defendant paid 1/2 the taxes associated with the real property for 1998 and 1999. The property taxes were Three Hundred Forty and 00/100($340.00) Dollars per year. The Plaintiff and the Defendant also paid one-half (1/2) the Homeowners Insurance on the real property since the parties separated, with his one-half (1/2) being One Hundred Twenty-Seven and 00/100 ($127.00) Dollars per year.

            B. Eighty-Five Hundred and 00/100 ($8,500.00) Dollars was paid to Douglas and Sons from the balance of the proceeds of the Seventy-Eight Thousand and 00/100 ($78,000.00) Dollar refinance in March of 1998. The defendant paid the balance of the moneys owed to Douglas and Sons after the parties separated, with the balance being One Thousand Five Hundred and 00/100 ($1,500.00) Dollars.

            C. That before the parties separated the Plaintiff incurred medical bills for kidney stones, and associated surgery. As of the date of separation, the Plaintiff owed, and still owes, Four Thousand Six Hundred Seventy and 00/100 ($4,670.00) Dollars to Viewmont Urology, Eight Thousand Seven Hundred and Sixty-One and 00/100 ($8,761.00) Dollars to Frye Regional Medical Center, Two Hundred Seventy-Five and 00/100 ($275.00) Dollars to Catawba County Ambulance, and One Thousand Eighty and 00/100 ($1,080.00) Dollars to Unifour Anesthesia.

            D. With regard to the debts listed on Schedule "L" of the Pre-Trial Order, the Court does not find the Lawn Specialist, Bell Atlantic Mobile, Ray Sain or Catawba Radiologist debts to be marital debts.

            E. After the parties separated the Plaintiff paid Fourteen and 52/100 ($14.52) Dollars to Alexander County for taxes on the Pontoon, and the Defendant paid Thirty-Four and 69/100 ($34.69) Dollars to Federal Express, both of which were marital debts.

            F. The defendant contends certain credit card debts in amounts indicated on Schedule "L" of the pre-trial order were marital debts. The Court does not find the Sears debt to be marital.

            G. The Defendant contends there were Internal Revenue Service obligations inaddition to that listed on Schedule "L" of the Pre-Trial Order. She contends these Internal Revenue Service obligations resulted from joint income of the parties. She further contends she paid the same with the amount she paid being between Sixteen and Seventeen Thousand Dollars. The defendant offered no evidence of the debts, nor canceled check or receipts for payment of the same. She further offered no evidence from the taxing authorities that amounts were owed, or payments made.

            H. The Defendant contends she made house payments after the date of separation and prior to the March, 1998 refinance of approximately Two Thousand Six Hundred and 00/100 ($2,600.00) Dollars.

            I. The Defendant paid maintenance expenses on the real property after the date of separation of Two Hundred Eighteen and 00/100 ($218.00) Dollars.

            J. The Court has considered the Defendant's contention regarding Ten Thousand Seven Hundred Sixty and 90/100 ($10,760.90) Dollars for payments she made associated with the tractor and trailers and insurance after the parties separated.

            21. The Court has considered the Defendant's receipt of income from her sole and exclusive use of business property after the parties separated. From the time the parties separated until November of 1997, the Defendant had the exclusive use of the Tractors and Trailers of the parties. The Defendant also had the exclusive use of the Tractors and Trailers of the parties since January of 1998. The Plaintiff says the Court should consider the fact that the Defendant deposited up the [sic] Five Thousand Eight Hundred and 00/100 ($5,800.00) Dollars per month into the business account from operating the parties' marital property, and that all said proceeds she deposited inured to her benefit as she had the sole use of said business account. The defendant testified she used deposits in the account for her benefit.
            22. The Court has considered the payments the Defendant made on the Amigo Jeep and insurance for the same as contained on Defendant's Exhibit No. 8.

            23. The Court does not find the Jeep to be marital property, so the Court does not consider car payments or insurance paid on the Amigo and Jeep as distributable factors.

            24. The Court has considered Two Thousand Six Hundred Sixty-Six and 53/100 ($2,666.53) Dollars which the Defendant paid as shown on her Exhibit No. 9 for gas, tires and other expense[s] for the use and operation of marital vehicles, and has considered the Defendant's use of the proceeds from these vehicles during that same time.

            25. The Court shall not consider any sums as claimed on Defendant's Exhibit Number 11 as distributable factors.

            26. The Court has considered Seventeen Thousand Four Hundred and 00/100 ($17,400.00) Dollars of proceeds the Defendant received from her separate property, being the sale of beach property. She contends she used Fifteen Thousand and 00/100 ($15,000.00) Dollars to remodel the home and pay into the business of Performance Unlimited.

            27. The Defendant contends the Court should consider Twenty-Five Hundred and 00/100 ($2,500.00) Dollars which came from the sale of her home she had prior to the marriage in march of 1992, which she said was used to purchase property during the marriage.

            28. That the gross revenue generated by the business property of the parties was approximately Two Hundred to Three Hundred Fifty Thousand per year prior to the separation of the parties.

            29. The Court has considered the Defendant's occupancy of the former marital residence since the Date of Separation, as well as the increased equity in the former marital residence as of the Date of Distribution.
            30. The Date of Distribution net value of the parties' house and 1.07 acre marital property was approximately $28,000.00, the increase in value attributable to the joint effort of the parties to pay debts as hereinabove considered.

We find that the trial court considered and listed the pertinent distributional factors under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-20(c) (2001) which, if supported by appropriate findings of fact, would be sufficient to warrant an unequal distribution of the marital property. See Khajanchi, 140 N.C. App. at 558, 537 S.E.2d at 849; Minter v. Minter, 111 N.C. App. 321, 329, 432 S.E.2d 720, 725, disc. review denied, 335 N.C. 176, 438 S.E.2d 201 (1993). The trial court in the present case determined that an unequal distribution of the net marital estate would be equitable, with fifty-three percent awarded to plaintiff and forty-seven percent to defendant.
    However, the crucial issue in this case is whether the trial court made sufficient findings of fact to justify the unequal distribution. See Khajanchi, 140 N.C. App. at 558, 537 S.E.2d at 849 (noting that the trial court "must make findings of fact based on the evidence in support of its conclusion that an equal division would not be equitable"). Defendant notes that several findings of fact state the contentions of the parties but do not resolve the respective issues. The mere recitation of allegations is insufficient to constitute proper findings of fact. See In re Anderson, 151 N.C. App. 94, 97, 564 S.E.2d 599, 602 (2002) ("As indicated by the word 'alleged,' the findings are not the 'ultimate facts' as required by Rule 52(a) to support the trial court'sconclusions of law, but rather are mere recitations of allegations. As a result we are unable to conduct a proper review of the findings."); Dunlap v. Clarke Checks, Inc., 92 N.C. App. 581, 584, 375 S.E.2d 171, 174 (1989) ("Findings of fact that merely restate a party's contentions or testimony without finding the facts in dispute are not adequate. It is the duty of the fact finder to resolve conflicting evidence.") (citing Wall v. Timberlake, 272 N.C. 731, 158 S.E.2d 780 (1968)). The portions of findings of fact 20F, 20G, 20H, 20J, 21, 26, and 27 in the trial court's equitable distribution order that only state the contentions of the parties without resolving the respective issues are not proper findings of fact. On remand, the trial court shall make proper findings of fact as they relate to the trial court's decision whether to distribute the marital property in an unequal manner.
V.

    Defendant next contends that it was error for the trial court to fail to consider defendant's exhibit number one after it was admitted into evidence, or alternatively that the trial court erred by failing to admit the exhibit into evidence. Defendant's exhibit number one consists of two handwritten lists of payments allegedly made to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) by defendant after the date of separation, a photocopy of carbon copies of the checks defendant allegedly sent to the IRS, and a copy of a receipt for a draft in the amount of $3,800.00 taken out by defendant, which she allegedly sent to the IRS. Defendant attempted to introduce the exhibit as follows:        MS. HENDERSON: Okay. All right. Exhibit one is a listing of IRS payments that I made after Scott left.

        THE COURT: Is that what we were talking about before?

        MS. HENDERSON: Yes. Toward a tax debt of about $20,000.

        THE COURT: Have you seen that?

        MR. ISENHOWER [plaintiff's counsel]: I have. Could I see it again? Its got numerous pages.

        THE COURT: Yes.

        MS. HENDERSON: The tax debt was fifteen something, and there was a $2,000 fee that was paid to an agency to handle it. And the remainder was paid by the refinance.

        THE COURT: May I see it? You may continue.

        MS. HENDERSON: Item number two is additional house payments that I made after the date of separation with receipts.

        THE COURT: Have you seen that, Mr. Isenhower?

        MR. ISENHOWER: Is she moving to introduce that now?

        THE COURT: I think--

        MS. HENDERSON: I'm sorry?

        THE COURT: I'm not sure if she's gotten that far, yet.

        MR. ISENHOWER: I've seen it, yes, sir.

        THE COURT: Do you have any objection to me considering that?

        MR. ISENHOWER: Well--

        MS. HENDERSON: I've also got the sheet with Scott's in there.

        MR. ISENHOWER: No, sir.
        THE COURT: All right. Then Defendant's exhibit #2 will be received.

    It is unclear whether the trial court admitted defendant's exhibit number one into evidence. The trial court simply asked defendant if it could see the exhibit but never stated whether the exhibit was admitted into evidence. The trial court did not specifically state it was not admitting defendant's exhibit number one, as the trial court did in reference to defendant's exhibit number sixteen. The trial court treated defendant's exhibit number one much like it treated defendant's exhibit number thirteen, where defendant never specifically asked the trial court to admit the exhibit, and the trial court initially did not state whether or not it was admitted. Even though the trial court never expressly admitted defendant's exhibit number thirteen, after the trial court accepted several other exhibits into evidence, plaintiff's counsel expressed his belief that the trial court had admitted defendant's exhibit number thirteen into evidence. However, in response to this expression by plaintiff's counsel, the trial court clarified that defendant's exhibit number thirteen had not been accepted. There was no such clarification by the trial court as to defendant's exhibit number one. The trial court did state that in all of the exhibits tendered by defendant it would disregard any notes made by attorneys or by defendant as she appeared pro se, and it would only "consider the underlying receipts in this case and what [] they show." As there were no receipts in defendant's exhibit number one, only notes by defendant, a photocopy copy of carbon copies of checks that in and of themselves do not show anypayment was made, and an account draft, that without defendant's handwritten note does not indicate what the money was used for, the trial court would have been justified in finding that the evidence in the exhibit was not credible.
    However, we are unable to determine whether the trial court admitted defendant's exhibit number one into evidence and must therefore remand for a determination by the trial court as to whether defendant's exhibit number one was properly admitted.
VI.

    Defendant also assigns error to the trial court's finding that the alleged payments made by defendant to the IRS were not payments of marital debts. The trial court's finding of fact 20G stated:
            The defendant contends there were Internal Revenue Service obligations in addition to [those] listed on Schedule "L" of the Pre-Trial Order. She contends these Internal Revenue Service obligations resulted from joint incomes of the parties. She further contends she paid the same with the amount she paid being between Sixteen and Seventeen Thousand Dollars. The Defendant offered no evidence of the debts, nor canceled check or receipts for payment of the same. She further offered no evidence from the taxing authorities that amounts were owed, or payments made.

    Defendant argues that this finding of fact is improper on two bases. First, defendant argues that the trial court did not make the necessary ultimate findings of fact as to whether the alleged debts to the IRS existed, were marital, or were paid by defendant after separation. Second, defendant argues that the trial court's finding that defendant offered no evidence of the IRS debt was erroneous in light of defendant's testimony and defendant's exhibitnumber one. We find that both of defendant's contentions have merit.
    As discussed above, finding of fact 20G does not resolve the ultimate facts as to whether the alleged debts existed, were marital, or were paid by defendant after separation. See In re Anderson, 151 N.C. App. at 97, 564 S.E.2d at 602; Dunlap, 92 N.C. App. at 584, 375 S.E.2d at 174. "Ultimate facts are the final facts required to establish the plaintiff's cause of action or the defendant's defense; and evidentiary facts are those subsidiary facts required to prove the ultimate facts." Smith v. Smith, 336 N.C. 575, 579, 444 S.E.2d 420, 422-23 (1994) (citations omitted). The trial court is only required to make ultimate findings of fact, as opposed to evidentiary findings of fact. Armstrong v. Armstrong, 322 N.C. 396, 405-06, 368 S.E.2d 595, 600 (1988).
    While only required to make ultimate findings of fact, the trial court in the present case did make evidentiary findings of fact in finding of fact 20G. Findings of fact must be supported by competent evidence. Gum v. Gum, 107 N.C. App. 734, 738, 421 S.E.2d 788, 791 (1992) (citing Lawing v. Lawing, 81 N.C. App. 159, 162, 344 S.E.2d 100, 104 (1986)). In the present case, the trial court's determination that defendant presented "no evidence" of the debts is not supported by the evidence. First, there is substantial testimony by defendant as to these IRS debts. The trial court did note that it would consider the testimony "in light of the fact that [the debt was] not included in the affidavit nor on the pre-trial order." While the trial court may not have foundthis evidence to be credible, the testimony was allowed by the trial court despite plaintiff's objection. Grasty v. Grasty, 125 N.C. App. 736, 739, 482 S.E.2d 752, 754, disc. review denied, 346 N.C. 278, 487 S.E.2d 545 (1997) ("The credibility of the evidence in an equitable distribution trial is for the trial court.") (citing Hunt v. Hunt, 85 N.C. App. 484, 491, 355 S.E.2d 519, 523 (1987)). Thus, the trial court's finding that defendant presented no evidence is therefore not supported by the record. However, the remainder of this finding is supported by the evidence in that there are no "canceled check[s] or receipts for payment of the [debt]. [Defendant] further offered no evidence from the taxing authorities that amounts were owed, or payments made."
    On remand, the trial court is only required to make ultimate findings of fact as to the existence of the IRS debts and their classification. Any further findings of fact the trial court chooses to make must also be supported by the evidence. In light of our decision concerning defendant's exhibit number one, the trial court must also make a determination as to whether exhibit number one is admissible and then assess the impact defendant's exhibit number one has on finding of fact 20G. We remand with instructions for the trial court to make proper findings of fact as to the alleged IRS debts as discussed above.
    In summary, we remand for entry of a new equitable distribution order. The trial court properly relied on plaintiff's testimony as to the value of various items of personal property. However, the trial court erred in finding the debts to ViewmontUrology, Catawba County Ambulance, and Unifour Anesthesia to be marital debts based on the lack of evidence, and we remand with instructions to properly classify this $6025.00 as plaintiff's separate debt. We also remand with instructions that the trial court make a ruling as to whether defendant's exhibit number one is properly before it, and if so to give it the consideration the trial court deems appropriate. We further remand for the trial court, without taking any additional evidence, to make appropriate findings of facts concerning the distributional factors as discussed above, and to specifically make an appropriate finding of fact as to the IRS debts in finding 20G.     
    Affirmed in part; reversed in part; and remanded in part for additional findings of fact.
    Judges HUNTER and CALABRIA concur.
    Report per Rule 30(e).

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