Appeal by defendants from order entered 12 April 2002 by Judge
Robert F. Floyd, Jr., in Robeson County Superior Court. Heard in
the Court of Appeals 17 February 2003.
J. Gates Harris for plaintiff-appellee.
Etheridge, Moser, Garner, Bruner and Wansker, P.A., by Terry
R. Garner, for defendant-appellants.
MARTIN, Judge.
Plaintiff brought this action alleging that defendant had
converted rental income to which plaintiff was entitled. In her
complaint, plaintiff alleged that on 5 November 1998 she and her
late husband, Leon Douglas Bridgers, had executed a deed conveying
a life estate in certain farm land to themselves, with a vested
remainder in fee simple to defendants, who are Mr. Bridgers'
children from a previous marriage. Plaintiff alleged that her
husband had died on 3 October 2001, and that she had a life estate
in the property. She alleged that on or about 15 October 2001,
defendants made demand upon, and received from, the tenant farmrental of $9,700.00. Plaintiff sought compensatory and punitive
damages.
Defendants filed an answer, asserting in a counterclaim that
plaintiff and Leon Bridgers had released their life estates to
defendants by the execution and delivery of an instrument dated 27
October 2000. A copy of that instrument, recorded on the date of
its execution, was attached to the answer. In her reply, plaintiff
admitted execution of the 27 October 2000 instrument, but asserted
that it was ineffective to release her life estate in the subject
property.
All parties moved for summary judgment. The superior court
concluded, from the provisions of the instrument itself and without
resort to the circumstances attending its execution, that it was
the intent of the plaintiff and Leon, in executing the 27 October
2000 instrument, to convey to defendants only their interest in
standing timber on the property and not to release their life
estates. The court entered judgment declaring that plaintiff
retains a life estate in the land described in the deed and
ordering that defendants pay the farm rentals to her. Defendants
appeal.
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Resolution of the present case requires interpretation of the
instrument entitled “Nonwarranty/Timber Deed” executed by plaintiff
and her late husband on 27 October 2000. G.S. § 39-1.1 states
that:
[i]n construing a conveyance executed after
January 1, 1968, in which there areinconsistent clauses, the courts shall
determine the effect of the instrument on the
basis of the intent of the parties as it
appears from all of the provisions of the
instrument.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 39-1.1(a) (2002). The interpretation of the
terms of a deed is a question of law for the court.
Mason-Reel v.
Simpson, 100 N.C. App. 651, 397 S.E.2d 755 (1990). Only if the
intent of the parties cannot be determined from the language of the
deed should the court consider the circumstances surrounding its
execution.
Id.
The pertinent language of the 27 October 2000 instrument
granted to defendants:
[plaintiff and Mr. Bridgers'] share of all
timber of any size being situated on the
tracts or parcels of land lying and being in
Rowland Township, Robeson County, North
Carolina, and being described as tax parcels
1908 02 011, 1911 01 011, and 3701 01 007.
The purpose of this deed is to release the
life estate of the grantors to the grantees in
the above described parcels of property as
established in the deed recorded in Book 1029,
page 272 of the Robeson County Registry.
The deed to which the above clause refers is the 5 November 1998
deed by which plaintiff and Mr. Bridgers conveyed to themselves a
life estate in certain parcels of farm property, with a vested
remainder in fee simple to defendants.
Although defendants agree with the superior court's
determination that it could ascertain the intent of the grantors
from the deed's provisions without resort to a consideration of the
circumstances surrounding its execution, they assert the court's
conclusion as to such intent was incorrect. Defendants acknowledgethat the deed is “internally inconsistent” because, in the first
paragraph at issue, it grants rights to the timber on the disputed
property, but provides, in the next paragraph, for a release of the
grantors' life estates in the property on which the timber stands.
Nevertheless, they contend, the clear and unambiguous language of
the deed shows the grantors' intent to release their life estates
in the property. Citing
Strickland v. Jackson, 259 N.C. 81, 130
S.E.2d 22 (1963), they assert that the superior court was required
to interpret the deed in accordance with such clearly expressed
intent.
Considering all the provisions of the deed, we must agree with
the interpretation given them by the superior court. The
instrument was entitled “Nonwarranty/Timber Deed.” The language is
clear and unambiguous that plaintiff and her husband, the grantors,
intended to release their life estates only with respect to the
timber on the disputed farm land, not to the land itself. Indeed,
had the grantors intended to release their life estates in the farm
land altogether, there would have been no reason for the deed to
mention or convey the timber standing on that land separately.
Affirmed.
Chief Judge EAGLES and Judge GEER concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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