NO. COA02-546
Appeal by defendant from judgments entered 28 November 2001 by
Judge W. Osmond Smith in Durham County Superior Court. Heard in
the Court of Appeals 24 February 2003.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General
Thomas M. Woodard, for the State.
Michael J. Reece for defendant-appellant.
TYSON, Judge.
I. Background
On 2 July 2001, the Durham County grand jury indicted Torry
LaShawn Reid (defendant) on charges of possession with intent to
sell and deliver a Schedule I controlled substance, sale of a
Schedule I controlled substance, delivery of a Schedule I
controlled substance, and with being an habitual felon. The jury
found defendant guilty of the substantive offenses, and defendant
pled guilty to having attained the status of an habitual felon.
The trial court arrested judgment on the conviction for delivery of
a Schedule I controlled substance, and consolidated the two
remaining offenses for judgment and sentenced defendant as anhabitual felon to a term of 120 to 153 months imprisonment.
Defendant appeals.
The State presented evidence at trial tending to show the
following: Corporal Robbie Davis of the Durham Police Department
met with F.B.I. Special Agent Sergio Sanz and informant Jerond Best
prior to 15 February 2001. Corporal Davis testified he interviewed
Mr. Best in the presence of Agent Sanz and debriefed Jerond Best
as far as - - Mr. Best's knowledge of the drug distribution
activities of [defendant]. Mr. Best was documented as an
accomplice informant as a result of the interview, and a subsequent
debriefing occurred. On 15 February 2001, Mr. Best placed a
recorded telephone call to an individual whose voice Corporal Davis
identified as being that of defendant. Mr. Best made arrangements
to buy $200 worth of heroin from the individual. After the
telephone conversation, officers placed a recording device,
commonly referred to as a wire, on Mr. Best and gave him $200 to
purchase the heroin. Officers videotaped the subsequent drug
transaction between Mr. Best and defendant at a Fast Fare store.
After completing the transaction, Mr. Best returned to the officers
with seventeen bindles of heroin (having a value of $170) and $30
in currency. A forensic chemist with the S.B.I. testified the
seventeen bindles contained 0.6 gram of heroin.
Agent Sanz testified that he headed a drug task force and
concentrated efforts on [p]rimarily the mid level, like Mr. Reid.
Mr. Reid is considered a mid level drug dealer. Agent Sanz first
learned of defendant after he initially debriefed Mr. Best. WhenAgent Sanz asked Corporal Davis about defendant, Corporal Davis
told [him] that Mr. Reid was a very worthy heroin dealer in Durham
who had been selling heroin for some time and should be targeted.
Mr. Best testified as to the recorded telephone call and
transaction. Best stated that defendant passed the heroin to him
when they shook hands at the Fast Fare. After the State rested its
case, defendant offered no evidence.
II. Assignments of Error Abandoned
Defendant has neither stated any argument nor cited any
authority in his brief in support of the eight assignments of error
found in the record on appeal. Those assignments of error are
therefore deemed abandoned. N.C. R. App. P. 28(b)(6).
Approximately three months after the record on appeal was settled,
defendant filed a motion to add three new assignments of error. We
note that
the essential function of [assignments of
error] is to identify for the appellee's
benefit all the errors possibly to be urged on
appeal, hence the total scope of review, so
that the appellee may properly assess the
sufficiency of the proposed record on appeal
to protect his position on all these points.
See Commentary, Drafting Committee Note, N.C. R. App. R. 10(c),
reprinted in 287 N.C. 671, 703 (1975). Adding additional
assignments of error after settlement of the record on appeal could
create deficiencies in the record on appeal and disadvantage an
appellee.
Id. Because the record on appeal here is adequate to
address the proposed assignments of error, we allow the motion to
amend the record on appeal in the interest of justice.
III. Issues
Defendant contends he received ineffective assistance of trial
counsel because his attorney failed to object to three comments
about him made by witnesses.
IV. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Defendant argues the three comments were damaging
characterizations of him and were not competent evidence.
Defendant's argument is not persuasive. A defendant's
[constitutional] right to counsel includes the right to effective
assistance of counsel.
State v. Braswell, 312 N.C. 553, 561, 324
S.E.2d 241, 247 (1985). The test for determining whether a
defendant in a criminal case has received effective assistance of
counsel is the same under both the federal and state constitutions.
Braswell, 312 N.C. at 562, 324 S.E.2d at 248.
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant
must meet a two-prong test set forth in
Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984).
Id.
First the defendant must show that counsel's
performance was deficient. This requires
showing that counsel made errors so serious
that counsel was not functioning as the
'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the
Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must
show that the deficient performance prejudiced
the defense. This requires showing that
counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive
the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose
result is reliable.
State v. Lewis, 321 N.C. 42, 48-49, 361 S.E.2d 728, 732 (1987)
(
quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 693).
[I]f a reviewing court can determine at the outset that thereis no reasonable probability that in the absence of counsel's
alleged errors the result of the proceeding would have been
different, then the court need not determine whether counsel's
performance was actually deficient.
Braswell, 312 N.C. at 563,
324 S.E.2d at 249.
The fact that counsel made an error, even an
unreasonable error, does not warrant reversal of a conviction
unless there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
errors, there would have been a different result in the
proceedings.
Braswell, 312 N.C. at 563, 324 S.E.2d at 248. The
question becomes whether a reasonable probability exists that,
absent counsel's deficient performance, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.
State v. Moorman, 320 N.C.
387, 399, 358 S.E.2d 502, 510 (1987).
Defendant first complains of Corporal Davis' statement that he
debriefed the informant as to the informant's knowledge of the
drug distribution activities of defendant. This testimony
explained why law enforcement officers subsequently decided to
investigate defendant, and was not objectionable. [S]tatements of
one person to another to explain subsequent actions taken by the
person to whom the statement was made are admissible as nonhearsay
evidence.
State v. Thomas, 350 N.C. 315, 339, 514 S.E.2d 486,
501,
cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1006, 145 L. Ed. 2d 388 (1999).
Similarly, Agent Sanz's statement that Mr. Davis told me that
Mr. Reid was a very worthy heroin dealer in Durham who had been
selling heroin for some time and should be targeted[,] was
admissible to show why Agent Sanz got involved in the investigationof defendant. Finally,
Agent Sanz's testimony that he concentrated
his efforts on [p]rimarily the mid level, like Mr. Reid. Mr. Reid
is considered a mid level drug dealer[,] while improper opinion
testimony was not so serious as to deprive defendant of a fair
trial.
See State v. Owen, 130 N.C. App. 505, 515, 503 S.E.2d 426,
432,
appeal dismissed and disc. review denied, 349 N.C. 372, 525
S.E.2d 188 (1998).
V. Conclusion
Defendant has not shown that his trial counsel's failure to
object to this opinion testimony prejudiced his defense or that his
proceeding would have been different but for this lapse. We find
no error.
No error.
Judges TIMMONS-GOODSON and BRYANT concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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