IN THE MATTER OF:
DAVID STORM CARTER
DANIEL SEATON CARTER New Hanover County
Nos. 99 J 153-154
RAYFORD DAVID CARTER
Respondent
Staff Attorney Julia Talbutt for petitioner-appellee New
Hanover County Department of Social Services.
Davis & Davis, by Regina Floyd-Davis for appellee Guardian ad
Litem.
Susan J. Hall for respondent-appellant.
HUNTER, Judge.
Rayford David Carter (“respondent”) appeals from the
termination of his parental rights as to the minor children David
Storm Carter and Daniel Seaton Carter. We affirm.
Respondent is the father of the twin boys who were born on 13
March 1996. Pursuant to a nonsecure custody order of 5 February
1997, the children were removed from their mother's home and have
continuously been in the custody of the New Hanover County
Department of Social Services (“petitioner”) since that time,
living in various foster care placements. In February of 1997, respondent was arrested on three counts
of misdemeanor child abuse involving two of the children's
stepbrothers. Respondent pled guilty to the misdemeanor charges
and was subsequently incarcerated in South Carolina.
On 3 April 1997, the trial court adjudicated the minor
children to be neglected. The mother's parental rights were
terminated on 3 June 1999. Petitioner filed a petition to
terminate respondent's parental rights on 23 May 2000. Respondent
was released from incarceration on 21 January 2001, but was
required to remain in South Carolina until 25 July 2001.
During the termination hearing on 17 September 2001,
respondent testified to having completed several courses while
imprisoned, but was unable to provide any documentation to support
that assertion. He admitted failing to seek any services for anger
management or parenting classes following his release from
incarceration. Respondent also conceded he made no attempt to seek
such services after his return to North Carolina:
I just didn't think it was necessary at that
time because I didn't know what to do. I'm
going to be honest with you, every time I've
talked to DSS I would ask them what would need
to be successfully done and they told me
wouldn't be no use in it because there was an
order against me that I wasn't going to see my
children anyway and that I'd be wasting my
time.
Respondent claimed “there was not a mark on my younguns” when
petitioner took his children on 5 February 1997, but “when they
went into y'all's care, all of a sudden they started becoming
marked.” He denied beating one of his stepchildren on 4 February1997 and accidentally striking one of his sons while doing so.
Despite asserting the mother did not provide appropriate care and
supervision for the children, respondent claims he took the blame
for the charges against them out of love for the children and their
mother, naively believing that this was in the best interests of
the family.
In its order terminating respondent's parental rights, the
trial court made the following findings of fact and conclusions of
law:
5. That the removal of the children from the
home of their mother and the Respondent
was precipitated by the discovery of
multiple injuries and bruises on the
child Timothy who was alleged to have
been abused by the Respondent. At the
time of removal from the home and of
placement of the children, there was in
place a protection plan between the
mother of the children and the Department
of Social Services. The protection plan
. . . required that Respondent Rayford
David Carter was not to be utilized as a
caretaker of the children because of
previous incidents in which the
Respondent had employed excessive
corporal punishment with Timothy and
other children of the mother. The
Department of Social Services provided
day care to the children so that the
Respondent would not be utilized as a
caretaker.
6. That the majority of the bruises on
Timothy which were discovered by school
personnel on 5 February 1997, were
inflicted by Respondent on 4 February
1997 as a “punishment” for Timothy's
receiving bad marks in school. That the
mother of the children observed 40 to 50
injurious marks and a swollen jaw on her
son Timothy when he was examined by a
physician. A belt or strap mark was
observed on Daniel as well. Respondenttold the mother of the children that the
infant Daniel had crawled between
Timothy's legs while the Respondent was
beating Timothy with a belt and Daniel
was struck by the belt. That on an
occasion prior to 4 February 1997,
Respondent had caused Timothy to stand on
an inverted potato chip can with arms
outstretched holding rocks. That if
Timothy lowered a hand, Respondent
increased the time the child had to
stand. The mother intervened and told
the child to get down.
7. That as a result of the abuse suffered by
Timothy, Respondent and the mother of the
children were arrested and charged with
misdemeanor child abuse. Charges against
the mother of the children were dropped
upon the Respondent's pleading guilty to
a misdemeanor charge of child abuse.
That conviction of misdemeanor child
abuse resulted in the revocation of
Respondent's parole from a South Carolina
criminal judgement. Respondent was
returned to the South Carolina Department
of Corrections and was continuously
incarcerated until on or about 29 January
2001. That upon his release from custody
in South Carolina on or about 29 January
2001, Respondent remained on parole until
on or about 21 July 2001. During this
period of parole, Respondent was at
liberty in South Carolina but contends he
was unable to leave the State of South
Carolina.
8. That at the time Respondent was arrested
in February 1997, Respondent was aware
that a conviction of misdemeanor child
abuse would result in the revocation of
his parole from South Carolina and his
incarceration by the State of South
Carolina for the duration of his
sentence. That notwithstanding that at
this time Respondent denies that he at
any time mistreated the child Timothy or
any other child of the mother Mercy Lynn
Gatlin, Respondent pleaded guilty to the
offense of misdemeanor child abuse of the
child Timothy. The court specifically
finds that his denial or minimization ofhis culpability is clear, strong and
convincing evidence that during the time
since the removal of the children, which
was necessitated by his intentional
abuse, he has made no progress to resolve
those issues which caused the removal,
and that there is no reasonable
likelihood that the safety of the
children can be reasonably assured.
. . . .
10. That shortly after Respondent's
incarceration in South Carolina,
Respondent indicated that he wished to
maintain contact with his sons.
Respondent sent birthday cards and
letters to his sons which were kept by
the social worker to be given to the boys
at a later date. Respondent's father met
with social workers on his son's behalf
and participated in agency review
meetings. The initial plan for the
children was reunification with their
mother. However the mother left New
Hanover County with a fiance and no
longer worked on the plan of
reunification. By May 1998, the agency
plan for the boys had changed from
reunification to adoption. In February
1999, Respondent notified the Department
of Social Services that he opposed the
plan of adoption. Respondent has
consistently opposed the plan of adoption
since at least as early as February 1999.
At one point Respondent's father
indicated that after meeting the foster
parents, he would urge his son, the
Respondent, to allow the children's
adoption. Despite his verbal statements
that he desired reunification, his
attitude and position concerning the
“punishment” and “discipline” he
inflicted, even in the face of the prior
findings and orders of the court,
reflects a consistent and unimproved
attitude which poses a danger to the
welfare of the children were they to be
returned to his custody. The court has
specifically examined the question as to
whether any construction of the original
facts and circumstances precipitatingremoval could be construed to be a mere
error of judgment on the Respondent's
part, and specifically finds that no
reasonable person could consider the
actions which caused removal to be
reasonable or appropriate. The court has
considered whether his incarceration,
precipitated by his conviction for these
acts of child abuse, posed such a
disability that further efforts should
have been made by the Department or
additional time allowed; and the court
specifically finds that not to be the
case. The sole responsibility for a
failure to make substantial progress
rests solely with the Respondent, and no
other person or agency.
11. That David Storm Carter and Daniel Seaton
Carter have been placed together in the
same pre-adoptive home since late 1998.
That both boys are well adjusted in this
home and recognize this home as permanent
and the foster parents as mother and
father. The bonding of the twins is such
that it is not in their interest to be
separated at this time. The lapse of
time, the age of the children, the
duration of a stable placement, and their
needs for a permanent placement all
militate against further delay to
experiment with an unrealistic plan for
reunification.
THIS COURT THEREFORE CONCLUDES That based on
the foregoing the Court determines as a matter
of law that the grounds for termination of the
Respondent's parental rights have been
established by clear, cogent and convincing
evidence. Those grounds are that the
Respondent has willfully left the children in
foster care for in excess of twelve-months
without showing to the satisfaction of the
Court that reasonable progress under the
circumstances has been made within the twelve
months in correcting the conditions which led
to the removal of the children and that the
Respondent has neglected the children by
endangering these two children while
administering unreasonable and excessive
punishment to the older child Timothy to such
a degree as to constitute abuse.
. . . .
THE COURT FURTHER FINDS AND CONCLUDES AS
FOLLOWS: After the determination that the
grounds for termination have been established
by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence, the
court proceeds to assess the best interests of
the children; and the court finds by clear,
cogent and convincing evidence that the best
interests of the children will be best served
by the termination of parental rights of the
Respondent to allow the children a safe and
permanent home by adoption. This determination
is based upon the foregoing findings, the
recommendation of the independent Guardian Ad
Litem appointed by the court, and especially
the need to establish a permanent placement
plan for these children who have remained in
foster care since February, 1997, while the
Respondent has made no substantial progress in
remedying those issues which necessitated
removal to protect the children from the
Respondent.
The trial court then terminated respondent's parental rights. From
the trial court's order, respondent appeals.
Respondent first argues the evidence was insufficient to
support the trial court's conclusion that he willfully left the
children in foster care in excess of twelve months, without making
reasonable progress within those twelve months to correct the
conditions which led to the children's removal. See N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(2) (2001).
“The standard for review in termination of parental rights
cases is whether the findings of fact are supported by clear,
cogent and convincing evidence and whether these findings, in turn,
support the conclusions of law.” In re Clark, 72 N.C. App. 118,
124, 323 S.E.2d 754, 758 (1984). While several grounds for
termination of parental rights are provided by N.C. Gen. Stat. §7B-1111, they are set forth in the alternative such that a finding
of one or more of the grounds is sufficient to support an order of
termination. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1110 (2001); In re Williamson,
91 N.C. App. 668, 678, 373 S.E.2d 317, 322-23 (1988). If a trial
court concludes that any one of the alternative statutory grounds
for termination exists, and its conclusion is supported by the
findings of fact, this Court need not address whether termination
was proper under the remaining statutory grounds. See Williamson,
91 N.C. App. at 679, 373 S.E.2d at 323.
Respondent has failed to assign error to any of the trial
court's findings of fact, and those findings are therefore presumed
to be correct and supported by the evidence. In re Moore, 306 N.C.
394, 404, 293 S.E.2d 127, 133 (1982). In our discretion, we have
examined the record on appeal and found competent evidence in the
form of the orders filed in the case as well as the testimonies of
respondent and three employees of petitioner, all of which support
the trial court's findings of fact. We further hold that those
findings in turn support the trial court's conclusion to terminate
respondent's parental rights. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(2).
Having determined that the trial court's order is supported by one
of the grounds set forth in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a), we need
not reach respondent's contention as to the trial court's finding
of neglect as a second ground for termination.
Respondent failed to set out his remaining assignment of error
in his brief. Because he has neither cited any authority nor
stated any reason or argument in support of that assignment oferror, it is deemed abandoned. N.C.R. App. P. 28(b)(6). The trial
court's order terminating respondent's parental rights as to the
minor children is affirmed.
Affirmed.
Judges BRYANT and ELMORE concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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