STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v
.
Wake County
No. 99 CRS 96934
SHAROID TE-JUAN WRIGHT
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney
General Ralf F. Haskell, for the State.
Webb & Webb, by John Webb, for defendant-appellant.
EAGLES, Chief Judge.
Defendant Sharoid Te-Juan Wright appeals from judgment entered
in Wake County Superior Court upon a jury verdict convicting him of
the first-degree murder of Roshaun Floyd.
The State's evidence tended to establish the following:
Defendant and Roshaun “Shaun” Floyd (“Floyd”) were friends who
lived near one another and associated together socially. On 5
November 1999, Floyd was “hanging out” with defendant and another
male known only to Floyd as “Thirst Bucket.”
At approximately 11:10 p.m., two black males in their twenties
and of average height and build, approached a pedestrian from
behind on the 200 block of North Columbia Street in Chapel Hill,
North Carolina. The two males knocked the pedestrian down, robbedhim and then fled in a 1992, two door Acura Integra, bearing North
Carolina registration number “MPS 8337.” The car, which was waiting
nearby with a third individual in the driver's seat, belonged to
Floyd.
At approximately 11:50 p.m., the men arrived at Domino's Pizza
in Cole Park Plaza just across the Chatham County line near Chapel
Hill. Defendant and Floyd got out of the car, walked up to the
store and asked the person inside if they could use the store's
restroom. Although the store was closed, the owner, Wade
Cartwright, was inside the store totaling the day's receipts and
preparing the bank deposit. When Cartwright told defendant and
Floyd that the store did not have a public restroom, defendant
asked Cartwright for directions to I-40. After Cartwright went to
the door, propped it open slightly and began giving defendant and
Floyd directions to I-40, defendant “grabbed the door and pulled
it” open. Floyd produced a knife and swung it at Cartwright.
Cartwright stepped backwards to avoid being cut and then pushed the
door open and ran between defendant and Floyd across the parking
lot. Defendant pursued Cartwright for a short distance, but then
returned to the store where he rejoined Floyd. Floyd had gone into
the store and “grabbed the till.” The third individual then pulled
Floyd's car up to the front of the store where defendant and Floyd
got inside and fled.
Around midnight on 6 November 1999, police contacted Floyd's
parents by phone looking for Floyd. The officers told Floyd's
parents that Floyd's car matched the description of a car that wasused in two separate robberies that occurred earlier that night.
Floyd returned home at approximately 8:00 a.m. on 6 November 1999.
Floyd's mother promptly told him that the police were looking for
him in connection with the two robberies. Floyd denied any
involvement and left shortly thereafter. Later that evening,
defendant was talking to his girlfriend, Miranda Fields (“Fields”),
at his apartment. During this conversation, defendant told Fields
that he had robbed a Domino's Pizza the night before. Just after
defendant revealed this information, Floyd's mother called
defendant's apartment looking for Floyd. Floyd's mother told
defendant that “the police were looking for [Floyd] because his car
had been involved in a robbery.” Defendant told Floyd's mother
that he had not seen Floyd since Floyd dropped him off the night
before. Shortly thereafter, Floyd called defendant. Defendant told
Floyd to meet him at defendant's apartment.
Defendant and Fields then went to Fields' car, moved it to the
far side of the parking lot and waited to see “if the police were
coming with [Floyd].” Defendant and Fields were soon joined by
defendant's brother, Shandon Wright. Defendant told Shandon about
the robberies and then said that Floyd was on his way to
defendant's apartment. Defendant said that he “was going to --
wanted to kill [Floyd] because he didn't want [Floyd] to tell the
police because [defendant] didn't want to go back to jail.”
Defendant further stated that “he was going to put [Floyd's] body
somewhere where nobody would ever find him.” Defendant laid an
unopened, folding knife on Fields' leg while they waited for Floyd.Floyd drove up to defendant's apartment approximately five to ten
minutes later. Defendant, seeing that Floyd was alone, picked up
the knife and walked over to meet Floyd. Defendant and Floyd went
upstairs to defendant's apartment, but returned approximately ten
minutes later. Defendant walked over to Fields' car, told her that
he would be back but instructed her to leave her cell phone on. At
approximately 8:00 p.m., Floyd drove away with defendant. Floyd was
never seen alive again.
Sometime between 9:00 p.m. and 10:00 p.m., defendant called
Fields on her cell phone and told her: “I did it, I did it, oh my
God, I can't believe I did it.” Defendant, who was now crying, told
Fields that he had blood on his hands and that he needed Fields to
come get him. Fields reluctantly agreed and defendant instructed
Fields to meet him at the Mayflower restaurant on Capital Boulevard
in Raleigh, North Carolina.
Fields' cousin, Veronica Sanders, drove with Fields to the
Mayflower. They saw Floyd's car parked in the parking lot, but
neither Floyd nor defendant appeared to be in the car. As Fields
and Sanders drove by, Sanders noticed smeared blood on the
passenger's side window. Defendant, who had gotten out of the car
and was standing beside the restaurant, approached Fields' car and
told Fields to follow him. Defendant then got into Floyd's car and
drove out of the parking lot. Sanders and Fields followed defendant
from the Mayflower to I-440 and then onto westbound I-40. Once on
I-40, Sanders and Fields became frightened and contacted police via
Fields' cell phone. After talking to 911 dispatchers, Fields andSanders returned to Raleigh. Defendant continued driving west on I-
40.
On 8 November 1999, Floyd's car was found in a parking lot at
the Raleigh-Durham International Airport. There were smeared blood
stains on the car's exterior beginning near the rear of the
driver's door and continuing all the way around the rear of the car
to the passenger's side door. There were also blood stains on the
car's interior, including on the head liner above the driver's
seat, the gear shift handle, the steering wheel, the passenger's
side door jamb and the interior trim, seat cushion and floorboard
of the rear passenger's side of the car. On 2 December 1999,
Floyd's body was discovered in a shallow grave, near a rest area,
located just off I-40 in Johnston County.
Dr. Robert L. Thompson, the forensic pathologist at the office
of the medical examiner in Chapel Hill, North Carolina, who
performed an autopsy on Floyd's body, testified as an expert in the
field of forensic pathology. During the autopsy Dr. Thompson noted
that the victim sustained 9 stab wounds to his chest, head, neck
and back, in addition to 6 superficial cuts to the head. Although
Dr. Thompson determined that the cause of death was multiple stab
wounds, he opined that the fatal wound was a single stab wound to
the chest that penetrated Floyd's heart. Dr. Thompson further
opined that the victim would have been rendered unconscious within
approximately 30 seconds after receiving this wound. Dr. Thompson
did not note the presence of any defensive wounds on the victim's
body. Special Agent Peter D. Deaver of the North Carolina State
Bureau of Investigation examined the blood stains found in and on
Floyd's car and testified as an expert in the field of blood
spatter interpretation. As a result of his examination, Agent
Deaver noted the following: (1) the presence of blood spatter on
the head liner above the driver's seat; (2) contact blood stains
that began just behind the driver's side door and continued in the
same direction all the way around the rear of the car to the
passenger's door; and (3) that blood had soaked all the way through
the rear seat cushion and onto the floorboard. Agent Deaver opined
that “at least two blows” were inflicted while the victim was
seated in the driver's seat. Agent Deaver further opined that the
victim, bleeding heavily, had been taken from the driver's seat,
around the rear of the car and placed in the rear passenger-side
seat, where he remained for a long period of time.
Special Agent Brenda Bissette of the North Carolina State
Bureau of Investigation also examined the blood evidence recovered
from Floyd's car and testified as an expert in the field of
forensic DNA analysis. According to Agent Bissette, the DNA
profile obtained from the blood stains found on the car's exterior
matched only the DNA profile obtained from samples of Floyd's
blood. Similarly, the DNA profiles of the blood stains found on the
car's door jamb, interior trim and rear seat cushion only matched
Floyd's blood. However, the blood stains found on the car's
steering wheel and gear shift handle originated from two separatesources, which matched samples of blood taken from both Shaun Floyd
and defendant.
Defendant testified in his own defense that after leaving his
apartment on 6 November 1999, he and Floyd drove to Biltmore Hills
Park in Raleigh. On the way to the park, defendant and Floyd
purchased four 40 ounce bottles of King Cobra malt liquor, a
quarter ounce of marijuana and four cigars. Once at the park,
defendant and Floyd got out of Floyd's car, walked up a hill to a
group of picnic tables and began drinking the malt liquor and
smoking the marijuana. While there defendant and Floyd began trying
to come up with a story to tell police about the robberies. After
defendant consumed 80 ounces of malt liquor and smoked almost all
of the marijuana, he and Floyd began to argue about who should
accept the blame. This argument soon erupted into a physical
altercation. Defendant testified that when Floyd started winning
the fight, defendant removed the knife from his pocket and stabbed
Floyd. When Floyd continued fighting, defendant testified he “just
lost it” and started stabbing Floyd repeatedly. When Floyd stopped
moving, defendant picked Floyd up, put him in the back seat of the
car and began driving toward Wake Medical Center. However,
defendant “got scared at the last minute” and instead of continuing
on to Wake Medical Center, defendant drove to the rest area on I-40
and threw Floyd's body down an embankment. The next day, defendant
returned to the rest area with his brother, Shandon Wright, and
buried Floyd's body in a shallow grave. Defendant was convicted offirst-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without
parole. Defendant appeals.
Defendant first contends that the trial court improperly
denied his motion to dismiss the first-degree murder charge at the
close of the evidence. Defendant argues that because (1) the
killing was in self-defense, and (2) he was too intoxicated to
formulate the requisite specific intent to kill, the evidence was
insufficient to support a conviction of first-degree murder. We
disagree.
“In ruling on a motion to dismiss a charge of first-degree
murder, the trial court must consider the evidence in the light
most favorable to the State, giving the State the benefit of every
reasonable inference to be drawn from that evidence.” State v.
Ross, 338 N.C. 280, 287, 449 S.E.2d 556, 562 (1994). “[T]here must
be substantial evidence tending to prove each element of the
offense charged and that defendant committed the crime.” Id.
“Substantial evidence is defined as [that amount of] relevant
evidence which a reasonable mind could accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.” State v. Lee, 348 N.C. 474, 488, 501 S.E.2d
334, 343 (1998). Contradictions and discrepancies in the evidence
do not warrant dismissal; rather, they are for the jury to resolve.
Id. “If there is substantial evidence -- whether direct,
circumstantial, or both -- to support a finding that the offense
charged has been committed and that the defendant committed it, the
case is for the jury and the motion to dismiss should be denied.”
State v. Locklear, 322 N.C. 349, 358, 368 S.E.2d 377, 383 (1988). “First-degree murder is the unlawful killing of a human being
with malice and with premeditation and deliberation.” State v.
Perdue, 320 N.C. 51, 58, 357 S.E.2d 345, 350 (1987). Defendant does
not contest the sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding of
malice; instead, defendant concedes that he is guilty of second-
degree murder. Therefore, the determinative question here is
whether the State presented substantial evidence of premeditation
and deliberation. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-17 (2002). After
careful review of the record and trial transcript, we conclude the
State presented ample evidence of premeditation and deliberation.
“Premeditation means that defendant formed the specific intent
to kill the victim for some period of time, however short, before
the actual killing. Deliberation is an intention to kill, executed
by defendant in a cool state of blood, in furtherance of a fixed
design to accomplish some unlawful purpose.” Perdue, 320 N.C. at
58, 357 S.E.2d at 349 (citation omitted). “The elements of
premeditation and deliberation are not ordinarily susceptible to
direct proof”; rather, they are generally inferred from the
circumstances that surround the killing. State v. Fountain, 282
N.C. 58, 70, 191 S.E.2d 674, 683 (1972). Relevant circumstances
include:
(1) want of provocation on the part of the deceased; (2)
the conduct and statements of defendant before and after
the killing; (3) the dealing of lethal blows after the
deceased has been felled and rendered helpless; (4)
evidence that the killing was done in a brutal manner;
and (5) the nature and number of the victim's wounds.
State v. Hamilton, 150 N.C. App. 558, 563, 563 S.E.2d 292, 295
(2002).
Here, the State's evidence tended to show that defendant
planned to kill Floyd in order to avoid detection or arrest for the
robberies defendant committed along with Floyd and “Thirst-Bucket.”
Defendant made express statements to this effect to both his
girlfriend and brother, just hours before the actual killing.
Moreover, defendant's girlfriend, Miranda Fields testified that
defendant was “calm” at the time he said he was going to kill
Floyd. The blood evidence indicated that Floyd was stabbed multiple
times while sitting in the driver's seat of his own car. The
absence of defensive wounds on Floyd's body reasonably supports an
inference that defendant was not provoked to attack by Floyd.
Finally, Floyd was stabbed and/or cut a total of fifteen times.
Several of these wounds were located on both the left and right
sides of Floyd's back, as well as the left side of Floyd's head.
Recalling that the State's evidence tended to establish that Floyd
was sitting in the driver's seat when he was first attacked; this
evidence, together with the absence of defensive wounds and Dr.
Thompson's testimony that Floyd would have been rendered
unconscious within seconds of being stabbed in the chest,
reasonably supports an inference that at least some of the wounds
were inflicted after Floyd was rendered helpless. Although
defendant presented evidence which tended to wholly contradict the
State's theory and evidence, this other evidence did not warrant a
dismissal. On the contrary, these discrepancies were for the juryto resolve. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court properly
denied defendant's motion to dismiss.
Defendant next contends that the indictment upon which he was
tried and convicted was insufficient to support a conviction of
first-degree murder because it failed to specifically allege the
elements of premeditation and deliberation. See Jones v. United
States, 526 U.S. 227, 143 L. Ed. 2d 311 (1999). We disagree.
Our courts have consistently held that a short-form murder
indictment that complies with the requirements of G.S. § 15-144
will support a conviction of first-degree murder, under any theory
set forth in G.S. § 14-17, without the need for specific
allegations concerning premeditation and deliberation. State v.
Braxton, 352 N.C. 158, 174, 531 S.E.2d 428, 437 (2000), cert.
denied, 531 U.S. 1130, 148 L. Ed. 2d 797 (2001). Because the
indictment here complied in all respects with G.S. § 15-144, we
conclude this assignment of error is without merit.
Defendant next contends that the trial court erred by
permitting the State to exclude all potential jurors from service
who expressed the view that they could not, under any
circumstances, vote in favor of the death penalty. Defendant argues
that this practice deprived him of a jury made up of a fair and
representative cross-section of the community and resulted in the
impaneling of a “guilt prone” jury. We disagree.
The North Carolina Supreme Court has consistently held that
“'death-qualifying' a jury is constitutional under both the federal
and state Constitutions.” State v. Williams, 355 N.C. 501, 552, 565S.E.2d 609, 639 (2002)(citations omitted), cert. denied, ___ U.S.
___, 154 L. Ed. 2d 808 (2003). Furthermore, the Court has expressly
rejected defendant's arguments that “'death qualification' denies
a defendant his right to a jury made up of a cross-section of the
community, and . . . results in a conviction-prone jury.” State v.
Holden, 321 N.C. 125, 133, 362 S.E.2d 513, 520 (1987)(citing
Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 90 L. Ed. 2d 137 (1986)), cert.
denied, 486 U.S. 1061, 100 L. Ed. 2d 935 (1988). Accordingly, this
assignment of error is rejected.
Defendant's final contention is that the trial court erred by
failing to conduct an inquiry into the substance of a conversation
that allegedly took place between one or more jurors outside of
deliberations. We disagree.
After the jury had retired to deliberate, a member of the
district attorney's staff overheard two or three jurors discussing
the case during a luncheon recess. The staff member immediately
informed the prosecutors, who in turn informed defense counsel and
the trial judge. The prosecutor then requested that the trial judge
re-instruct the jury not to discuss the case outside of
deliberations. Following the prosecutor's request, the trial judge
asked counsel for “[a]ny other comment about that.” Upon receiving
no further comments, the trial judge instructed the jury not to
discuss the case outside of the jury room.
A defendant waives appellate review of the trial court's
failure to conduct an inquiry into the substance of alleged
conversations between jurors by neither objecting to the trialcourt's action in reinstructing the jury nor requesting further
inquiry into the substance of the alleged conversations between
jurors. State v. Jaynes, 342 N.C. 249, 262-63, 464 S.E.2d 448, 457
(1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1024, 135 L. Ed. 2d 1080 (1996).
Here, even after explicitly being given an opportunity to do so,
defendant neither objected to the trial court's action nor
requested any further inquiry into the substance of the alleged
conversation. Accordingly, defendant has waived appellate review of
this issue.
We hold that defendant received a fair trial, free from
prejudicial error.
No error.
Judges BRYANT and LEVINSON concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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