CHARLES F. GIBSON,
Employee-Appellant,
v. N. C. Industrial Commission
I.C. No. 916154
BILDON, INC.,
Employer-Appellee,
and
KEY RISK MANAGEMENT SERVICES
COMPANY, INC.,
Carrier-Appellee
George W. Moore, for employee-appellant.
Root & Root, P.L.L.C., by Louise Critz Root, for employer-
appellee.
WYNN, Judge.
From an Opinion and Award of the North Carolina Industrial
Commission denying his workers' compensation claim, employee,
Charles F. Gibson, appeals. After carefully reviewing the record,
we hold that the [] Commission's findings of fact [are] conclusive
on appeal because competent evidence in the record supports those
findings. Adams v. AVX Corp., 349 N.C. 676, 682, 509 S.E.2d 411,
414 (1998). Furthermore, the Commission's findings of fact support
its conclusions of law. Therefore, we affirm the Opinion and Awardof the full Commission.
On 14 December 1998, Mr. Gibson reported a job-related injury
to his immediate supervisor, Gene Davis. The substance of this
report was in controversy during the hearing below. Whereas Mr.
Gibson testified that he consistently related his injury to a
falling piece of metal, Mr. Davis, as well as other witnesses on
record, testified that Mr. Gibson related his injury to lead
exposure. This issue was potentially dispositive because Mr.
Gibson tested negative for lead exposure; consequently, unless an
accident or traumatic event precipitated his symptoms, his
complaints did not arise in the course of employment for the
purposes of the Workers' Compensation Act.
After hearing the evidence, the full Commission resolved the
conflicting testimony in favor of the employer, Bildon, Inc. Most
notably, the full Commission found that Mr. Gibson was not a
credible witness, and that his injuries were the product of a
degenerative process, rather than an accident associated with
falling metal. The full Commission made the following pertinent
findings of fact:
3. Plaintiff testified that on December 14,
1998, as he was working, a metal piece
[weighing sixty pounds] started to fall from
the table. He grabbed the piece with his
right hand, catching it by the handle. As he
did so, plaintiff felt as if the part
snatched him. Plaintiff testified that he
began to experience a headache and pain in his
chest, arms, and neck.
4. Plaintiff's testimony is not credible in
light of the medical history which plaintiff
reported to his treating physicians at the
time. Specifically, plaintiff reportedshortness of breath and other respiratory
symptoms, which he adamantly related to lead
exposure at work. Only after all testing was
reported as normal, and plaintiff was informed
of the same, did he begin to claim that he was
suffering from a neck condition, which he
related to an alleged injury at work. . . .
5. On December 14, 1998, plaintiff reported
having pain in his chest and arms to Gene
Davis. However, plaintiff did not
specifically tell Mr. Davis that a piece [of
metal] had fallen and that in catching the
piece, he had begun to experience pain.
6. Being concerned that plaintiff may have
symptoms of lead exposure, the employer
referred plaintiff to its doctor, Dr. John
Lange . . . . At his initial visit on December
16, 1998, plaintiff reported a history to Dr.
Lange of no episode of injury [from falling
pieces of metal]. Plaintiff also described
symptoms of headaches, chest pain, painful
kidneys and feeling tired for one week.
Plaintiff reported that these symptoms were
due to lead exposure. Thereafter, on December
22, 1998, plaintiff returned to Dr. Lange, at
which time he reported headache, shortness of
breath and a fiery feeling in his
lungs. . . . Plaintiff told Dr. Lange that his
problems were from use or contact with lead.
Based upon plaintiff's insistence, Dr. Lange
formed the opinion that plaintiff fixated on
the idea that he was suffering from lead
exposure. Following testing, Dr. Lange found
plaintiff was not suffering from lead
exposure, and plaintiff was released from
treatment as of January 11, 1999.
7. Dr. Lange found plaintiff capable of
returning to unrestricted work as of December
28, 1998.
8. On January 8, 1999, plaintiff sought
treatment with Dr. James Irion and Dr. Bon
Webb . . . . Plaintiff reported having
shortness of breath for three weeks.
9. On January 14, 1999, . . . . Plaintiff
reported recurrent progressive respiratory
symptoms, which he attributed to lead exposure
at work. . . .
10. Plaintiff did not report a history of a
jerking incident or attempting to catch a
falling metal piece at work to Dr. Webb.
Instead, plaintiff reported that he often
worked in a posture with his back bent and
neck flexed while performing his job. Dr.
Webb diagnosed plaintiff with costochondritis,
an inflamation of the area between the ribs
and the sternum. Dr. Webb found plaintiff
capable of returning to unrestricted work as
of March 19, 1999.
11. On March 25, 1999, neurosurgeon Dr. Seyed
Emadian . . . examined plaintiff, who reported
experiencing pain while lifting a fifty pound
object. Dr. Emadian found plaintiff capable
of returning to unrestricted work at that
time.
12. In approximately April of 1999, plaintiff
told company president Jim Crafton about his
pain originating from an incident when an
object dropped. This was the first notice,
which the employer received that plaintiff's
symptoms were due to an accident rather than
from an exposure to lead.
. . . .
15. Despite being released to unrestricted
duties, plaintiff has not sought to return to
work in any capacity with defendant-employer
since the alleged incident of December 14,
1998.
17. The greater weight of the evidence of
record indicates that plaintiff's cervical
spine condition was a result of [a]
degenerative process in his neck and was not
due to any alleged incident at work.
Furthermore, the credible evidence of record
fails to establish that plaintiff sustained an
injury by accident or specific traumatic
incident.
Based on these findings of fact, the full Commission concluded that
Mr. Gibson did not sustain an injury . . . arising out of and in
the course of [his] employment with employer-appellee. From this
determination, and the aforementioned findings of fact, Mr. Gibsonappeals.
Under our Workers' Compensation Act, 'the Commission is the
fact finding body.' Adams, 349 N.C. at 680, 509 S.E.2d at 413
(quoting Brewer v. Powers Trucking Co., 256 N.C. 175, 182, 123
S.E.2d 608, 613 (1962)). 'The Commission is the sole judge of the
credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their
testimony.' Adams, 349 N.C. at 680, 509 S.E.2d at 413 (quoting
Anderson v. Lincoln Constr. Co., 265 N.C. 431, 433-34, 144 S.E.2d
272, 274 (1965)). The Commission's findings of fact 'are
conclusive on appeal if supported by any competent evidence.'
Adams, 349 N.C. at 681, 509 S.E.2d at 414 (quoting Gallimore v.
Marilyn's Shoes, 292 N.C. 399, 402, 233 S.E.2d 529, 531 (1977)).
Thus, this Court is precluded from weighing the evidence on appeal;
rather, we can do no more than 'determine whether the record
contains any evidence tending to support the [challenged]
finding.' Adams, 349 N.C. at 681, 509 S.E.2d at 414 (quoting
Anderson, 265 N.C. at 434, 144 S.E.2d at 274). Moreover, even
where the evidence before the Commission is such as to permit
either one of two contrary findings, the determination of the
Commission is conclusive on appeal and the mere fact that an
appellate court disagrees with the findings of the Commission is
not grounds for reversal. Morrison v. Burlington Industries, 301
N.C. 226, 232, 271 S.E.2d 364, 367 (1981).
Mr. Gibson argues that the full Commission did not have
competent evidence to make Findings of Fact 4, 6, 10, 11, 12, 14,
15, and 17. Admittedly, the evidence presented to the fullCommission was conflicting. For instance, Mr. Gibson challenges
the Commission's Finding of Fact 4 wherein the Commission found
that Mr. Gibson's testimony [was] not credible in light of the
medical history [he] reported to his treating physicians at the
time. Mr. Gibson argues this finding is contrary to the evidence
because he testified that he told his supervisor, Mr. Gene Davis,
that he had a little accident and was having some difficulties as
a result. Although this evidence was in the record, the
Commission also had before it the testimony of Mr. Davis and Dr.
Lange, wherein both witnesses testified that Mr. Gibson related his
symptoms to lead exposure. As noted, even where the evidence
before the Commission is such as to permit either one of two
contrary findings, the determination of the Commission is
conclusive on appeal . . . . Morrison v. Burlington Industries,
301 N.C. at 232, 271 S.E.2d at 367. Consequently, Mr. Gibson can
not successfully challenge the Commission's findings of fact by
merely pointing to contrary evidence in the record.
After reviewing Mr. Gibson's arguments in his brief, it is
apparent that Mr. Gibson's arguments are without merit in light of
our Supreme Court's holding in Adams. As noted, Adams held that
the full Commission's findings of fact are conclusive on appeal if
supported by any competent evidence tending to support the
challenged finding. Although Adams endowed upon the full
Commission the power, on a cold record, to reverse findings of fact
made by a Deputy Commissioner, it conversely limited this Court's
review of the full Commission's findings of fact to whether therewas any competent evidence tending to support them. Adams v. AVX
Corp., 349 N.C. at 681, 509 S.E.2d at 413 (It is the Commission
that ultimately determines credibility, whether from a cold record
or from live testimony.).
In the case sub judice, the record is replete with competent
evidence tending to support the Commission's challenged findings of
fact. Moreover, these findings of fact, based upon competent
evidence tending to support the challenged findings, support the
Commission's conclusions of law. Accordingly, Adams mandates that
we affirm the decision of the full Commission.
Affirmed.
Judges TIMMONS-GOODSON and LEVINSON concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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