An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Proced ure.

NO. COA02-792


Filed: 18 March 2003


    v.                            Alamance County
                                Nos. 01 CRS 08894-95

    Appeal by defendant from judgment dated 13 February 2002 by Judge W. Osmond Smith, III in Alamance County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 4 March 2003.

    Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney General Isaac T. Avery, III and Assistant Attorney General Patricia A. Duffy, for the State.

    Neill A. Jennings, Jr. for defendant appellant.

    BRYANT, Judge.

    Shane Michael Newsome (defendant) appeals from judgment dated 13 February 2002 entered consistent with jury verdicts finding him guilty of Driving While Impaired (DWI), driving after consuming alcohol while under 21 years of age, transportation of an open container of an alcoholic beverage, and defendant's plea of responsible to a charge of failing to wear a seatbelt.   (See footnote 1) 
    As a consequence of being charged with driving while impaired, defendant's North Carolina driver's license was revoked on 29 April2001 for thirty days pursuant to section 20-16.5 of the North Carolina General Statutes.
    This matter was initially tried in district court on 29 November 2001, where defendant was found guilty on all charges. Defendant appealed for trial de novo to the superior court. Prior to trial in superior court, defendant moved to dismiss the charges against him, alleging the automatic thirty-day suspension followed by a trial for DWI and driving after consuming alcohol while under the age of 21 violated the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. The superior court denied defendant's motion to dismiss and proceeded to trial.


    The issue is whether the immediate thirty-day driver's license revocation for persons charged with implied consent offenses under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-16.5 bars subsequent prosecution for DWI and other alcohol related offenses.
    Specifically, defendant contends that such prosecution violates prohibitions against double jeopardy.    As conceded by defendant, however, this issue has been previously addressed by this Court in State v. Reid, 148 N.C. App. 548, 559 S.E.2d 561 (2002) and State v. Evans, 145 N.C. App. 324, 550 S.E.2d 853 (2001) and decided contrary to his position. See also State v. Oliver, 343 N.C. 202, 470 S.E.2d 16 (1996) (ten-day driver's license revocation for persons charged with implied consent offenses pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-16.5 is a civil penalty, and therefore, subsequent prosecution for DWI does not result in adouble jeopardy violation); N.C.G.S. § 20-16.5 (2001). We decline defendant's invitation to revisit this issue. See In re Appeal from Civil Penalty, 324 N.C. 373, 384, 379 S.E.2d 30, 37 (1989) (one panel of this Court may not overrule the decision of another panel of this Court). As held by our Supreme Court in Oliver and this Court in Evans and Reid, prosecution of a defendant for DWI or other alcohol-related offenses following revocation of a defendant's license for thirty days under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-16.5 for an implied consent offense does not implicate prohibitions on double jeopardy. Thus, this argument is overruled.
    No error.
    Judges HUNTER and ELMORE concur.
    Report per Rule 30(e).

Footnote: 1
    Defendant only advances his appeal of the driving while impaired and driving after consuming alcohol while under 21 years of age.

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